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In common with all historical writings, this attempt to examine 
the application of irenic internationalism and to identify its quali-
ties is shaped by the availability of resources. In this respect, 
the students of Oklahoma State University are well served because the 
holdings of the Edmon Low Library include the essential volumes of 
primary and secondary materials. Especially useful are the Papers Re-
lating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual 
Message of the President to Congress (cited as Foreign Relations), the 
Congressional Record, the Senate and House Documents, and the micro-
films of The New York Times. Supplementing the published works are the 
papers of George Gray which have been collected in two depositories. 
Special thanks must be extended to Gladys Coghlan and Peyton Lewis of 
the Historical Society of Delaware, Wilmington, and to Stuart Dick of 
the University Library of the University of Delaware, Newark, fortheir 
kind assistance in making available research facilities and for helping 
to locate relevant material. 
Appreciation must also be expressed to family and friends, to 
teaching colleagues, and to students all of whom have endured slights 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
An ill and unfit choice of words leads men away into unnumer-
able and inane controversies and fancies. 
Francis Bacon 
Popular unfamiliarity with the name of George Gray is in part ex-
plained by the concept of diplomacy which he practiced during the 
period of America•s emergence as a great power with a colonial empire. 
Irenic diplomacy, as distinct from the diplomacy of imperialism and 
the diplomacy of isolationism was not likely to attract the attentjon 
of later generations of historians, and those who applied its precepts 
were not likely to acquire a reputation which would survive their 
career. The natural tendency of historians to dwell on presidents 
and secretaries of state, on premiers and ambassadors, and an associ-
ated tendency to polarize the debate over imperialism have the effect 
of excluding the less dramatic names from the pages of the textbooks. 
Accordingly, the great debate of 1898 is reduced to a contest be-
tween the expansionists and the anti-expansionists, between Theodore 
Roosevelt and William Jennings Bryan, between Senator Lodge and Sen-
ator Hoar. Easily omitted from such an examination are other argu-
ments which supported neither imperialism nor isolationism. 
Irenic internationalism was positioned between the two extremes, 
and, while it shared qualities with them, it was also distinct from 
them. Although it would not command the same degree of attention from 
l 
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later scholars, it nevertheless functioned as a viable alternative to 
imperialism and isolationism. A foreign policy based on international 
cooperation rather than on the competition for colonies was championed 
by a small number of articulate spokesmen, both within and without the 
government. Of these, George Gray, as United States Senator, federal 
judge, and private citizen, was actively involved in American diplo-
matic activities and consciously sought to influence the formulation 
of foreign policy. For over a decade he was the leading proponent of 
an internationalist foreign policy which would emphasize peaceful co-
operation rather than imperialistic competition. The nature of this 
irenic internationalism, the extent to which it was applied by the 
United States Government, and its distinctions from other policies can 
therefore be revealed by an examination of the diplomatic career of 
George Gray, a man highly regarded in his own time but little known to 
later generations. 
Unlike his more famous contemporaries, George Gray sought for his 
nation an active role in international affairs which avoided the ex-
cesses of both imperialism and isolationism. Although opposed to the 
transformation of America into an imperial republic, he could not ac-
cept the opposite extreme of denying American participation in the 
world cormnunity. Like the imperialists, he favored an America more 
active in international society; but unlike them, he opposed the im-
position of American soverei.gnty upon unwilling and distant subjects. 
Like the isolationists he opposed the use of America's new military 
and industrial power to construct an empire on the European model; un-
like the isolationists, he supported the use of American moral and 
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economic influence in world affairs. As distinct from both imperial-
ism and isolationism, George Gray•s irenic internationalism was predi-
cated on the end and not on the means to attain that end. 
As the spokesman for irenic internationalism in the United States, 
George Gray was part of the great peace movement which was increasing 
its activity and its influence, especially in Europe and North America 
during the last years of the nineteenth century and the early part of 
the twentieth century. This associated him with kindred spirits in 
other lands who, like himself, saw the benefits to accrue to mankind 
from a policy of international cooperation rather than international 
competition. The trend was not limited to the peace movement but em-
braced reformers of every conceivable description. Geographical bar-
riers and political frontiers were ignored as visionaries and realists 
joined to bring to their respective populations better health, greater 
security, improved nutrition, and more comfort. Pacifists, humani tar-
ians, businessmen, labor leaders, and scientists shared in common the 
cosmopo 1 it an spirit of the age. The very forces which are most often 
pictured as divisive--industrialism and the resultant competition for 
raw materials and for markets--also served to foster cooperation and 
coordination to a degree never before experienced. 
Although not confined to Europe, it was there that the new spirit 
was most evident. The huge population in a small area made it incum-
bent upon the various sovereignties to set aside their tradition of 
political and military competition in favor of cooperation on matters 
of common interest. Weights and measures were standardized, river and 
rail traffic were regulated, postal and telegraph systems were coordi~ 
nated, patents and trademarks were reciprocally recognized. The 
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tradition was already strong within the scientific community, which by 
1914 had created more than 100 international organizations to encourage 
the exchange of ideas and information. The labor movement also tended 
to blur national distinctions even before it culminated in the con-
gresses of the Second International, and by 1910, 60 percent of 
Europe's unionized workers, representing 28 different trades, were 
linked through international federation. An associated development 
was the rapid organization of consumer and producer cooperatives, so 
that in 1913~over 4,000 of these were represented at an international 
conference. Parallel developments were also occurring within manage-
ment and ownership. In 1905 the International Association of Chambers 
of Commerce was founded, followed in 1908 by the International Federa-
tion of Permanent Committees for Expositions. The desire for reform 
naturally attracted the attention of churches which recognized the 
value of international cooperation. The 1910 World Missionary Confer-
ence in Edinburgh launched the ecumenical drive which was to be such 
an important aspect of religious development in the twentieth century. 
Temperance, Zionism, and women's rights, especially suffrage, were 
causes which transcended national frontiers. The Olympic Games were 
reconstituted during this period, an indication of the thoroughness 
with which the spirit of internationalism permeated every form of 
communal activity. The formation of 317 international organizations, 
13 governmental and 304 private between 1900 and 1914, make this pe-
riod the most productive in the twentieth century. 1 
The peace movement was, by its very nature, international in or-
ientation and a natural magnet for those, such as George Gray, who 
advocated international cooperation through conferences, congresses, 
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arbitration, international law, etc. It was also elitist; its adher-
ents tended to be educated and wealthy, with sources of information and 
with access to positions of power. Through extensive correspondence, 
through journal articles and books, and through public addresses they 
exercised an influence vastly disproportionate to their numbers. Be-
cause the movement utterly collapsed in 1914, and because it had never 
sought to enlist huge numbers in its cause, there has been a natural 
tendency to dismiss it, even to ignore it. The search for the causes 
of the Great War has focused attention upon the study of militarism, 
of nationalism, and of the alliance systems to the near exclusion of 
parallel developments within the international peace movement. 
Recently, however, the~e has been something of a countermovement, 
applying a variety of Newtonian logic: the forces of war inspired an 
opposite and equal reaction--at least nearly equal. Thus, it is noted 
that the same governments which were most conspiculously caught up in 
the arms race, also provided the strongest support for the peace move-
ment. Specifically, from 1890 to 1914 the per capita costs of military 
and naval establishments in the British Empire and in Russia increased 
two-fold, in the United States and in Germany three-fold; but all four 
powers were represented in the two Hague Peace Conferences. George 
Gray was a member of the generation which established universal mili-
tary service in almost every major nation; but it was also the same 
generation which established the International Law Association, the 
Interparliamentary Union, and the Institute of International Law. In-
deed, he was one of the founders of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, serving for many years as a vice president and a member of 
the executive committee, and maintaining his membership and interest 
until his death. 
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Still other examples of the parallel development of militarism 
and international peace can be cited. At the same time that competing 
alliances were being forged, Alfred Nobel was establishing the fund 
for his Peace Prize, and Andrew Carnegie was financing constructionof 
the Peace Palace. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was 
established, and for years it listed as a vice-president and a trustee 
the name of George Gray. 
At the time of his death, George Gray was a board member of two 
other organizations which fostered the cause of humanitarianism: the 
American National Red Cross and the Smithsonian Institution. As one 
of the original incorporators of the former, he had also served as 
the President of the Delaware Chapter. For 35 years he had served 
the latter as a member of the Board of Regents, and during his last 
10 years he was the chairman of its executive committee. 
In 1904 the militaristic impulses were evident in Europe, where 
France and Great Britain were forming their Entente Cordiale, as well 
as in Asia, where Russia and Japan were engaged in hostilities. In 
that same year, a parallel was to be found in the form of a conference 
at Lake Mohank, New York, which promoted the cause of international 
arbitratio. These conferences were held annually and attracted the 
active participation of the leading advocates of arbitration and of 
other irenic concepts, including Dr. Edward Everett Hale, John W. 
Foster, Oscar Straus, Nicholas Murray Butler, and James Brown Scott. 
As the presiding officer in 1904 and 1905, George Gray lauded the 
support given to arbitration by Great Britain, and he strongly en-
dorsed American ratification of recently proposed general treaties 
of arbitration. 
In sum, the forces which generated the catastrophe of 1914 were 
not allowed to develop unchallenged. In every major nation there was 
a party of dedicated workers who labored in the cause of peace. Be-
cause it was a labor in vain, later generations have tended too much 
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to ignore it altogether; but in the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury there was much to suggest its ultimate success. More than one 
contemporary observer, intelligent and well-informed, but with a re-
stricted vision that considered only the irenic evidence would subscribe 
to 11 the great illusion 11 and would conclude that" ..• the day is 
reasonably near when wars between civilized nations will be exceedingly 
rare. n 2 
The dawning of the millenium was a beautiful vision, and uni-
versal peace was a worthy goal, but George Gray could not concur that 
their time had arrived. Although much had "been already accomplished 
in making war more difficult and arbitration more easy," he was "not 
so enthusiastic as to believe" that the possibility of war had been 
eliminated. 3 His concept of irenic internationalism identified Ameri-
ca•s new activitist role, the increased use of arbitration, and the 
general spirit of international cooperation merely as factors which 
encouraged peace but did not guarantee it. 
George Gray had earlier supported irenic internationalism as a 
United States Senator, but his first opportunity to apply them as an 
active participant in diplomatic negotiations occurred in 1898. This 
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was especially significant, because that year has long been recognized 
as a turning point in American foreign policy--the year in which the 
United States engaged a European nation in a war with imperialistic 
overtones and acquired a true colonial empire. It was also the year 
of a less familiar confrontation with Great Britain in a Canadian 
boundary dispute. The new policy of international cooperation was 
continued in the following years as the United States participated in 
the two Hague Conferences, in the Algeciras Conference, and in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the Pacific, the United States 
consolidated its hold on the Philippines, annexed Hawaii, secured 
title to American Samoa, occupied Guam and Wake Islands, and issued 
the Open Door Notes. 
This sudden increase of international participation, culminating 
in American involvement in the First World War and the Versailles 
Peace Conference, has long been a source of confusion--even of dis-
tortion. For example, authors of survey textbooks of United States 
history have traditionally found it difficult to handle the explana-
tion of America's sudden emergence as a great power and as a parti-
cipant in the race for colonies. The common approach is to follow 
the study of the Civil War and Reconstruction with a series of chap-
ters dealing with the settlement of the interior of the continent, 
the expansion of capitalist enterprises, the growth of the metropoli-
tan areas, and the tide of immigration. 4 The result in many instances 
is to leave the casual student of history with the feeling that Amer-
ica discovered the outside world only in 1898. 
This, of course, is a distortion of the truth. The fault is not 
necessarily that of the textbook author, since it is the nature of 
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such works to treat their subject topically instead of strictly chron-
ologically. Any study of history at any level of sophistication must 
coordinate chronology with topical explanations. This is especially 
true of the study of American diplomacy in the last years of the 
nineteenth century. There is a strong tendency to view the dramatic 
events, especially of the war with Spain, separate from the broader 
currents prevailing within the nation at that time. A nation•s for-
eign affairs are never conducted in a vacuum, immune from the contem-
porary issues of its domestic politics. Foreign and domestic events 
interact, especially in a democratic government. 5 
During the 1890s, America•s involvement in the race for colonies 
was but one of several major trends. This was also the period in 
which the country•s capitalist structure reached maturity, in which 
its industrial capacity rivalled Europe•s, and in which the formation 
of trusts permitted powerful and narrow concentrations of wealth. 
The year 1889 had seen the first of the great land rushes into Okla-
homa, and the next year the Census Bureau proclaimed that the frontier 
no longer existed. There was also a third movement, however, of even 
greater importance--a great demonstration of increased democratic 
sentiment which gave its name to the era: Populism. 6 
To view America•s entry into the imperialistic struggle, labeled 
by critics as jingoism, without considering its relationship to the 
Populist crusade, would oversimplify reality. The desire to regulate 
the American business community reflected an intense confidence in 
the ability of government to right all wrongs, even in international 
affairs. Richard Hofstadter has pointed out that 11 it hardly seems an 
accident that jingoism and Populism rose together ... ? As heirs to the 
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Populist spirit, the Progressives continued the tradition of using the 
government as an instrument of reform both at home and abroad. Noting 
that it was the result that mattered rather than the means, Willi am E. 
Leuchtenburg draws the following parallel between Progressives and 
imperialism: 
... Imperialism and progressivism flourished together be-
cause they were both expressions of the same philosophy of 
government, a tendency to judge any action not by the means 
employed but by the results achieved, a worship of defini-
tive action for action•s sake •.. and an almost religious 
faith in the democratic mission of America. . . . Since 
the United States was the land of free institutions, any 
extension of its domain was ~ se an extension of freedom 
and democracy. It was an age that admired results, that 
was not too concerned with fine distinctions and nice 
theories. The Progressives •.. admired anyone who could 
clean up the slaughterhouse or link two great oceans, who 
could get a job done without months of tedious debate and 
deference to legal precedents.8 
But merely to recognize that domestic and foreign affairs are re-
lated does not in itself resolve the confusion associated with the 
events of 1898. Even among diplomatic historians there is little con-
sensus of interpretation. Was America•s sudden expansion really 11 The 
Great Aberration of 1898, 11 or was the push into the Pacific but a con-
tinuation of a movement which could be traced back at least as far as 
1803? The answer, more relative than absolute, is determined by the 
frame of reference adopted by the individual historian. 
If the framework is that of westward movement, it is appropriate 
to trace a continuous chain of events: the Louisiana Purchase, the 
Mexican cession, the Gadsden Purchase, the Alaska Purchase, the annexa-
tion of Hawaii, and the annexation of the Philippines. It may even be 
appropriate to argue that the movement did not stop there but continued 
to lead Americans to entanglement on the Chinese mainland, to the occu-
pation of Japan, and eventually to confrontation in Vietnam. 
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By contrast, a different frame of reference can be adopted which 
considers the population and the future status of the areas brought 
under the American flag. According to this rationale, expansion prior 
to 1898 had incorporated small populations which were politically un-
organized and which would be assimilated into the American population. 
The land itself was contiguous to the United States, or at least (in 
the case of Alaksa) on the North American continent, and it was antici-
pated that much of it would' eventually enter the Union as states. 
Therefore, the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, far distant 
from American shores and inhabited by alien populations which--it was 
assumed--could never be assimilated nor prepared for statehood, consti-
tuted the great aberration of America's foreign policy. 9 The value of 
such interpretive dichotomies is to be found less in the acceptance of 
the one framework over the other than in an awareness of the existence 
of both. 
Difficulty for the historian is compounded by semantic obstacles, 
particularly involving the response to the expansionist impulse. The 
abuse of the terms "isolation" and "isolationism" was not confined to a 
particular period nor to a single group of writers. It has been used 
to describe American foreign policy during the period preceding 1898, 
during the 1920s, and, more recently, in the years following the with-
drawal from Vietnam. Thus, for Harold U. Falkner'there was an obvious 
parallel between the 1920s and the early 1890s, as he detected a "re-
turn to an earlier policy of isolation."10 By contrast, the Beards de-
scribed the 1920s as a decade of aggressive American foreign policy, a 
position supported by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. 11 American rejection 
of membership in the League of Nations was described by at least one 
writer as 11 Isolation Perfected ... 12 
Further examples of confusion are suggested by the writings of 
such historians as Richard Van Alstyne and William G. Carleton. The 
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former described the 11 militant manifest destiny men 11 and 11 the isola-
tionists of the nineteenth century ... l3 The latter defined the debate 
over the League of Nations as a contest not between isolationists and 
internationalists, but rather between nationalists and international-
ists.14 Albert K. Weinberg is a noted authority on American diplomatic 
history in general and imperialism in particular, but his description 
of expansionism has been cited as an example of George Orwe11•s 
double-think: 11 Expansion •.. really was long a major expression of 
isolationism. 1115 Francis Bacon•s warning against 11 an ill and unfit 
choice of words 11 could not have had a stronger relevance in his own 
time. 
In spite of the frequency of its appearance in contemporary debates 
and in the pages of later histories, 11 isolationism11 was more a myth 
than a policy. It has never existed as a consistent program in Ameri-
can foreign policy, but has served more effectively as a pejorative 
label used by advocates of increased involvement in foreign affairs. 16 
To Professor Weinberg, American isolation 11 is not a theory but a pre-
dicament. 11 He continues in a more serious vein: 
... Isolation is not a theory of American foreign policy. 
Isolation is a theory about a theory, misrepresentative even 
if taken only semiliterally, it has placed the discussion of 
American foreign policy in a sad predicament of abfuscation, 
not without its influence upon national decisions.l7 
That the United States practiced cautious diplomacy prior to 1898 
is accepted almost without dissent. It was, however, a policy of 
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"national reserve, 11 never of isolation. It was, in the words of a 
former Secretary of State, "a deliberate and more or less regular ab-
stention from certain political relationships usually considered in-
strumental to either interest or duty." 18 Even those who made 
frequent use of the term assumed that it referred only to political 
and military relationships, and not to America's heavy interest in 
international commerce in both hemispheres and on all the seas. It 
was entanglement with European political intrigues that was to be 
avoided from the very first. As Professor Weinberg notes, John Adams 
feared the proposed alliance with France even before the nation de-
clared its independence. 19 This form of isolation was given its 
strongest emphasis and acquired an almost sacred quality by George 
Washington's famous query in his "Farewell Address": "Why, by inter-
weaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle ourpeace 
and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, 
humor, or caprice?" 20 
In the debate over the League of Nations, two of the most prom-
inent United States Senators were William E. Borah of Idaho and Henry 
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Both opposed the terms of membership 
incorporated in the proposed Treaty of Versailles, and both were 
sensitive to the charges of isolationism. Senator Borah rejected the 
concept of isolation and recommended in its place a concept of "free-
dom of action." 21 Senator Lodge recognized that "isolationist" was a 
political epithet: 
... Those who favor our taking part in European politics 
and wish the United States to become an integral part of 
the European political system, use the word "isolationist" 
in order to discredit those who differ with them. There 
is no such thing as an 'isolationist,' of course, in the 
United States, and there never has been, because 'isola-
tionist,' if strictly interpreted, means naturally that 
those to whom it is applied believe that the United 
States should pursue a policy of isolation and separate 
itself from the doings and interests of the rest of the 
world. I repeat, there is no such thing as an 'isola-
tionist' in the United States and there never has been, 
and the United States has never been isolated. The rest 
of the world could not isolate us and we have never done 
it or thought of doing it ourselves.22 
14 
To support his position, Senator Lodge compiled a statistical sum-
mary which revealed that the Senate gave its advice and consent to 582 
treaties, conventions, and international agreements during the years 
1789-1923. In 136 years, he noted, only 11 treaties had been rejected 
by the Senate. The reaction caused by the rejection of the Treaty of 
Versailles obscured the fact that this act was followed by 45 treaties, 
conventions, and international agreements into which the United States 
entered during the first ha 1 f of the 1 920s. "To say, in the presence 
of these statistics, that the United States is 'isolated' would seem 
to be more picturesque than veracious." 23 
Cursory treatment by textbooks, interpretive dichotomies, and 
semantic obscurities do not exhaust the list of confusions presented 
by the events of 1898. The extent to which those events captured the 
public attention and the extent to which the public involved itself in 
contemporary debate have the effect of blurring the subject for later 
generations and of adding an element not present when decisions of 
policy are left to bureaucrats and technocrats. Long after the war 
with Spain, the debate continued among all strata of society, in the 
press, both academic and popular, in Congress, and within other agen-
cies of the government. No other issue of foreign affairs has ever 
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dominated public debate during peacetime as has the question of the 
proper form of American internationalism. The question transcended 
traditional party lines and attracted the attention of seemingly every 
prominent figure. The list of distinguished expansionists included 
Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, Senators Lodge and Beveridge, and 
intellectuals such as Brooks Adams and Henry Adams. Aligned in opposi-
tion were men of at least equal brilliance, including President Cleve-
land, Senator Hoar, Speaker Reed, William Jennings Bryan, and Andrew 
Carnegie. 
The expansionist leaders tended to come from conservative, well 
established families from the eastern part of the nation, whose con-
cept of reform was not limited by national borders. Cultured, educa-
ted, imbued with the theories of Captain Alfred Mahan, this patrician 
community viewed the world scene with an Anglo-Saxon bias. Although 
they tended to be registered Republicans, there were prominent excep-
tions, such as Walter Hines Page, the Democratic editor of the Atlantic 
Monthly. Even before 1898, they had advocated a large and modern navy, 
had defined the need for strategically located coaling and cable sta-
tions, had considered the possibility of an American canal at the isth-
mus, and had identified Hawaii, Samoa, and the Caribbean islands as 
appropriate targets for American expansion. The most aggressive among 
them would have added Canada to the 1 i st. 11 We have a record of con-
quest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people 
in the nineteenth century,.~ wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. 
We desire no extension to the south, for neither the popula-
tion nor the lands of Central or South America would be 
desirable additions to the United States. But from the 
Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag 
and one country. Neither race nor climate forbids this 
extension and every consideration of national growth and 
national welfare demands it.Z4 
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But this robust enthusiasm for foreign conquest was not a consequence 
of dynamic American capitalism, as some have argued. Contrary to the 
expectations of Vladimir Lenin and other varieties of economic deter-
minists, the leading capitalists took scant notice of imperialist op-
portunities before the Spanish-American War. II • The rise of ex-
pansionist philosophy in the United States owed little to economic 
influences." So concluded Julius Pratt after a thorough study of bus-
iness journals and private correspondence among the leaders of the 
business corrmunity. 
In fact, ... business interests in the United States 
were generally opposed to expansion, or indifferent to 
it, until after May 1, 1898. The need of American busi-
ness for colonial markets and fields for investment was 
discovered not by business men but by historians and 
other intellectuals, by journalists and politicians.25 
On this point a careful distinction must be noted: once the war with 
Spain began the business leaders were not slow to realize the opportun-
ities presented by a policy of expansion. 
American business had been either opposed or indifferent 
to the expansionist philosophy which had arisen since 
1890. But almost at the moment when the war began, a 
large section of American business had ..• been con-
verted to the belief that a program of territorial ex-
pansion would serve its purposes.26 
The argument presented by anti-imperialists focused on anticipated 
harm to the Republic and its institutions. Several found it inconsist-
ent for a republic based on the consent of the governed to possess 
colonies. II . • Our Government was formed for the express purpose of 
creating in a new world a new nation, the foundation of which should 
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be man•s self-government ... , .. was the position of former President 
Grover Cleveland. The United States must not 11 abandon its old land-
marks" and should resist 11 the lights of monarchical hazards.~~ 27 As 
the most prominent Republican official to oppose expansion, Speaker 
Thomas B. Reed found it difficult to oppose openly the policy of his 
party, but privately regretted its incompatibility with the 11 founda-
tion principles of our government ... 28 
Rarely in the history of public debate over governmental policy 
has any issue attracted the attention of intellectuals as did the 
question of expansion. The cause of anti-imperialism was adopted by 
university presidents, such as David Starr Jordan of Stanford Uni-
versity and Henry Wade Rogers of Northwestern University; by profes-
sors such as William Graham Sumner, William James, and Charles Eliot 
Norton; and b~ such literati as Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, and 
Finley Peter Dunne. To promote their efforts they created the Anti-
Imperialist League, financed at least in part by Andrew Carnegie. 
Intense lobbying against the treaty with Spain proved unsuccessful, as 
did William Jennings Bryan•s effort to make imperialism the primary 
issue in the presidential campaign of 1900. Shortly thereafter, im-
perialism faded from the forefront of public consciousness as it was 
replaced by other issues of public controversy. 29 
Imperialism was but the most extreme form of internationalism, 
and thus it created the most heated debate. The participation in the 
debate by intellectuals and personalities of genteel breeding did not 
preclude rancor and exaggeration. Those who opposed expansion fre-
quently carried the argument into opposition to all forms of interna-
tionalism, and proponents of expansion on more than one occasion 
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all owed themselves to be swept up by visions of the benefits to be 
realized from a policy of imperialism in particular and international-
ism in genera 1 . 
The most dramatic examples of the latter form of exaggeration 
were those who justified American involvement on racist grounds. To 
John O'Sullivan•s concept of manifest destiny were grafted new 
theories of national superiority, which received inspiration from the 
writings of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, John Fiske, and William 
Graham Sumner. Although Charles Darwin would certainly never have 
recognized the distorted interpretations of his theories, his appre-
ciation of the American spirit was well calculated to flatter a nation 
poised on the brink of territorial expansion: 
There is apparently much truth in the belief that the won-
derful progress of the United States, as well as the char-
acter of the people, are the results of natural selection; 
for the more energetic, restless, and courageous men from 
all parts of Europe have emigrated during the last ten or 
twelve generations to that great country, and have there 
succeeded best.30 
The extent to which such theories actually influenced those who 
were in a position to determine national policies can never be deter-
mined. In a recent study of the historiography of imperialism, James 
A. Field has directed attention to the tendency to overemphasize the 
relationship between professors and politicians. 
The standard ideologists who are alleged to have infected 
the American people with the disease of Darwinist expan-
sionism were few in number and of doubtful leverage, and 
the standard quotations from their works are selective 
and unrepresentative.31 
While this may be true, it is an equal fallacy to suggest that no such 
relationship has ever existed. For example, more than casual relation-
ships can be demonstrated between the president most widely associated 
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with imperialist tendencies, Theodore Roosevelt, and three imperialist 
writers--a professor of political science, a sociologist, and a naval 
strategist. 
The first was John W. Burgess~ a political scientist at Columbia 
University. Having made a study of the political talents of several 
European ethnic groups, he concluded that only Germans and Anglo-Saxons 
could create a true national state, which he regarded as 11 the most 
modern and the most complete solution of the whole problem of politi-
cal organization which the world has as yet produced. 11 Other attempts 
were inferior: Greeks, Celts, and Slavs could organize only on the 
local level; Romans could organize on the world level, but only in the 
form of empire. It was the Anglo-Saxon and the German, whom he collec-
tively labeled the Teutons, who were. 11 particularly endowed with the 
capacity for establishing national states, 11 and who were 11 especially 
called to that work ..• intrusted, in the general economy of his-
tory, with the mission of conducting the political civilization of the 
modern world. 11 The Teutonic nations had been 11 called to carry the 
political civilization of the modern world into those parts of the 
world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races; i.e., they must 
have a colonial policy.n 32 To those reluctant to undertake such a 
mission, Professor Burgess argued the crying need of the world: 
..• By far the larger part of the surface of the globe is 
inhabited by populations which have not succeeded in estab-
lishing civilized states; which have, in fact, no capacity 
to accomplish such a work; and which must, therefore, re-
main in a state of barbarism or semi-barbarism, unless the 
political nations undertake the work of state organization 
for them. This condition of things authorizes the politi-
cal nations not only to answer the call of the unpolitical 
populations for aid and direction, but also to force organ-
ization upon them by any means necessary, in their honest 
judgment, to accomplish this result. There is no human 
right to the status of barbarism.33 
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To John Burgess there was a clear concept of noblesse oblige among the 
community of advanced nations. 11 lndifference on the part of Teutonic 
states to the political civilization of the rest of the world is, then, 
not only mistaken policy, but disregard of duty, 
The definition of national duty offered by Professor Burgess 
found an echo in the following decade, as President Theodore Roosevelt 
announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in a message sent to 
Congress: 
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable 
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if 
it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no 
interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, 
or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as else-
where, ultimately require intervention by some civilized 
nation. . . . 35 
The parallel messianic impulses expressed in the presidential 
address and the professorial essay could be attributed to the general 
intellectual environment in which both figures moved. However, when 
it is recalled that while at Columbia University, Theodore Roosevelt 
was a student of John Burgess, the conclusion appears inescapable that 
here was a direct association between an ideologist and public pol-
icy.36 This was certainly the conclusion of Nicholas Murray Butler, 
who, as President of Columbia University, was closely associated with 
Professor Burgess. Plans were made for the professor•s study to be 
reprinted in 1917, because President Butler felt his interpretations 
had made 11 a most profound impression . both in Europe and in the 
United States. 1137 Perhaps more profound than they had anticipated. 
The project was suspended when it was pointed out by a typesetter 
that 11 ••• everything done by the Germans in the present war found 
its justiciation in that book. 1138 
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Social Darwinism was the isomorphic bond between Burgess and an 
English sociologist, Benjamin Kidd. His principal work, Social Evolu-
tion, anticipated that the growth of the world's population would soon 
make the tropics essential as a source of food. The indigenous popula-
\ 
tion, he had no doubt, would be unable to utilize the resources of 
the areas, therefore it was incumbent upon the British and the Ameri-
cans to provide the organizational skill. Benefits would accrue to 
all mankind, and the assumption of responsibility by the Anglo-Saxons 
was especially fortuitous because they would exploit the nutritional 
potential without exploiting the population. 39 The conclusion reached 
by James Field's study--that imperialist theoreticians had little im-
pact on the actual course of events--is not sustained by the reception 
given to the efforts of Benjamin Kidd. In less than two years, his 
work had run through at least 14 printings and had been reviewed in 
the North American Review by a writer with mixed reactions. The re-
viewer found Benjamin Kidd 11 burdened by a certain mixture of dogmatism 
and superficiality, 11 although some themes were handled 11 Very well , 11 
including an 11 excel1ent chapter on modern socialism. 1140 The writer 
was the future president, Theodore Roosevelt, and he would be carrying 
Benjamin Kidd's ideas to the White House within six years. 
A third influence operating on the future president was that of 
the legendary Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Again, James Field is in-
clined to discount the effectiveness of Captain Mahan's influence 
because his writings did not attempt to focus America•s attention on 
imperialism in general and particularly on the growing importance of 
the Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that 
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Theodore Roosevelt was approvingly conscious of the points which Cap-
tain Mahan did stress: the need for a large and modern navy, for 
coaling stations, and for cable stations. Theodore Roosevelt heaped 
praise on Captain Mahan in his review of The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History. 41 To his friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore 
Roosevelt described a contemporary essay by Captain Mahan on the 
11ye 11 ow peri 111 as 11 a really nob 1 e article. n42 He corresponded with 
the Captain in terms of mutual understanding and sympathy. 43 It is 
surely no exaggeration to suggest that Captain Mahan--along with so-
ciologist Kidd and political scientist Burgess--were among a small 
group of influential writers who helped to mold the thinking which 
would soon be leading America into new adventures of expansion. Given 
the similarity between their writings and future policies, the timing 
of their publications, and their known association with Theodore Roose-
velt--to consider just one public figure--it is difficult to accept 
James Field•s conclusion that 11 ••• the claimed impact of the so-
called •imperialist• tracts on either the American people or important 
figures in government tends to dissolve on inspection .... n44 
Racial affinity led several British observers to applaud Ameri-
can expansion, frequently noting that the United States was merely 
following the pattern of the mother country. 11 The isolation of the 
United States from the affairs of the world is no longer possible. 
They must and they will assume their rightful position among great 
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nations, with the responsibilities and the difficulties entailed," 
observed a British nobleman, to whom "rightful position" implied ex-
pansion. "The inherited instincts of the race are forcing the Ameri-
can people onward and outward .. Race energy and race aptitudes, 
not blind chances, have made the United States second only to the 
mother country as a commercial power." Like Great Britain, the United 
States, inhabited by the same racial stock, was destined for greatness. 
"The same forces that have created the British Empire have built up the 
great Republic, and will irresistibly bring it into the front rank of 
the States of the world." 45 Another writer concurred; the world would 
benefit from the Anglo-Saxon mission, which had done 11more than any 
other cause to promote civilization and progress." 46 11 . It is 
alike the destiny and the duty of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon 
race to govern and convert to civil uses the inferior races • ..4? The 
presence of common blood reduced the competitive antagonism and made 
potential rivals into "fellow-labourers in the work of the better 
ordering of the world." 48 
To these vague concepts of national mission were added closely 
related assurances that the mission was divinely directed. Reverend 
Josiah Strong, never noted for his lack of enthusiasm or for thinking 
on a small scale, looked forward to the day when the whole of mankind 
would be 11 Anglo-Saxonized," by which he apparently meant that everyone 
would possess "a pure spiritual Ghristianity.n49 War was ordinarily 
unacceptable to the Methodist Church, but an exception could be made 
for the sake of a moral campaign, such as the 1 iberation of the Cubans. 
11 • • • Our cause wi 11 be just, and Methodism wi 11 be ready to do its 
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full duty. Every Methodist preacher will be a recruiting officer."50 
The willingness to carry the crusade to the battlefield was not con-
fined to just one church. According to one editor in 1898, the 
churches were almost unanimous in recognizing that 11 •• the Nation 
has been moved to battle by the demand of an awakened conscience an-
swering to the call of outraged humanity." 51 The opportunity for 
Christian service is ours, proclaimed a Baptist publication, " .•. 
the divine agencies are available; and Christ's leadership is appar-
ently assured ... 52 Such was the duty of the American people "by virtue 
of the call of God," assured another Baptist writer. "This call is 
very plain. The hand of God in history has ever been plain."53 What 
God has ordained, no people would dare to resist. 
Woe to any nation brought to a pass where it is called to 
guide a weaker people's future which hesitates for fear 
its own interests will be entangled and its own future 
imperilled by the full discharge of an unmistakable duty. 
The power and wealth, the intelligence and the 
wisdom of the United States, are a solemn trust for the 
upbuilding and civilization of the world.54 
National, racial, and religious enthusiasms were not the only 
prerequisites for jingoism. For some, war appeared to have positive 
benefits and therefore did not need national missions, nor racial 
energies, nor unconverted heathens to justify it. Like the refiner's 
fire, it served as God's test for the nations, and victory indicated 
efficiency, which in turn resulted from a spiritual quality. "Effi-
ciency in war, or, rather, efficiency for war, is God's test of a 
nation's soul. By that test it stands or by that test it falls." 
Should the dreams of the sentimental pacifists become reality, "the 
machinery by which national corruption is punished and national vir-
tue is rewarded would be ungeared. The higher would cease to supersede 
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the lower and the course of human evolution would suffer arrest. 11 
Decadent societies would rationalize that Christianity was incompati-
ble with militarism, but virile societies would face the truth un-
afraid.55 Such examples of martial rhetoric can be easily dismissed 
when written by a British citizen-for a British publication; it is a 
different matter when the statement is attributed to Theodore Roose-
velt: "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs 
of war. 1156 
The lust for war was not confined to academic journals and reli-
gious periodicals. The excitement preceding the war with Spain is 
closely associated with the expression "yellow journalism, 11 and with 
the newspaper battles between William Randolph Hearst and Joseph 
Pulitzer. As the Journal and the World raced to satiate the public 
hunger for horror stories from off the coast of Florida, New York City 
became the principal theater for the struggle. 
It was a battle of gigantic proportions, in which the suf-
ferings of Cuba merely chanced to furnish some of the most 
convenient ammunition. Whenever one side sprang a sensa-
tion the normal reply was, of course, for the other to 
spring a better one.57 
Among the several familiar examples from this period, that involving 
the famed artist Frederic Remington, is probably the most revealing. 
He was sent by Hearst to Cuba to procure pictures of Spanish atroci-
ties but found it difficult to locate suitable subjects. After a 
short stay he telegraphed his boss from Havana: 11 Everything is quiet. 
There is no trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return." 
Hearst repliec: 11 Remington, Havana: Please remain. You furnish the 
pictures and r•n furnish the war." Remington obliged with inflam-
matory pictures--entirely from his own imagination. 58 
The excesses of enthusiasm, the recourse to rancorous rhetoric, 
and the theories of radical racism were themes common to both sides 
of the expansionist debate. Both sides exaggerated, as prejudice 
tended to produce an equal but opposite prejudice. Shortly before 
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the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, a sympathetic British observer 
of American expansionist sentiment counseled his friends to reconsider, 
not because they might do damage to colonial subjects, but because such 
subjects were unfit to receive the blessings of American imperialism: 
Possessing on her own continent an enormous territory of un-
equalled natural resources, and capable of easily supporting 
more than twice its present population, the United States 
needs no transmarine domains in which to expand. One some-
times hears it said that her mission is to spread democratic 
principles. Polynesians and Asiatics, Creole Spaniards and 
mulattoes are not fit to receive those principles. Neither 
are negroes fit, as the history of Hayti and of most of the 
South-American so-called •republics• proves.59 
The new role of imperialist power seemed to arouse several men of 
letters as no domestic issue ever had. Most prominent of these liter-
ati whose writings were to challenge the imperialists was Mark Twain. 
In Europe when America went to war against Spain, he delighted at first 
in the high moral purpose of his countrymen, but then abruptly changed 
when it was determined that the Philippines would be retained as a 
spoil of conquest. 
When the United States sent word to Spain that the Cuban 
atrocities must end she occupied the highest moral posi-
tion ever taken by a nation since the Almighty made the 
earth. But when she snatched the Philippines she stained 
the flag.60 
Much of Mark Twain•s criticism of imperialism was withheld from publi-
cation by the moderating hand of his wife. However, his biographer has 
provided this example, a description of 11 Christendom 11 : 
A majestic matron in flowing robes drenched with blood. 
On her head a golden crown of thorns; impaled on its 
spines the bleeding heads of patriots who died for their 
countries--Boers, Boxers, Filipinos; in one hand a slung 
shot [sic], in the other a Bible, open at the text •oo 
unto others," etc. Protruding from pocket bottle labeled 
•we bring you the blessings of civilization. •61 
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To Kipling•s familiar jingo jingle, an American poet replied with 
this paraphrase: 
Take up the White Man•s burden, 
Send forth your sturdy kin 
And load them down with Bibles 
And Cannon-balls and gin. 
Throw in a few diseases 
To spread in tropic climes, 
For there the healthy niggers 
Are quite behind the times. 
And don•t forget the factories 
On those benighted shores 
They have no cheerful iron milles, 
Nor eke department stores. 
They never work twelve hours a day 
And live in strange content 
Altho they never have to pay 
A single sou of rent. 
Take up the White Man•s burden, 
And teach the Philippines 
What interest and taxes are 
And what a mortgage means 
Give them electrocution chairs, 
And prisons, too, galore, 
And if they seem inclined to kick, 
Then spill their heathen gore.62 
Disappointment with American expansion, distrust of the sincerity 
of the religious leaders, hatred for all imperialists--all these com-
bined to produce in Henry Black Fuller a bitterness so severe that no 
publisher would accept his works, and he was forced to finance their 
printing at his own expense. Imperialists were to Fuller no better 
than hogs: 
This is not the age of romance, of the lofty but illogical 
lion, but of the practical hog. . . • A lion eats when he 
is hungry and so far he is a good Imperialist; but he stops 
there. When a hog satisfies his hunger he has only begun. 
After the needs of nature comes Benevolent Assimilation--
duty seconds appetite--his higher nature comes in (or 
rather out). He considers what he owes to the world and 
so he goes right on eating, and so does the Imperialist.63 
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Two imperialists in particular caught Fuller's attention. Theo-
dore Roosevelt he labeled a ''Megaphone of Mars," who delighted in "the 
spatter of brains upon the plains--and the gore that is mushy and 
thick. "64 For President McKinley, Fuller dipped deepest into his cess-
pool of vituperation: 
Thou sweating chattel slave to swine! 
Who dost befoul the holy shrine 
Of liberty with murder! 
What canting lies can save thee now, 
Red handed as thou art, thy knife 
Drinking the struggling patriot's life! 
What shame can reach thy soddened heart 
In shame, blood scarlet as thou art! · 
Who for a coral bead or rattle 
'Gainst unarmed babes doth march to battle! 
Calling with sanctimonious face 
On God to sanction thy disgrace. 
May he inflict on thee again 
The curse of thine own brother Cain!65 
Voices of moderation existed also--less dramatic, less shrill, 
less inflammatory, and therefore often less noticed by their contem-
poraries and by historians. It was possible to argue the question of 
expansion without racist slurs, without hatred for the opposition, 
without cursing the flag and the altar. Sincere patriots there were 
who despaired of their country's policies and who could appeal to both 
the heart and the mind. Their counsel, tinged with disappointment, re-
flected at the same time criticism for past errors and a hope for fu-
ture corrections: 
Americans, you once were free--
Free as the broad plains and the forest profound--
And then, after your Revolution, you led the world. 
Your example freed France, and France set Europe aflame. 
Without battalions or men of war you were in the van of 
nations. 
Think you to lead again by dint of armies and navies and 
coast defences? 
Not so is the world mastered. 
Speed your frontiers, take Cuba and Hawaii, 
bring fn Canada if you can, push on over the great 
Southern Hemisphere; 
Will these lands be yours? 
There is only one possession in them worth the capturing, 
and that is the hearts of men; 
And these hearts can never be won by a nation of slaves. 
Be free, and all mankind will flock to your standard.66 
Similarly, among the intellectuals it was possible to find the 
voice of reason which did not permit opposition to war to obscure 
other considerations. For example, William James had no doubt that 
Americans sincerely wanted to free the Cubans--and equally sincerely 
wanted to go to war to do it: 
The basis of it all is, or rather was, perfectly honest 
humanitarianism, and an absolutely disinterested desire 
on the part of our people to set the Cubans free .... 
We were winning the most extraordinary diplomatic victor-
ies, but they were of no use. We were ready (as we sup-
posed) for war and nothing but war must come.67 
In a speech delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Yale 
University, William Graham Sumner referred to the conquest of the 
United States by Spain. The decision to retain the Philippines, he 
suggested, would lead to endless difficulties and would constitute, 
in effect, Spain's revenge: 
Expansion and imperialism are at war with the best tradi-
tions, principles, and interests of the American people, 
and ... they will plunge us into a network of difficult 
problems and political perils, which we might have avoided, 
while they offer us no corresponding advantage in return.68 
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Mr. Dooley, the satirical creation of Finley Peter Dunne, could 
not resist directing his gentle barbs at public officials, and a fig-
ure as prominent as Theodore Roosevelt was an especially inviting tar-
get. Mr. Dooley suggested a title for the Rough Rider's war memoirs: 
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Alone in Cuba. For the same anticipated work, Henry Blake Fuller had 
proposed How to Make a Mountain Out of the Mole-Hill I Climbed in Cuba, 
in 20 volumes. 69 Neither were all newspapers infected with the war-
mongering spirit of William Randolph Hearst. Mature and responsible 
journalism characterized the story of the sinking of the Maine which 
appeared in The Daily Oklahoman, 70 one of numerous journals which suc-
cessfully resisted the opportunity to fan the flames of war. 
The debate over America•s imperialism encouraged the type of extrem-
ism which affected not only the thinking of contemporaries but also the 
view of later generations. The tendency to polarize, to accept no third 
alternative, and to sort events and personalities into but two mutually 
exclusive camps, persisted in later historians. The effect has been to 
overlook men like George Gray, his counterparts in other nations, and 
the option of a via media. 
Irenic internationalism placed peace above colonies, above coaling 
stations, above the euphoria of splendid little wars. An examination 
of its application by George Gray permits a clarification of its style 
as well as its distinctions from contemporary alternatives. Although 
he never occupied nor sought the very highest position of power--the 
office of president, the office of secretary of state--George Gray 
played an important role in the foreign affairs of the United States 
at a crucial stage of its development. The study of his career there-
fore presents an exceptional opportunity to examine the relevantevents 
from a perspective not usually considered. Three missions in partic-
ular--the Joint High Commission with Canada, the Paris Peace Confer-
ence with Spain, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration--illustrate 
irenic internationalism as practiced by George Gray, a diplomat whose 
influence has outlived the popular familiarity with his name. 
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CHAPTER II 
CAREER 
There is no simple formula for peace, and no single 
act that will assure peace. 
John Foster Dulles 
George Gray first came to national attention in the early 1880s, 
not as a diplomat engaged in negotiations of international import but 
as a delegate to the Democratic National Conventions of 1880 and 1884. 
In each case, he addressed the assembly, championing the cause of his 
political mentor, Thomas F. Bayard, Senator from Delaware. At the 
time, he was serving as the Attorney General of Delaware, but soon 
after the 1885 Convention he entered the United States Senate, and 
his national reputation experienced a similar growth. 
Politics came naturally to George Gray by reason of his train-
ing and his paternal inheritance. His father Andrew, born of 11 Revolu-
tionary stock, 11 was a lawyer and a businessman, serving as president 
of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company. 1 George's grandfather, 
also named Andrew, was a planter, a state legislator, and an author-
ity on political science and economics, subjects on which he wrote 
numerous works. It was George's great-grandfather, William Gray, who 
initiated the generations of public service by immigrating from County 
Antrim, Ireland, to Delaware, where he settled in Kent County around 
1740. 
Young George was educated in the common schools and then entered 
the College of New Jersey (later renamed Princeton University), from 
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which he received an A.B. degree in 1859. In 1863 he received an A.M. 
degree from that institution and was admitted to the Delaware Bar, 
having read law for three years in his father•s office and for one 
year at Harvard Law School. His law practice was begun in New Castle 
and was later transferred to Wilmington. In 1879, the young attorney's 
first wife, the former Harriet L. Black, passed away. The second Mrs. 
George Gray, Margaret J. Black, was the sister of the deceased and 
remained his lifelong companion, preceding him in death by about three 
years. 
George Gray began his political career in 1879, the year of his 
appointment by Governor Hall as Delaware's Attorney General. He was 
reappointed by Governor Stockley in 1884, but served only a portion 
of the term. Grover Cleveland, having been elected to his first term 
as president in 1884, appointed Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware, as his 
Secretary of State. While vacating his senatorial office, Bayard 
I 
used his influence with the Legislature to secure the election of the 
man most likely to provide the finest representation for Delaware, 
Attorney General George Gray. Bayard•s respect for Gray•s ability is 
reflected in a statement he wrote several years later: 
His record as Attorney-General was not only a matter of 
pride to his friends and admirers, but to all citizens of 
the State regardless of party, and the learning and abil-
ities which he displayed readily led to his appointment 
as United States Senator from Delaware in ·1885 •... 2 
The Legislature apparently concurred with the new Secretary of State 
and reelected Gray for a full term in 1887 and again in 1893. Thus, 
for 14 years, George Gray pursued a career in the United States Sen-
ate--a service marked with distinction and with the promise of other 
forms of service to follow. 
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George Gray•s participation on the national level of partisan 
politics began with the 1876 National Convention of the Democratic 
Party. Held in St. Louis, t.his Convention nominated Governor Samuel 
J. Tilden of New York, whose narrow defeat a few months later resulted 
in a major constitutional crisis. At Cincinnati four years later, the 
Democrats conducted one of their most spectacular and noisy conven-
tions. After three days of what The New York Times called a 11 howling 
brawl, 11 the roll call of states reached Delaware. George Gray, a 
11 big, handsome man of commanding presence, 11 took the floor to nominate 
Thomas F. Bayard for president. As he spoke, the bedlam subsided. 
11 He looked youthful, but he looked magnificent, too, and sternly im-
pressive.113 The Bayard candidacy was blocked by Southerners, and the 
Party turned to another unsuccessful nominee, General Hancock. The 
pattern was repeated in 1884 at Chicago. Once again Gray nominated 
Senator Bayard, and once again the Democrats chose otherwise--this 
time more fortunately. Their nominee, Grover Cleveland, was destined 
to defeat James G. Blaine and lead his party to the White House for 
the first time since James Buchanan•s victory a generation earlier. 
It was the decade of the 1890s which provided for George Gray 
and many other Democrats the most difficult test of their party loy-
alty. In 1892, from Omaha, came indications of grassroot support for 
new concepts of national currency based on bimetallism, a concept em-
braced by a new third party, the People•s Party, or--as it was to be 
familiarly known--the Populist Party. By 1896, this group had suffi-
cient strength to think of associating with either of the two major 
parties for a concerted bid for the White House. The Republicans, 
managed from behind the scenes by the Ohio millionaire, Marcus A. 
Hanna, rejected the Populist overtures. For the Democrats, meeting 
in Chicago, it was a different story. Torn between the silver and 
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gold wings of the party, the delegates debated in the July heat. 
Finally, after the 11 Cross of Gold 11 speech, the Democrats found their 
candidate--and lost their gold supporters. William Jennings Bryan 
had engineered the fusion between the Populists and the Democratic 
Party, but in the process he had alienated powerful eastern forces 
which now bolted the party. Loyalty to President Cleveland, commit-
ment to sound money, and a belief that William Jennings Bryan was a 
radical led to the formation of the National (Gold) Democratic Party, 
whose supporters included Senator George Gray. It was principle, 
not party, which corrmanded the Senator•s allegiance. nt cannot change 
those beliefs, even at the bidding of a Democratic National Conven-
tion, .. he said. 11 Convictions cannot be compromised. 114 Though he de-
clined to serve as the candidate of the Gold Democrats and even refused 
to be a delegate to their Indianapolis convention, he did supporttheir 
eventual nominee, his senatorial colleague from Illinois, John A. Pal-
mer. 5 William McKinley•s defeat of William Jennings Bryan was decisive, 
John Palmer failed to receive a single electoral vote, the silver is-
sue rapidly faded, and the Democratic Party reunited. The period of 
apostasy was over, and the prodigals, Senator Gray included, were wel-
comed back to the fold. 6 
Senator Gray•s opposition to the silver forces was based on convic-
tion regarding the issues rather than merely his distaste for William 
Jennings Bryan. He had sailed to England during the previous summer 
to study the silver question in its international setting and make an 
assessment of the probable future of bimetallism among America•s more 
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important trading partners. His interest in the subject continued be-
yond the election of 1896, and he made reference to it in a later in-
terview held in London. He also spoke of American friendship for the 
British--a friendship which had recently been strained by the boundary 
dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. His support for efforts 
to frame a new Anglo-American treaty of arbitration anticipated by 
several years his very active participation in this technique of solv-
ing international disputes. 7 
Although quiet and unobtrusive by nature, George Gray was an 
acknowledged leader of the Senate during his 14 years of service. It 
was his style to support policies and specific items of legislation 
rather than to initiate them. This earned for him the respect and 
appreciation of his colleagues, while at the same time it denied him 
a national reputation. No famous bills bearing the name George Gray 
would preserve his image for future generations, even though the ef-
fect of his service would continue for many years. After George 
Gray•s retirement from the Senate, a contemporary journalist would 
summarize his style: 
It must be said of him ... that he has never headed any 
advance movement of which the fruits will carry his name 
into history. His activities were mainly directed toward 
shaping legislation which others had initiated, and unques-
tionably his effective intervention has often saved the 
country from bad laws and made some good ones better.8 
George Gray•s support for President Cleveland identified him as 
an administration senator, but it was also recognized that this support 
was based on common principles, generally conservative, rather than on 
selfish motive. Writing at the half way point of Grover Cleveland•s 
second administration, a contributor to Harper•s Weekly observed: 
Senator Gray did not become Mr. Cleveland•s friend be-
cause the latter was President, or because he was the 
friend and successor of the Secretary of State. He was 
and is an administration Senator because he believes in 
the political principles which triumphed in Mr. Cleve-
land•s election.9 
Because of the community of interest between President and Sen-
ator, it was to be expected that Grover Cleveland would make an at-
tempt to include Senator Gray in his official family. During the 
second adminstration, George Gray was invited to become Attorney 
General, but declined. Earlier, at the conclusion of the first ad-
ministration, he had just missed being nominated for Chief Justice, 
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a position for which he was well suited and one which he would likely 
have accepted. While it is clear that President Cleveland gave 
George Gray the strongest consideration and even signed the nomina-
tion, the political reasons which compelled him to withdraw it are 
not so clearly understood. At any rate, whether by his own choice or 
as a result of forces over which he had no control, George Gray was to 
remain in the United States Senate until 1899. 10 
Senator Gray•s support for the Administration•s policy on Hawai-
ian annexation is especially illuminating. At a time when the spirit 
of jingoism was growing it was difficult to resist the tide of emotion 
and to recognize that these distant islands, small, defenseless, and 
of great potential value to the United States, were nevertheless en-
titled to the same rights of self-rule as all other nations. The re-
quest for annexation, made by a small group of white revolutionaries 
who had overthrown the Hawaiian monarchy, was debated by the Senate in 
1894. In opposing annexation, Senator Gray not only recognized the 
unfairness of the action to the native population, he unconsciously 
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provided an indication of his position in the subsequent debate over 
annexation of the Philippine Islands. Political impotence, hear-
gued, could not provide an excuse for depriving a people of their 
territory and their government. On the floor of the Senate, he urged 
his colleagues to 11 sustain the honor of our country and our flag 11 by 
treating Hawaiian interests with the same respect accorded a power-
ful empire. To show less consideration would be dishonorable for the 
United States. 11 
As a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, George 
Gray continued to represent the view that America•s policy toward 
Hawaii must be predicated on the highest concept of integrity. He was 
concerned that a grave injustice had been done to the Hawaiian queen, 
and he was especially disturbed by the role of American troops during 
the coup. Their presence had been arranged by the American Minister 
in Honolulu, John L. Stevens, an avowed annexationist, ostensibly for 
the purpose of protecting American life and property; in reality their 
presence had the effect of intimidating the deposed Queen and of con-
solidating the revolution. Without proper authorization, Minister 
Stevens accorded official recognition to the new government and even 
proclaimed an American protectorate over the islands. Lacking the 
support of the White House, which was now occupied by the highly 
principled Cleveland, the proclamation had no effect except to place 
the investigating senators in a tight position. The Democrats, who 
comprised the majority party, found it difficult either to refuse so 
rich a prize as Hawaii or to oppose the position of their own presi-
dent. The result was a carefully worded report which approved the 
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actions both of President Cleveland, who had blocked annexation, and 
of Minister Stevens, who had pushed annexation to the very brink of 
fulfillment. 
Senator Gray was less inclined to straddle the fence, and in a 
minority report he took issue with his Democratic colleagues, especi-
ally regarding the usurpation of authority by Minister Stevens. As 
the debate continued on the floor of the Senate, he called for a defi-
nite commitment to reject the annexation of Hawaii. It was a futile 
effort, however, as restraint had never been a tradition of the Senate. 
At length, a compromise was achieved: there would be no annexation 
and there would be no interference with the new Americanized Republic 
of Hawaii. Senator Gray recognized that the victory over the annexa-
tionists was less than complete. Although delayed for the present, an-
nexation was certain to be proposed again and as equally certain to 
arouse his opposition. Senator Gray summed up his position thus: 
I believe that our policy is a continental one, and that 
we are not called upon by anything in our past history or 
by anything in the necessities of our situation to step 
off this continent in a career of colonial aggrandizement. 
That belongs to a past age; it belongs to other forms of 
government.l2 
It was a position doomed to ultimate failure, as the islands were 
annexed before the end of the decade. At the same time, however, it 
demonstrated the courage of its proponent. Ten years later, The New 
York Times cited Senator Gray's opposition to annexation as an effort 
to inject conscious morality into statecraft and compared his eloquence 
with that of Pitt and Burke. 13 
In domestic legislation, Senator Gray's most significant contri-
bution to his party resulted from his opposition to the Force Bill. 
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This legislation sponsored by Henry C. Lodge authorized federal troops 
to supervise elections in the South. Although the stated purpose of 
such intervention was to protect the franchise of the Blacks, to Sen-
ator Gray and to a small group of fellow Democrats with whom he met 
privately in an upstairs room in the Capitol, the Bill was a Republi-
can device for undermining the Democratic strength in the South. Be-
sides, and of greater consequence, the Bill was an obvious encroachment 
on states• rights. On the Senate floor, when it appeared certain that 
the Lodge forces would be successful, Senator Gray rose at the last 
minute. His speech lasted three days and was 11 intellectual and unim-
passioned.•• It gave the opposition forces the time needed to conioli-
date victory, and the Force Bill went down to defeat. Characteristi-
cally, it was not Senator Gray who received the public acclaim for 
this service, but rather Senator Gorman, who had furnished the tech-
nical leadership. That was not the first nor the last time that 
others reaped the credit for his efforts. 14 
George Gray approached the end of his senatorial career with a 
reputation for impartiality and determination to assess both sides of 
any argument. Equally evident was his courage to withstand the pres-
sure of public sentiment when he believed it to be founded on blind 
emotion rather than objective considerations. His was the ability to 
remain collected while others about him demonstrated less discipline. 
When a Negro was lynched in his home town of Wilmington, everyone was 
appropriately appalled. However, George Gray was able to move beyond 
outrage and in a public interview carefully analyzed the social condi-
tions which had made the atrocity possible. 15 For him it was not 
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sufficient that the lynching be deplored; indignation had to be util-
ized as to reduce the chances that it would ever be repeated. This 
academic quality was not always understood or appreciated by those 
who favored quick and decisive action, a criticism noted by a popular 
periodical: 
With Gray ... politics is an ingrained part of life. 
He cannot separate and differentiate between his charac-
ter as a man, a judge and a politician. He is often so 
deliberate in making up his mind as to provoke criticism 
for what seems to the public like vacillation. This is 
an injustice to him. The vacillator is a man who is one 
moment of one opinion and the next moment of another. 
Gray does not reach an opinion promptly, but once reached 
it sticks, whatever it may be, and its unpopularity will 
not tend to hold it back.l6 
The last years of the nineteenth century were not lacking other 
opportunities to prove the validity of this assessment, and one of the 
richest sources lay 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Since 1895 
Cuba had been in revolt against a Spain whose pride would not permit 
the colony to leave her diminished empire and whose resources were 
not sufficient to quell the rebellion. Almost daily, the American 
people learned of fresh atrocities from the south, some genuine and 
some manufactured, with the result that anything and anyone associ-
ated with Spain was linked in the public's mind with the devil himself. 
Especially unfortunate was the figure of Dupuy de Lome, Spain's Minis-
ter in Washington. Although not lacking in talent, Minister de Lome 
committed a series of indiscretions, some oral, some in writing, of 
which the notorious letter of February, 1898was merely the most in-
famous--and consequently the final--example. For several years, he 
had been the subject of criticism by United States Senators who were 
alienated by his aloof bearing and sharp tongue. George Gray, however, 
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was able to see the beleaguered diplomat as a natural product of the 
Old World--of forces and of a background foreign to American tradi-
tions. He recognized that de Lomers task in Washington, extremely 
difficult under the best of circumstances, was made nearly impossible 
by the intransigence of his home government. He defended de Lome in 
Congress, and he doubtless would have concurred with former Secretary 
of State Richard Olney that the diplomat 11must realize how much worse 
a blunder can be than a crime. ~~ 17 
This sense of objectivity determined Senator Gray's course of ac-
tion during the difficult days immediately preceding the declaration 
of war against Spain. De Lome's letter and the destruction of the 
Maine made the outbreak of hostilities more a question of date than 
of possibility. For all his abhorrence of war, George Gray could not 
accept unqualified pacifism if it meant the continued suffering of 
Cuba's population. 11 We intervene, .•. 11 he explained on the floor 
of the Senate in April, 1898, 11 in the cause of outraged humanity which 
we attempt to succor. 11 Nor would he a 11 ow his position to be swayed 
by partisan politics. The political affiliation of the occupant of 
the White House was blurred by the threat posed by a foreign foe. It 
was not a Republican president he was supporting, but rather 11 an Amer-
ican President, the leader of 70,000,000 of people, inducted into his 
high office by their will and by the laws of his country. 11 Conceding 
that his position appeared 11 hackneyed, 11 he nevertheless made it clear: 
II . Partisan politics halt at the shore line .... 11 
His position won applause from the galleries and plaudits from 
his Republican colleagues, but it was not at attempt to play to the 
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grandstands. There was no need, he cautioned, to make such a speech. 
11 We do not need to lash running horses. 11 What was needed was 11 a 
truce betwee~ the political parties of this country until we can set-
tle our account with Spain. 11 This reasoned appeal for bipartisanship 
did not fall on deaf ears, and on April 25, Democrats and Republicans 
joined to give unanimous Senate approval to the resolution declaring 
war against Spain. 18 
The importance of bipartisan support was not lost on President 
McKinley, who rewarded Senator Gray with a series of appointments. 
The first was an appointment in July, 1898, to the Joint High Commission 
to settle a boundary dispute with Canada. The following September 
the senator received his second appointment--to the Peace Commission 
to conclude the war with Spain. The third appointment, to a federal 
judgeship, came in March, 1899. The fourth was to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in August, 1900. Thus, within two years, George Gray 
was called to play three important roles in international jurispru-
dence and one involving primarily domestic conerns. His service on 
the world stage must be considered separately and at greater length, 
but his service on the federal judiciary deserves consideration at 
this point. 
Although the four appointments collectively provide a clear in-
dication of the administration•s esteem for George Gray•s talents, 
the third was of greatest personal importance to the senator. The 
elections of November, 1898, had given the Republicans control of the 
Delaware Legislature, thus signalling that his career in Washington 
would not be extended beyond his current term which would expire in 
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March, 1899. Fortunately, the President and the Senator, even though 
political opponents, agreed in giving a higher priority to merit than 
to party affiliation. Thus, on March 3, 1899, just one day before 
his term expired, it was announced that George Gray would be ap-
pointed United States Circuit Judge for the Third Judicial Circuit. 19 
The position was only one level lower than the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and its jurisdiction included George Gray's home state 
of Delaware as well as New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It provided an 
appropriate sequel to 14 years of outstanding service in Congress. 
For the next 15 years, Judge Gray served the public with the same 
sense of dedication, the same highminded morality, and the same de-
gree of efficiency tha~ had earlier been the hallmarks of Senator 
Gray. 20 
As a federal judge, George Gray specialized in a branch of juris-
prudence not likely to earn for him a national reputation. His knowl-
edge of utility and railroad law commanded the respect of his 
colleagues but kept his name from the headlines. During these years, 
he found time to write, to teach, to speak on issues which attracted 
his attention, and to serve as an army officer and a military ap-
praiser. "Substantial justice between men and classes of men and 
nations" was his goal, not publicity. As a Federal Circuit Judge, 
"he may have . missed the striking reward he so well deserved," 
but his compensation came in another--a higher--form. 21 
In spite of the relative anonymity of the judicial bench, cir-
cumstances continually arose which had the effect of thrusting 
George Gray into the spotlight of public awareness. The most impor-
tant of these events was the Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902. By the 
standards of later generations, the demands of the strikers appear 
moderate: a 20% increase in wages, elimination of the ten hour work 
day, and recognition of the United Mine Workers as legal representa-
tive and bargaining agent. Nevertheless, the operators were deter-
mined to destroy the infant union by exhausting its treasury and by 
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breaking the strike through the long process of attrition. Through-
out the early fa 11 of 1902 President Theodore Rooseve 1 t observed the 
struggle with keen concern. At a time when coal was needed to heat 
homes, schools, and other public buildings and to power trains and 
factories, the seriousness of the strike can hardly be overestimated. 
By October, he had received confidential warnings from New York and 
Massachusetts that fuel riots could be expected if the strike were 
not immediately settled. Finally he could hold back no longer. Al-
though lacking authority either by legislation or by precedent, he 
determined to intervene with the fu-1-l weight of his administration. 
Working closely with J. P. Morgan, whose support was essential to any 
settlement, the President allowed it to be known that he was prepared 
to use the army to seize and to operate the mines unless both sides 
were willing to submit to arbitration. The strikers readily agreed, 
but the operators hesitated. Under no circumstances would they rec-
ognize the UMW as the bargaining agent. At the last minute, the 
President was able to reach a compromise in which the UMW president 
would be recognized as the spokesman for the miners but would not be 
officially recognized as the union leader. On October 23, the miners 
returned to work, ending a crisis which President Roosevelt consid-
ered 11 as dangerous a situation as I ever dealt with. 1122 
It was, however, a precarious peace the permanence of which de-
pended in large measure upon the membership of the arbitration com-
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mission. Like his predecessor, President Roosevelt turned to a member 
of the opposition party and appointed George Gray the chairman. It 
was a fortunate decision for the Administration, the strikers, the 
operators, and the entire nation, but accepting was not an easy de-
cision for Judge Gray. His strict construction of the Constitution 
recognized no presidential authority to intervene in a labor dispute. 
On the other hand, the presence of a grave national peril provided a 
justification. The President's position, he later noted, "gave him 
an influence, a leadership, as first citizen of the republic ... 
that enabled him to appeal to the ... good sense of the parties to 
the controversy." It was only appropriate that the President should 
place upon labor and management "the moral coercion of public opin-
ion." Regardless of their differences in other areas, and regardless 
of their conflicting interpretation of constitutional authority, 
Judge Gray did not hesitate to lay credit where it belonged: "I do 
not think that any President ever acted more wisely, courageously, 
or promptly in a National crisis. Mr. Roosevelt deserves unstinted 
praise for what he did." 23 
Under Judge Gray's leadership, the Commission lost no time in 
settling the issues in dispute. Its investigation opened the very 
day after the miners returned to work, hearings were conducted in 
Scranton and Philadelphia, testimony was received from 558 witnesses, 
and the awards were handed down in March, 1903. The workers received 
a pay increase of 10%, and the ten hour work day was reduced to nine 
hours for some groups, eight hours for others. In addition, a 
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sliding scale was prepared which permitted wages to rise as the sell-
ing price of coal rose. Finally, an arbitration procedure was ar-
ranged to settle future disputes. 
Remarkably, the settlement was hailed by both sides as a victory. 
The operators had delayed recognition of the UMW, and the workers had 
won benefits which they readily recognized would not have been at-
tained by the strike. Of even greater importance, recognition of 
their union appeared likely in the near future. Although the agree-
ment was binding for only three years, its provisions were so well 
received that they remained in effect long after the deadline 
passed. 24 
The successful arbitration between workers and mine operators was 
one of the most brilliant accomplishments in George Gray's long career 
of public service and earned for him unqualified accolades from all 
elements of society. The New York Times hailed him as the most pop-
ular citizen in the country with the working classes and considered 
him to be more appreciated by the capitalists and the employers than 
even the president himself. 25 President Roosevelt, who was hardly 
noted for extravagant compliments, wrote to express his appreciation: 
When you were appointed, we were within measurable distance 
of a great National calamity. By your acceptance of the 
position and the wisdom, fearlessness, and absolute fair-
ness of your course since, you not only averted that calam~ 
ity but performed great and lasting service to the Nation.26 
As for his own role in ending the crisis, Judge Gray spoke or 
wrote very little. His service in that regard was simply an applica-
tion of his belief in the peaceful settlement of disputes. 11 1 am con-
fident, .. he insisted, 11 that there is a bottom fact in human nature in 
which we can find an alternative of violence and the strong hand. 1127 
Apparently others agreed, for he was soon flooded with requests for 
his service as an arbitrator. Some requests were typed on formal 
stationery, some were handwritten on plain paper, some were from em-
P 1 ayers, some were from the workers, but a 11 had in common a respect 
and a confidence for Judge Gray's impartial abilities. 28 Unable to 
respond to all of the calls, he nevertheless rendered assistance 
whenever his judicial docket would permit. Of special significance 
was his service as practically the sole arbitrator in two additional 
mining strikes, one in Alabama and the other in Illinois. 
During this same period, Judge Gray was also called to partici-
pate in an arbitration of an international nature. The Dominican 
Republic had for years been marked by political instability and fis-
cal irresponsibility during which the customary seizures of private 
property were made. In one such instance, the nationalization of a 
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railroad owned by a corporation known as the Improvement Company, the 
United States Government felt obliged to intervene. As the result of 
negotiations conducted under American auspices, the Improvement 
Company and the Dominican government agreed on the sum to be paid to 
satisfy the company's claims and further agreed to submit to arbi-
tration the manner of pahment, the amount of the installments, and 
the nature of the security offered to assure payment. The panel of 
arbitration consisted of three members and included George Gray. 
Its award, announced in 1904, specified the details of compensation 
and was reluctantly accepted by the hard-pressed government. 29 
Twelve years later George Gray was again appointed to deal with 
a Latin American nation, but this time the issue was much more 
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complicated and the result was much less satisfying. In Mexico, the 
excesses of the revolution had already caused serious tensions with 
her northern neighbor when a series of atrocities led to armed inter-
vention. In January, 1916, 18 American mining engineers were mas-
sacred by the followers of the rebel, Francisco Villa, and two months 
later he led his band of cutthroats north of the border to sack 
Columbus, New Mexico. In response, General John Pershing led a puni-
tive expedition deep into Mexico and was continuing to occupy Mexican 
territory. Venustiano Carranza was in power in Mexico City, and the 
Wilson Administration, having granted him de facto recognition, 
sought to launch talks which would make it possible to withdraw the 
troops and to end the border incursions. 30 
The opportunity was readily seized by the Mexican Government, and 
in August, 1916, both sides appointed members of a Mixed Commission. 
The American appointees included Secretary of the Interior Franklin 
K. Lane and Dr. John R. Matt, who was the General Secretary of the 
International Committee of the Y.M.C.A. President Wilson had origin-
ally wanted former Secretary of State Richard Olney on the Commission, 
but he had declined because of unfamiliarity with the issues. Also, 
an effort to secure the participation of Justice Louis Brandeis was 
thwarted by a conference with Chief Justice White, who insisted that 
his duties would not permit such service. George Gray•s willingness 
to serve could be taken for granted. 11 I could not well decline the 
call upon me, any more than I could have declined an order to the 
Front, if I had been drafted into the service ... 31 His appointment 
was applauded by The New York Times because of his diplomatic experi-
ence with America•s neighbor to the north and because of his familiarity 
with the process of international arbitration. "He is an old-
fashioned Grover Cleveland Democrat," explained the writer, "a pro-
found lawyer and judge; a man of crystalline intellect, experienced, 
wary, suave, just, an arbitrator by temperament. 1132 Judge Gray had 
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been studying the Mexican situation for weeks before his appointment, 
and had concluded with his usual insight that it was a mistake to 
maintain the occupation over a prolonged period. When it appeared 
there was no longer any hope that the rebels could be captured, it 
would have been better, he felt, to withdraw the force to the border, 
"where they can hold Carranza's Government to the performance of its 
duty in suppressing Mexican banditry. 11 Continued occupation was a· 
clear violation of Mexican sovereignty, and 11 ••• the public opinion 
of the World will accuse us of insisting, against a weak and dis-
tracted Country, that we shall maintain a punitive expedition on its 
soil. . 
Carranza, of course, gave the highest priority to the early 
withdrawal of American troops, but he was nevertheless willing to co-
operate with President Wilson's request that the scope of the Commis-
sion be broadened to include other questions. Americans had endured 
a series of outrages during the course of the Mexican Revolution, and 
the heavy hand with which the Mexican Government was dealing with the 
Church created much bitterness on both sides of the border. Under the 
circumstances, however, the Commission, which convened in September in 
New London, Connecticut, and then transferred to Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, could do little more than to provide a dialogue between the 
two governments. The United States was reluctant to commit itself to 
a specific date by which the troops should be removed until theMexican 
Government should provide assurances that the border depredations 
would not continue. For its part, the Carranza Government sought a 
definite understanding regarding the right of hot pursuit, specifi-
cally the mutuality of the right and a time limit within which the 
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pursuit must be commenced. The failure of the Commission to overcome 
these obstacles bore heavily on Judge Gray: 11 I am still sadly of the 
opinion that we have failed where we might have succeeded in making 
an agreement as to border control and withdrawal satisfactory to the 
Mexican Government, 11 he confided. 11 I hope I am mistaken in all this, 
but I feel discouraged by the outcome of our long weeks of negotiation. 
We need not have sacrificed anything of honor or advantage to have had 
it different. However, ~ verrons. 1134 
In effect, the Revolution was permitted to run its course against 
much interference from the United States. American troops. were with-
drawn in February, 1917, but left behind a legacy of bitterness and 
suspicion. The failure of the negotiations was scarcely noticed by a 
public now more concerned with events in Europe than in Mexico. In 
the spring of 1917, German submarines were replacing Mexican bandits 
as the focus of American apprehension, leaving little room in the 
public consciousness for the Mexican-American Commission. It is 
viewed today as just one of a series of events which marked the course 
of the Mexican Revolution--one of a series of attempts by George Gray 
to improve international relations. 
Another element of the series, somewhat incongruous for the re-
tired judge, was the Pan-American Scientific Congress to which the 
Wilson Administration, in November, 1915, invited George Gray to 
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serve as a delegate. Not surprisingly, he hesitated to accept, doubt-
ing that he possessed the proper qualifications. Unless the purposes 
were broader than the name suggested, he. did not feel his participa-
tion would be of advantage for the United States. 35 Indeed, he was 
informed, the purposes of the Congress were broad and included a sec-
tion on international law. Here was an opportunity to improve interna-
tional relations in the New World, and his acceptance could not be 
long withheld. Secretary of State Lansing appointed him chairman of 
the American delegation. The sessions were held for two weeks in 
Washington and included a full schedule of social and public functions. 
Although he confessed that he was 11 a little tired 11 when he returned 
home, Judge Gray was satisfied with the results of the Congress. Not 
only had it brought together the scientists of two continents, it had 
promoted 11 the raprochement between the peoples of North and Latin 
America. 11 At a time when the very quality of civilization seemed 
threatened by the war then raging in Europe~ the role to be played 
by the nations of the New World was especially significant: 
It looks very much as if it would fall to the Americas to 
make a salvage, not only of International Law, but of our 
very civilization, out of the chaos of this bloody strug-
gle that is devastating the rest of the civilized world.36 
The war in Europe also brought into sharp relief the peace which 
had prevailed for a hundred years between the United States and Great 
Britain. At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 
which concluded the War of 1812, John Quincy Adams offered a prayer, 
based more on hope than on probability, that the event would commence 
a century of peaceful relations. That it did was an achievement the 
recognition of which could not be abated by the European conflagration; 
if anything, the Great War increased the incumbency of recognition. 
By treaty, the United States and Great Britain formed in 1915 a Com-
mission for the Advancement of Peace. As one of the individuals who 
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had rendered the greatest service in the cause of Anglo-American 
friendship, Judge Gray was included on the Commission. Shortly be-
fore his retirement in 1914, he had been a speaker at a grand celebra-
. tion of Anglo-American accord which was held at the Hotel Astor in 
New York City. Here he had defined the meaning of Anglo-American 
friendship in terms of its effect on the world peace movement to an 
audience which included Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, 
Joseph H. Choate, who had served as Ambassador to Great Britain, 
Walter Hines Page, who had just been appointed to that post, former 
presidential candidate Alton B. Parker, labor leader Samuel Gompers, 
and financiers Corn~lius Vanderbuilt and Andrew Carnegie. 37 
Throughout the range of his activities, and in spite of its con-
siderable variety, George Gray was able to maintain a careful balance 
between a constant political philosophy and a sense of pragmatism. 
Although he could be flexible as the coal arbitration demonstrated, 
he was essentially a conservative, and as such he was an opponent of 
the centralizing forces which had become prominent in American life. 
Especially within the federal bureaucracy he saw an alarming expansion 
of power at the expense of the states. Although he understood that gov-
ernmental agencies had to expand as the great corporations and labor 
unions assumed national proportions, he also understood the strains 
this expansion placed on federalism. If continued unchecked, the 
trend could reduce the states to mere provinces, governed by satraps. 
Judge Gray summarized his warning: 
The danger of this centralizing sentiment is that it ap-
peals to the selfishness of human nature and to the 
willingness to be relieved of the burdens and responsi-
bilities of self-government. But I am persuaded that 
the prevailing sentiment of the American people does 
not favor the exchange of our self-government communi-
ties and the individual liberty that they foster for the 
paternalism of a national Government, which suppresses 
the one and must, in the nature of things, tend to ex-
tinguish the other ..•. 38 
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The centripetal quality of the federal bureaucracy was paralleled 
by similar movements within American business, labor, and the society 
in general. The restrictive nature of the labor unions in particular 
was the subject of a remarkable speech by Judge Gray a few months 
after the coal arbitration awards were announced. Addressing a 
workingclass audience in the very heart of union territory, he 
stressed that liberty was only meaningful on the individual level. 
On the collective or corporate level, liberty was reduced in accord-
ance with the strength of the group, whether a social class or a labor 
union. It was the threat to individual liberty which Americans should 
fear, not some unseen foreign foe. Defense should be erected against 
those 11 insidious enemies 11 who proffered the security of a class, a 
corporation, or an association in the 11 Vain hope 11 that such subordina-
tion would bring happiness to those whose character was being weakened 
and destroyed. 
Labor unions, like other forms of association, were capable of 
abridging the freedom of their own members, and it was this abuse to 
which Judge Gray was opposed. It could be avoided, he maintained, by 
recognizing the rights of others. Personal and individual liberty 
11 Can only be safeguarded by a willing and generous recognition of the 
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like liberty of your neighbor or fellow citizen. 11 One's liberty was 
assured, he concluded, by the 11 homage 11 paid to the rights of others. 39 
His appreciation for the mutuality of rights separated George 
Gray from the class consciousness so characteristic of the early 
twentieth century. He could never divide society into rigid classes 
of capitalists and laborers, preferring instead to view his fellow 
citizens as individuals. This coincided with his view of the aims of 
the Founding Fathers, who had built a society and a government on in-
dividual liberty, not on class liberty, nor on corporate liberty, nor 
on guild liberty. A few years after his Pennsylvania address, The 
New York Times published a lengthy feature article which included 
Judge Gray's list of rights possessed by all citizens. Similar in 
structure to the Bill of Rights, it placed greater emphasis on the 
individual: the right to his home; the right to come and to go; the 
right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience; the 
right to work or not to work; the right to be exempt from interference 
by others in the enjoyment of these rights; the right to be exempt 
from the tyranny of one man or a few men; the right to so live that 
no man or set of men shall work his or their will on him against his 
consent. 40 
Outside the realm of industrial conflicts, his reputation was no 
less appreciated. In a front page item, The New York Times noted 
that he was being considered for the position of chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, along 
with such men as Governor Myron T. Herrick of Ohio and Secretary of 
the Treasury Leslie M. Shaw. The membership of the Board resembled 
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a Who's Who of American capitalists: Gould, Vanderbilt, Hill, Bel-
mont, Harriman, and Astor. 41 Moral strength was a quality the reco.g-
nition of which was not dependent upon social class. 
The wide range of George Gray's popularity and his appeal to 
both workers and capitalists inevitably began to associate his name 
with a campaign for the presidency. He had been actively involved in 
presidential politics for three decades, but usually as a figure be-
hind the scenes. Still, as early as 1892, Grover Cleveland's support-
ers had regarded Geroge Gray as 11 the legitimate heir to the nomination 11 
if their first choice did not get it. 42 By 1904 the Democratic Party 
had healed the wounds caused by the defection of the 11 Eastern gold-
buts11 eight years earlier. Twice the party had been led to defeat by 
William Jennings Bryan, and there was a consensus that it was time to 
try a new name. Several were available, including publisher William 
Randolph Hearst, former Secretary of State Richard Olney, and Cleve-
land Mayor Tom L. Johnson. George Gray favored a third term for 
Grover Cleveland, but his fellow Democrats from Delaware supported 
Judge Gray himself and instructed their delegation to the National 
Convention accordingly. The Judge refused to campaign in his own be-
half: 11 I have repeatedly stated that I am not and will not be a 
candidate for the Presidential nomination. 1143 But this did not pre-
vent his name from being mentioned prominently in several national 
journals and from being placed in nomination at the St. Louis Conven-
tion.44 However, the party turned instead to another conservative 
judge, Alton B. Parker of New York. The year 1904 was not destined 
to be a good year for the Democrats. In Chicago, the GOP Convention 
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nominated the incumbent president, Theodore Roosevelt, by acclamation 
and went on to achieve a sweeping victory. 
On election day, President Roosevelt proclaimed that he would 
not accept another nomination in 1908. For the supporters of George 
Gray, the stage was now set for a concerted effort. William Jennings 
Bryan had lost twice, and no other Democrat could match George Gray•s 
popularity throughout the nation. There was only one problem: Judge 
Gray insisted he was not interested in the White House, and he con-
sistently refused to encourage his supporters. Nevertheless, a 
strong campaign was mounted on his behalf; there was always the hope 
that he could be persuaded to accept a genuine national draft. 
The campaign began small. In the spring of 1907, The New York 
Times printed a letter to the editor favoring Judge Gray•s candidacy; 
six months later, the same newspaper ran a lengthy biographical essay 
entitled: 11 Ever Loyal to His Party and a Brilliant Defender of Con-
servative Principles, He Looms Large as a Presidential Possibility ... 45 
A spontaneous boom for Judge Gray was informally launched at the meet-
ing of the Democratic National Committee at French Lick Springs, Ini-
ana, in November, 1907. A more fonmal launching was scheduled for the 
following month in Washington. Richard R. Kenney of Dover, Delaware, 
was the power behind the Gray boom. A member of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee and a former U.S. Senator, Kenney recognized that: 
Gray was not actively seeking the nomination but hoped he would ac-
cept it as a matter of duty. 46 
As election year approached, three personalities emerged as the 
most likely to lead the Democrats into the campaign to succeed Presi-
dent Roosevelt: a governor, Johnson of Minnesota; a federal judge, 
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George Gray of Delaware; and a 11 Great Commoner, 11 the ubiquitous and 
indefatigable Bryan. Nowhere is the elasticity of the Democratic 
Party better demonstrated than its ability to embrace George Gray and 
William Jennings Bryan--two exponents of widely differing political 
philosophies and styles. 
Gradually, the cumbersome machinery of democratic partisan poli-
tics began to demonstrate the strengths and weakness of the three 
candidates. For Gray supporters, the campaign was unique: their 
candidate remained undeclared and refused to support or encourage 
their efforts. Nevertheless, the grassroots demonstration of support 
for Gray was as enthusiastic and sincere as if it had been profes-
sionally managed from behind the scenes. Delaware led the way, where 
the Democratic state organi~ation early endorsed Judge Gray for the 
presidency. The State Central Committee noted that Judge Gray did not 
desire the nomination but it also maintained that 11 ••• if nomin-
ated he would lead his party to victory at the polls, and if elected 
he would make a great, wise and good President. 11 Therefore, in the 
interests of the party and the country and not for his personal grati-
fication, his candidacy was being urged. 47 After the party primaries 
the Democrats met in state convention, where it was obvious that most 
delegates subscribed to the Central Committee•s summary of Judge 
Gray•s qualities. The sentiment was doubtless flattering, but Judge 
Gray responded with a letter to the Convention chairman: 11 ••• I am 
unwilling that the delegates from this State to the Denver Convention 
be instructed for me •... 1148 Undeterred and amidst prolonged cheer-
ing, the Convention instructed the delegates to vote as a unit for 
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Judge Gray as long as he had a chance of being nominated; then they 
were to support the acknowledged front-runner, William Jennings Bryan. 
In neighboring Pennsylvania, there was a strong popular support 
for the man who had settled the coal strike. "Coal Miners Boom Gray," 
read the front page item in The New York Times. 49 The movement there 
began with a gushing resolution passed by the Democratic Committee of 
Lackawanna County: 
He has reconciled capital and labor in the biterrest indus-
trial wars of modern times. Noteworthy among these recon-
ciliations is that accomplished by the Anthracite Strike 
Commission of which he was Chairman. No peacemaker in the 
whole-range of American history ranks with this man in the 
service he has rendered to his country.50 
In February, The New York Times editorialized in favor of the 
ticket which it felt represented the best opportunity to stop the 
Bryan bandwagon and to defeat William Howard Taft in November: Gov-
ernor Johnson and Judge Gray~ The editor anticipated that George 
Gray, as the nominee for the second position, would be able to at-
tract the support of organized labor. A letter from a laborer to 
the Philadelphia Record said that the working class had had enough 
of William Jennings Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt. The editor also 
quoted the Harrisburg Patriot, which descrived Judge Gray as "a 
sterling Democrat of the same type as Grover Cleveland" and predicted 
that his presence on the ticked "would harmonize the party and assure 
the election of a Democratic President and House of Representatives." 51 
Three months before the Democrats were to convene in Denver, The 
New York Times ran its second major biography of Judge Gray. It be-
gan by listing the reasons for the judge•s strong showing in his home 
state: he was a "Jeffersonian Democrat," he was "progressive without 
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being radical , 11 he was .. conservative without being retroactive, 11 he 
was 11 Sound of view as he has been sound of action, 11 he represented 
11 the best type of American ... The unnamed writer of the article ex-
plained that he had wired the judge requesting an interview. In 
spite of the inevitable refusal, he went anyway and found Judge Gray 
in his office in the Wilmington Post Office. Obviously, Judge Gray 
would not throw him out, and thus the Times reporter achieved what 
many would have thought impossible: an interview with a man who re-
fused to grant interviews about the presidential campaign of a man who 
refused to campaign. 
From the beginning, George Gray made it clear that he was not to 
be quoted and that he must not appear to be seeking the presidency. 
The reporter concluded that Judge Gray was a born diplomat. In spite 
of leading questions and a deliberate effort to draw him out, the 
Judge refused to discuss his own achievements. He was not equivocal--
he just would nottalkabout himself. This led the journalist to 
formulate mental pictures of the three leading Democrats: William 
Jennings Bryan, he said, had the appearance of a politician, Governor 
Johnson the appearance of an administrator, and Judge Gray the appear-
ance of a statesman. 11 The Delawarian shows a trust, a confidence in 
human nature that testifies the truth of what his friends say, that he 
never has sought politics; that politics have sought him. He would not 
1 ift his hand for the nomination ... 52 
In Washington, a headquarters was established to coordinate the 
Gray campaign, headed by Richard J. Beamish of Philadelphia, a news-
paperman, lawyer, and close friend of the candi·date. A week later, 
the George Gray League was sending campaign material to members of 
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Congress and to the delegates to the National Convention. John Cad-
wallader, the former Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, was Presi-
dent of the League, and Vance E. McCormick, former mayor of Harrisburg, 
served as chairman of the executive committee. 53 In spite of their 
efforts, the Judge stubbornly refused to act in any way which might 
be construed as lending support to his own candidacy. Earlier, he 
had declined to attend a dinner honoring William Jennings Bryan be-
cause he wasnotsympathetic to the Nebraskan•s politics and because 
he did not attend political functions. However, non-political func-
tions remained on his agenda; for example, the 34th annual dinner of 
the Princeton Club of Western Pennsylvania held in Pittsburgh. As a 
notable guest, in company with the University•s President, Dr. Woodrow 
Wilson, Judge Gray could not avoid the inevitable question: was his 
decision not to be a candidate for president irrevocable? 11 Emphati-
cally it is, 11 he replied. 11 1 am out of politics and I am going to 
stay out. 1154 The denial made its way to Beamish in Washington, who 
confirmed that it should be taken seriously. Nevertheless, he re-
mained confident that his candidate could be drafted to accept the 
nomination. 55 
In the final days preceding the National Convention, Beamish 
transferred his headquarters to Denver, accompanied by another close 
friend of George Gray, Josiah Marvel of Delaware. It was impossible 
to ignore Bryan•s commanding strength, but the Democrats could only 
nominate with a two-thirds vote of the Convention, and that factor 
kept alive the hopes of the other two camps. As they made their way 
westward, Beamish and Marvel insisted--most significantly at a stop 
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in Lincoln, Nebraska--that Bryan had overestimated his strength, that 
he could not muster the two-thirds necessary, and that the Convention 
would turn to Gray to avoid a deadlock. Once in the convention city, 
with headquarters established in the Savoy Hotel, the Gray campaigA 
moved into full swing, achieving what was expected to be the first of 
several victories: Gray's likeness was the first to appear in the 
various hotels, the result of the work of 11 a corps of expert bill-
stickers.1156 
It was brave talk, accompanied by brave gestures, but Beamish and 
Marvel and their co-workers were destined to be disappointed from the 
very beginning. For the Bryan camp, the question was not who would 
occupy the number one position--they were certain that had already 
been determined. Rather, their concern was to fill the number two 
position with a viable candidate who would balance and strengthen the 
ticket. On June 30, the word circulated that the vice-presidential 
nomination would go to a New Yorker if that delegation could agree on 
a man; otherwise, it was to go to George Gray. The next day, there 
was some indication that George Gray was William Jennings Bryan's 
first choice to share the ticket. Throughout, Beamish and Marvel in-
sisted that Bryan had his priorities reversed: the only ticket which 
could defeat William Howard Taft was Gray-Bryan, not the reverse. 
11 There is vitality in the Gray organization, 11 reported The New York 
Times, 11 and the Gray managers here are going to try to infuse enough 
of it into the body of delegates to cure the party's suicidal mania. 1157 
Doubtlessly, Judge Gray could have had the second position if he 
had but given his assent. By the time the issue was settled, over 
60 names had been considered by the Denver delegates, but a single 
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nod from Wilmington would have ended the speculation. Far removed from 
the excitement of the Convention, Judge Gray remained aloof from the 
Bryan overtures, a position which The New York Times took for granted: 
Judge Gray is a man of principle. That forbids him to have 
anything to do with Bryan and Bryanism. No Eastern Demo-
crat loyal to the old-time faith of the party, and mindful 
of his own reputation, will let his name go upon the ticket 
with that of Mr. Bryan. If Mr. Bryan is to be nominated 
the offer of the second place to a Democrat like Judge 
Gray would be an insult, its acceptance a degredation.58 
The foregone conclusion became official on July 10, when Bryan won 
the nomination on the first ballot. The resulting demonstration of 
70 minutes sharply contrasted with the one minute ovation accorded Judge 
Gray when his name was placed before the Convention. On the other hand, 
the timing and the schedule did not encourage lengthy demonstrations: 
it was almost midnight, and the Convention still had to hear the report 
from the Resolutions Committee. 59 The Gray boom had burst, and with it 
passed the last serious effort to draft the reluctant judge. He had 
never attracted more than the six delegates from his home state. Still, 
this was more than he had sought, and it cannot be denied that a vig-
orous campaign on his part would have made him a serious contender for 
the nomination. For several months preceding the Denver Convention, 
his name was the most prominent among the Democrats discussed by The 
New York Times. Even six years later, in a poll conducted to determine 
the popular sentiment concerning the Democratic nominee for the 1916 
election, George Gray was ranked in the top five. 60 
Other areas of service attracted George Gray's interests more 
than the White House; his work as a United States Senator and as a 
federal judge. At the same time, he operated on another level in 
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behalf of his country. Twice while serving in the Senate, he was 
called to represent the United States in negotiations with foreign 
powers. As a federal judge, his skill as an arbitrator was applied to 
domestic industrial disputes during the same period that it was ap-
plied to international disputes. On both levels, his purpose was the 
same: to exorcise those conditions which contributed to an atmosphere 
of violence. On the one hand, the potential violence was labor strife, 
on the other hand, it was international war. The steadfastness of 
purpose, the flexibility of approach, and--above all--the determination 
to achieve a just peace characterize George Gray's political philosophy, 
whether considered domestically or internationally. Three applications 
examined in detail demonstrate this irenic approach to international 
problems: the Quebec Conference with Canada, the Paris Conference 
with Spain, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE JOINT HIGH COMMISSION 
Speak softly, and carry a big stick. 
Theodore Roosevelt 
As if by deliberate intent, George Gray's first two diplomatic 
assignments could not possibly have provided greater contrast. Al-
though there were points of similarity--both conferences were held in 
the summer of 1898, and both were conducted in French-speaking cities--
the areas of difference are much more significant. The first confer-
ence, held in Quebec, was with a friendly neighbor; the second, held 
in Paris, involved a hostile enemy. The Quebec Conference was called 
to prevent difficulties from escalating; the Paris Conference was con-
ducted to conclude a war. George Gray's service in Canada would be 
brief and would be interrupted before the conference adjourned, but in 
France he would remain from the opening session until the last. The 
two conferences also contrasted in terms of their success; the first 
would fail, and the second would succeed. The Quebec Conference, 
brief, unsuccessful, and of secondary interest to a public emerging 
from war with Spain, nevertheless assumes an importance because it 
served as the point of introduction for George Gray's diplomacy. At 
the time of his appointment to the Joint High Corrrnission in July 1898, 
Senator Gray had no way of anticipating the brevity of his participa-
tion nor the eventual failure of the negotiations. 1 Thus the tasks 
which confronted him, study of the points in dispute and acquaintance 
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with his colleagues, both American and British, could not in any way 
be affected by the events which were to transpire a few weeks later. 
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The Quebec Conference had been called .in an effort to resolve a 
number of problems, most of a minor nature, which were disturbing the 
otherwise peaceful relationship existing between the United.States 
and Canada. Twelve topics were included in an agenda which was to be 
considered by a Joint High Commission, but of these 12 a single item, 
the boundary between Alaska and Canada, loomed ominously as the most 
difficult and the most important. Although Canada's southern border, 
the one which she shared with the northern tier of states, had been 
determined for several generations and posed no difficulty, her north-
western border with Alaska was a different matter. To any casual ob-
server, the boundary between Canada and the southern Panhandle of 
Alaska appears so arbitrary as to make territorial disagreements in-
evitable. In fact, the meandering nature of this line did give rise 
to disagreement which, if left unreconciled, could easily have de-
veloped into a serious confrontation, not without the threat of armed 
intervention. Fortunately for both sides, calmer counsel prevailed, 
and a peaceful settlement was achieved. This was not accomplished 
easily, for it required months of patient negotiations stretched over 
a period of several years. The Joint High Commission was just one 
step, albeit an unsuccessful one, along the path toward an eventual 
agreement. Other attempts would include the use of the regular chan-
nels of diplomacy, the use of Theodore Roosevelt's peculiar form of 
personal diplomacy, and finally the use of a mixed tribunal. That the 
boundary was resolved without violence is an indication of the willing-
ness of the American and British people to solve all such international 
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disputes peacefully and has served as a positive example for the rest 
of the world. 
As George Gray prepared to fulfill his responsibility as a member 
of the Joint High Commission, his first step was to acquaint himself 
with the historical antecedents of the disputed boundary. Specifically, 
what were the circumstances which had resulted in such a peculiar line 
of demarcation? What were the international agreements that had drawn 
the two neighbors into the dispute? What were the intentions and mo-
tives of the diplomats who had drawn up these agreements? What were 
the prior understandings which had permitted decades of peaceful co-
existence along this frontier? The same prerequisite of historical 
knowledge which applied to George Gray as he sought to resolve the dis-
pute applies also to the student of a later generation who seeks to 
understand the tension that developed between the United States and 
Canada in the final years of the nineteenth century. 
The boundary between Canada and Alaska was the product of the era 
of colonization during which North America was divided among the com-
peting empires of Europe. Great Britain had entered from the east, and 
her Canadian subjects had slowly extended her authority across the in-
terior until, early in the nineteenth century, it was approaching the 
Pacific Ocean. From Siberia, the Russian Empire had crossed the Ber-
ing Strait and gradually pushed its way southward a 1 ong the Pacific 
coast and eastward to confront the British advance. The southern 
border of Alaska was in effect the result of two empires which began 
in Europe and extended in opposite directions until they met on the 
other side of the globe. Both governments recognized that a boundary 
would have to be drawn in time, but early in the century there was no 
reason to give it immediate attention. The Napoleonic conflict and 
its aftermath monopolized the energies of government officials and 
dwarfed the concerns of the few distant subjects involved in the fur 
trade. 
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In 1821, however, a ukase from Czar Alexander I radically altered 
the situation, as it claimed the Pacific coastline as far south as the 
51st parallel, thus materially expanding the extent of the Russian 
claim. The challenge from St. Petersburg was met by the United States 
and Great Britain which shared a common determination that the extrav-
agance of the Russian claim would not be permitted. Fortunately, Amer-
ican and British foreign affairs were then being conducted by two men 
who were to establish peerless reputations and who were more than 
equal to the task of restraining Russian ambitions: John Quincy Adams 
and George Canning. Negotiations were soon launched in Washington, in 
London, and in St. Petersburg which were to result in two treaties, 
one between Russia and the United States signed on April 17, 1824, and 
the other between Russia and Great Britain signed on February 28, 1825. 
The effect of the treaty settlement was to permit Russia a graceful 
exit from an extravagant and untenable position. Her territorial 
claims were withdrawn to the southern tip of Alaska (54 degrees 40 
minutes). More importantly, an agreement was reached regarding the 
Alaskan boundary--an agreement which had been postponed from the 
earlier decades--an agreement which was to cause serious disruption of 
Anglo-American harmony 75 years later. 2 
Accordingly, the southern boundary between Russian Alaska and 
British Canada was to follow the crest of the coastal mountains, ex-
cept that nowhere was the line to be drawn further than ten marine 
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leagues from the coast. The effect was to bar British access to the 
ocean everywhere north of 54 degrees 40 minutes, but this was totally 
unacceptable to London as the goal had always been to pressure Russia 
to abandon the extravagance of the 1821 ukase. 3 The boundary defini-
tion was accepted with satisfaction by both sides, and no protest was 
registered during the 40 years in which Russia continued to rule 
Alaska. 
When the United States acquired Alaska in 1867, the treaty of 
purchase included the same boundary description which had appeared in 
the Anglo-Saxon Russian Treaty of 1825. Thereby the United States 
came into possession of precisely the same territory which Russia had 
held, with the identical boundary--as it developed--\'lith the same prob-
lems resulting from that boundary. In the first place, it proved im-
possible to draw the southern extremities of the boundary in exact 
conformity with the provisions of the Treaty of 1825, a result of the 
fact that the negotiators in St. Petersburg were confused about some 
of the points of geography. In addition, there was some confusion 
over terminology. Was the Portland Channel the same as the Portland 
Canal? Both terms had been used, but there had been no definition of 
either. However, these concerns were minor compared with the problem 
of the land boundary. Since the crest of the mountain chain lay 
further into the interior, the limit of ten marine leagues was applied. 
But from what point was the measurement to be made in the case of in-
lets, particularly of those fiords which extended well beyond the 
coastline? Was the measurement to be made from the mouth of the in-
let, or from the head? Stated in other terms, did the boundary cross 
these inlets, thus permitting the British to exercise jurisdiction 
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over the headwaters? By still another distinction, was any of the tide-
water along this narrow strip of land subject to British authority? 
In the 1880s, maps began to appear in British· Columbia which de-
viated from previous editions by showing that the boundary bisected 
the inlets. The seriousness of the conflict was exacerbated by the 
discovery of gold in the Klondike region farther north. The discov-
eries were not in the disputed area, but the excited movement of men 
and commerce in that general locale had drawn increased public atten-
tion to a previously obscure corner of the continent. Also, Canadian 
plans to construct a new transcontinental railroad were jeopardized 
because of the proximity of the proposed western terminus to foreign 
territory. Finally, at least two populated places were involved. If 
the British interpretation of the boundary prevailed, jurisdiction 
over these settlements would be shifted from the United States to 
Canada. 4 
In recognition of the importance of eliminating all confusion re-
garding the boundary, Great Britain and the United States agreed in 
1892 to a joint survey of the disputed Alaskan border. 5 Unfortunately, 
this failed to remove the primary source of conflict. Were the sur-
veyors to measure from the head or from the mouth of each inlet? Taku 
Inlet, for example, extended inland approximately 23 miles, Glacier 
Bay approximately 45 miles, and Lynn Canal approximately 70 miles. 
Hence, the distances--and differences--involved were considerable. 
Furthermore, according to the Canadian argument, the United States 
was contradicting itself by claiming these fiords as territorial wa-
ters and then measuring the border from the head. If American juris-
diction began at the head, the waters would be part of the high seas; 
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if the Americans exercised jurisdiction over the fiords, American 
sovereignty had to extend to the mouth of the fiord, and the survey 
should be measured from that line. By this argument, the boundary 
would bisect the inlets; Canada would receive territory currently 
occupied by the United States and would acquire free access to the 
sea. International authority and even the United States Supreme 
Court were cited by British advocates, but Washington could not so 
easily be persuaded to part with territory over which it had once ex-
ercised jurisdiction. II .. The feeling regarding the retention of 
territory, over which the Stars and Stripes have once flow, amounts to 
a religion, 11 complained the British. 6 
In spite of Washington's rejection of the British claim, and 
Britain's obvious inability to defend the claim militarily, the fact 
that it came from a great power and from a government with which Wash-
ington desired good relations meant that it could not be ignored. To 
resolve the difficulty, the two governments agreed in July, 1898, to 
constitute a Joint High Commission to deal with outstanding problems 
between Canada and the United States. By its appointments to the Com-
mission, the Crown indicated the importance of the Commission and the 
willingness of the government to flatter America and to seek an ami-
cable solution to the difficulties. Chief among the Canadian members 
was Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Premier. During a recent visit to Wash-
ington, he had spoken favorably of a commission and could be expected 
to exert the full weight of his office in behalf of the conference. 
As a member of Parliament for a quarter of a century, he was an admirer 
of Abraham Lincoln, and he had made no secret of his respect for the 
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United States in general. Cordiality could also be expected from the 
other Canadian members, Sir Richard J. Cartwright, Minister of Trade 
and Commerce and experienced member of Parliament, Sir Louis H. Davies, 
Minister of Marine and Fisheries and member of Parliament, and John 
Charlton, member of Parliament since 1872. Like Premier Laurier, they 
shared a respect for the United States with whose institutions and 
history they were conversant. An awareness of American military po-
tential and territorial sensitivity increased their desire to maintain 
friendly relations. 7 Because Canadian foreign affairs in 1898 were 
still handled from London, the Crown appointed Lord Herschell, the 
former Chance 11 or of Great Britain, to represent imperi a 1 interests. 
The final member of the British delegation, added after the others had 
been announced, was Sir James Winter, the Premier of Newfoundland which 
was not yet part of the Dominion of Canada. 
As if to emphasize the relative insignificance of the negotiations 
for the United States, which after all was almost totally preoccupied 
by the concurrent Spanish-American War, President McKinley appointed 
a set of commissioners whose credentials were not as impressive as 
their counterparts. Although not lacking in competence or sincerity, 
none of the American commissioners held rank as high as that of Pre-
mier Laurier, nor was there even a cabinet member. This can only 
partly be explained by the war with Spain, which naturally tended to 
distract the attention of the government and of the public. It was 
also an indication that a boundary dispute between Alska and Canada 
could not be expected to be of equal importance to the two governments 
involved. The announcement of President McKinley•s appointments to the 
Joint High Scommission was carried by The New York Times on page six, 
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under an ad for ladies' shoes (selling for $1.98 a pair). 8 The cas-
ualness of the American attitude toward· Canada was described for his 
readers by a newspaper correspondent from Toronto: 11 The people of 
Canada can scarcely understand the feeling of absolute indifference 
toward Canadian affairs that one continuously encounters here •..• 
To the average American in public life the Dominion does not exist. 119 
George Gray was one of the two United States Senators to serve 
on the commission. As a ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations 
Committee, he was held in high esteem by President McKinley, who had 
complete confidence in his ability to transcend party affiliation in 
favor of national policy. The other senator was Charles Warren Fair-
banks, a personal friend of the president. Long a power in Indiana 
politics, Senator Fairbanks was a member of the Republican Old Guard 
and in 1904 would be Theodore Roosevelt's successful running mate. 
Another powerful Republican member of Congress who received appointment 
to the commission was Maine's Nelson Dingley. As Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, he was an authority on tariff legislation and 
an appropriate choice to deal with a major trading partner of the United 
States. Two former officials were included in the original list of 
American delegates: John A. Kasson, former Assistant Postmaster Gen-
eral, former Minister to Spain, to Austria, and to Germany, and expert 
on international weights and measures; and John Watson Fosier, former 
Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison. A sixth name, that of 
Thomas Jefferson Coolidge of Boston, was added to balance the addition 
of Sir James Winter to the British delegation. 
As he prepared for the first meeting of the American delegation, 
scheduled for July 22, 1898, at the State Department, George Gray must 
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have reflected on the meaning of his appointment. John Kasson and 
John Foster had loyally served the Republican Party for years, and 
Senator Fairbanks and Congressman Dingley were among its most promi-
nent spokesmen. But it was not merely party affiliation which served 
to distinguish Senator Gray from his fellow delegates. Earlier he 
had opposed Nelson Dingley's efforts to enact a protective tarriff 
and had voted against the legislation establishing the tariff which 
bore the Congressman's name. Although he could not know it at the 
time, this was to be George Gray's first experien~e with a practice 
President McKinley would repeat later in the summer when he was con-
stituting the Paris Peace Commission, not in terms of an equal number 
of votes but in such a manner as to assure that both sides of a major 
question would be heard. Bipartisanship to the McKinley Administra-
tion in 1898 meant inclusion of a personality from the opposition 
party who would represent interests not otherwise considered, and 
who could work harmoniously within the delegation for the common good. 
The assignment given to George Gray in July, 1898, sensitive as it was, 
proved merely a harbinger of a similar but even more difficult assign-
ment which would follow in a few weeks. The diplomatic skills which 
George Gray would be called upon to exercise in Quebec, particularly 
those of opposition and accommodation, would be needed in greater 
abundance in Paris. 
Once assembled in Washington, the American delegation proceeded 
to perfect its organization. Senator Fairbanks, as the first member 
appointed, presided, Chandler P. Anderson of New York was elected sec-
retary, and a technical expert, Charles H. Butler, was assigned to 
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assist in the preparation of the American position on each of the is-
sues to be considered by the Joint High Commission. The issues them-
selves were not made public at this time, establishing a precedent 
for secrecy which was to extend to the joint sessions with the British. 
Having completed the necessary preliminaries, the delegation adjourned 
in the evening. It would reassemble the following month in Quebec. 10 
August 23, 1898,was set as the date on which the Joint High Com-
mission would convene, and as the pace of the preparations mounted, 
so did expectations, especially among Canadian observers. One hailed 
it hyperbolically: 
It is a movement reflecting the best spirit of the high-
est existing form of civilization. Perhaps no diplomatic 
conference has ever been entrusted with more important 
functions. Upon the issues of its deliberations hang 
consequences of the deepest importance to the present, 
and consequences that will reach far down into the fu-
ture, the unfolding of whose mighty issues mankind will 
watch with bated breath. 
With greater faculty for rhetoric than for political realism, the 
Canadian observer continued: 
The dictates of reason, the ties of consanguinity, the 
bonds of a common language and race, and the high claims 
of religion and humanity have with sudden and startling 
effect swept away the prejudices, the animosities and 
the jealousies that have kept these two mighty nations 
apart, and in place of all these we have the dawn of an 
era of good will, and of a common desire to act for a 
common purpose from the highest of motives.ll 
It was an unrealistic appraisal, of course, notwithstanding the 
fact that most of the topics before the Commission were not expected 
to cause much difficulty. An end to the wasteful and cruel destruc-
tion of wildlife caused by pelagic sealing among the Pribilof Islands 
in the Bering Sea was a goal which appealed to both governments. Of 
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greater difficulty were those questions relating to fisheries. Canadian 
officials felt that the United States was negligent in protecting the 
resources of the Great Lakes. On the North Atlantic Coast of Canada, 
American fishermen had been enjoying privileges granted by a treaty of 
1818, and Canadian interests felt it was time to curtail these rights. 
Left unresolved by the Joint High Commission, the dispute over fishery 
rights would continue and expand until finally eliminated in 1910 
through the process of arbitration. Appropriately, George Gray would 
serve as a member of the panel of arbitrators. 
The immense quantity of commerce which flowed across the border, 
while of obvious mutual advantage to the United States and Canada, 
also produced technical difficulties which were laid before the Joint 
High Commission. Even before the twentieth century, Canada traded 
less with Great Britain than with the United States, which accounted 
for over half of her imports. Already measured in the tens of mil-
lions of dollars, the value of the trade was expected to increase if 
the two governments could agree to a joint reduction of the tariff. 
So controversial was this issue of reciprocity that American newspapers 
tended to dwell on this point rather than on the boundary question, a 
further indication of the differing priorities. 12 Another technical 
problem closely related to the flow of commerce was the question of 
bonding regulations. Most of the wheat crop from Manitoba arrived in 
New York City by way of the Hudson River and the Great Lakes. Simi-
larly, the products of Ontario and Quebec, including lumber, were 
passed through Lake Champlain and New York City to markets in the West 
Indies and South America. Canadian railroads and canals reciprocated 
by providing the most direct route between Minneapolis and New Eng-
land. Hence, it was of the greatest importance to both countries 
that bonding regulations be set on a firm and permanent basis. 
Other questions included alien labor laws, the mining rights of 
foreigners, readjustment of customs duties, naval regulations on the 
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Great Lakes, the conveyance of foreign prisoners, wrecking and salvage 
rights, etc. 13 In all, there were approximately 12 topics to be con-
sidered, the number varying according to the manner in which the ques-
tions were grouped. Above all, of course, was the Alaskan boundary 
question which subordinated the other considerations. On this vital 
question, it was probably unreasonable to expect that the Commission 
could reach a solution. Alaska had become intertwined with Anglo-
American involvement elsewhere, specifically at the opposite end of 
the continent, where there was much interest in an isthmian canal. 
By the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, both nations were pledged 
to permit joint control over any future canal, but now the United 
States was determined to exercise unilateral control. Great Britain, 
if pressured to make concessions in the south, could expect concessions 
in the north. Increasingly, Congress was demonstrating its impatience 
with the diplomatic efforts of the administration to reach an accord 
with London. A resolution was considered by the House of Representa-
tives which called on the government to commence construction of the 
canal in defiance of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and, although Secretary 
Hay opposed such a move, he used the proposed legislation as leverage 
against the British. In addition, he even threatened to resign if the 
British would not cooperate, thereby permitting the president to ap-
point a new secreatary of state less sympathetic to Anglo-American 
unity. 14 
These pressures~ however, were behind the scenes and were not 
at all in evidence as George Gray and his American colleagues moved 
into the 35 rooms which had been reserved for them at the Chateau 
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Frontenac, Quebec•s largest hotel. Once settled, he joined with the 
others in a routine which was soon to be repeated in Paris. Although 
there was much hard work and although the daily sessions were to be 
marked by tough bargaining on both sides, the social amenities of the 
occasion were not to be slighted. On August 22, the day before the 
Joint High Commission was to convene, its individual members were 
treated to a sight-seeing tour. In the succeeding weeks, this would 
be followed by a series of 11 ••• balls and receptions, moonlight 
cruises on the St. Lawrence, and excursions into the mountains ... 15 
In time, as the hostesses of Quebec vied with one another, the so-
cial events took on more of the quality of competition and less of 
entertainment. The grandest spectacle was reserved for the public un-
veiling of a statue of Samuel de Champlain, which was attended by the 
highest officials of the Canadian government, as well as representa-
tives of the Crown. As if to underscore the seriousness of the deli-
berations which were being hosted by the city which Champlain had 
founded, the occasion also featured a parade of British and American 
warships. Less successful, but spectacular in its own way, was a 
chess game which was staged on another occasion by a local hostess. 
Her idea for using living pieces was original, but a sudden rain-
storm caused the figures to break character and scurry for shelter. 
No wonder one historian has concluded that ..... some of the gruff 
repartee at the morning conference table may have been due as much to 
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upset stomachs and aching heads as to reasons of state. 1116 In Septem-
ber, 1898, the commissioners recessed to transfer their deliberations 
to Washington. Here in January, 1899, their labors resumed, as did 
their entertainments. President McKinley entertained with a ball, 
and this was followed by so many social engagements the reporter from 
Toronto was unable to keep track of them. 17 
The display of cordiality among the commissioners contrasted 
sharply with the secret nature of their deliberations. As a result, 
the public was prevented from forming an accurate understanding of the 
course of the negotiations which were being conducted in the Parlia-
ment Building. At the initial session of the Joint High Commission, 
held August 23, 1898, Senator Fairbanks nominated Lord Herschell to 
be the permanent president, and the other delegates concurred. 
Three secretaries were named, and a Committee of Four was formed to 
prepare a plan of procedure. However, the press was not allowed to 
view the daily negotiations; it was told it would have to await the 
finished product which would be revealed at the conclusion of the 
sessions. Presumably this would be in the form of a treaty which 
would be submitted to the respective governments for ratification. 
Lord Herschell and Senator Fairbanks were selected to provide press 
releases, but at the end of August, The New York Times lamented that 
11 ••• so far there has been nothing which the commission has consid-
ered wise to reveal. 11 When the two spokesmen were approached by re-
porters, each praised the hospitality of the other side but refused 
to give any indication of the events transpiring behind the closed 
doors. 18 
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Inevitably in such an atmosphere, rumors arose to supplement, 
but more often to distort, the meager facts. Throughout the specula-
tion, the press focused on the presumed differences between Congress-
man Dingley and the British regarding the issue of reciprocity of 
trading arrangements. On August 30, The New York Times observed that 
books and documents relating to the Bering Sea sealing arbitration 
of 1893 were much in evidence. This was the first indication that it 
was not reciprocity that would be the stumbling block but another 
issue--an issue which was of common interest to the arbitrators of 
1893 and the commissioners of 1898: the Alaska boundary. 19 
The issue of the boundary was soon distilled by the commissioners 
to a single port, and the whole matter of the negotiation in retro-
spect can be easily summarized. Although they maintained that the 
true boundary bisected several inlets, the British chose to press 
their case in favor of only one, Lynn Canal. If the United States 
would recognize the British claim to a small port on this Canal, 
Pyramid Harbor, the other claims could be compromised, and the Com-
mission could proceed to consider the other issues which had been 
laid before it. The United States proposed that Pyramid Harbor and 
two other coastal communities be made free ports, that British 
vessels be given the same privileges as American vessels, and that 
the British be permitted to maintain a customs establishment at 
these points. In other words, the British would have free and un-
qualified use of the ports but not the sovereignty. It was a gener-
ous offer, particularly considering the weakness of the British claim 
and the fact that the territory was already in the possession of the 
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United States. When news of the American proposal was leaked to power-
ful commercial interests on the West Coast, the negative reaction was 
immediate and vigorous and caused the proposal to be withdrawn. It 
was of little consequence, however, as the British were indisposed to 
. accept anything less than a hundred year lease of Pyramid Harbor. 20 
Having reached an impasse which was not at all affected by the 
transfer to Washington, the commissioners turned to a consideration 
of an alternate mechanism whereby the boundary question could be 
resolved. The obvious course and the one suggested by the British 
delegation was arbitration. This was deemed particularly appropriate 
since the United States only a few years earlier had induced Great 
Britain to arbitrate the boundary dispute between Venezuela and 
British Guiana. But the American commissioners professed that they 
failed to see an analogy, and, as a practical matter, it was ex-
tremely unlikely that the Senate would have supported any arbitra-
tion which could result in the loss of American territory. 21 
On February 20, 1899, the Commission recessed. As the recess 
lengthened, it was gradually recognized as permanent. The failure 
of the Commission was most keenly felt by those who had hailed its 
formation as the dawn 11 0f an era of better feeling between the two 
great Anglo-Saxon commonwealths. 1122 The Alaskan boundary remained 
as controversial as before, and there was nothing on the surface to 
suggest a quick and smooth solution. Fortunately, this negative ap-
pearance was somewhat deceiving. In actuality, the necessary founda-
tions had been laid upon which the final solution was achieved in 
1903. The two sides had been drawn close enough together by the Joint 
High Commission to permit a modus vivendi, reached in an exchange of 
notes in October, 1899, which preserved the rights of both parties 
and reduced the level of tempers in Ottawa and Washington. The ar-
rangement was sufficiently commodious to insure the status quo for 
the next three years, during which time the parties involved experi-
enced considerable change. Death by natural causes had removed Con-
gressman Dingley, Lord Herschell, and Queen Victoria, and death by 
an assassin's bullet had removed President McKinley. The United 
States had won an easy victory over Spain and had acquired a distant 
colonial empire. Great Britain had won a difficult victory over the 
Boers, and both nations had been the target of the Boxers. But the 
biggest change of all was in the White House, now occupied by Theo-
dore Roosevelt. 
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In reply to the British offer of arbitration,, the United States 
had proposed a unique variation: a mixed tribunal of three members 
from each side but without a neutral umpire. Precedent for this 
scheme lay in an unratified treaty signed by Secretary of State 
Richard Olney and British Minister Pauncefote. By its provisions, a 
decision would require the concurrence of any five members. Intended 
for use in the most sensitive situations which could not be resolved 
through traditional diplomatic channels, the mixed tribunal was pro-
posed by the Roosevelt Administration. British leaders, including 
Canadian Premier Laurier, eagerly accepted this opportunity to es-
cape from an embarrassing impasse with dignity. The arrangement was 
formalized by the exchange in March, 1903, of ratifications of a con-
vention which simplified the procedure by permitting a decision based 
on a simple majority. The two Canadians and one Englishman appointed 
by King Edward and the three Americans appointed by President Roose-
velt included none of the members of the Joint High Commission. The 
tribunal convened in London, accepted a Case, a Counter-case, and an 
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Argument from each side, listened to oral arguments, voted, and ad-
journed within eight months from the exchange of ratifications--a 
dizzying pace for the mechanics of international relations. The de-
cision, rendered by a vote of the three Americans and the Englishman, 
sustained the American interpretation of the boundary, although there 
was some slight variation. 
The triumph was extravagantly hailed by President Roosevelt as 
11 the greatest diplomatic victory of the United States during the 
present generation. 1123 He would have been closer to the truth had he 
proclaimed it a justification of his Big Stick philosophy. Speaking 
quietly, i.e., without fanfare, he had, during the previous year, 
garrisoned military posts in southern Alaska, so that America's mili-
tary strength in the area outnumbered Canada's 20 to 1. In addition, 
during the spring of 1903 he had written letters to Americans in Lon-
don--letters which he could assume would be seen by British leaders. 
In one of these he asserted that if the London tribunal failed, he 
would 11 request Congress to make an appropriation which will enable me 
to run the boundary on my own hook . without any further regard to 
the attitude of England and Canada. 1124 In effect, he had guaranteed 
the decision before the tribunal ever assembled. 
Still, the position of arbitration, a cause advocated by George 
Gray, had been enhanced, not in terms of abstract justice, but in terms 
of power politics. It was a demonstration of a technique by which 
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democratic governments, sensitive to pressures from within their own 
body politic, could extract themselves with honor and dignity from 
indefensible positions. It was, to be sure, a painful lesson for the 
Canadians. Even before the London tribunal had been organized, a 
conservative Canadian journal in a suicidal rage had called for war 
against both Great Britain and the United States. Canadian interests 
had clearly been sacrificed to preserve harmony between London and 
Washington. At the same time, it was equally clear that Canada had 
the most to benefit from that harmony. Ironically, she paid the 
most and received the most. 25 
Finally, and most satisfying to the peaceful instincts of George 
Gray, the London decision affirmed the validity of irenic diplomacy. 
Although the territorial dispute may have appeared trivial to most 
Americans during the summer of the Spanish-American War--certainly 
not a worthy casus belli--history was replete with examples of nations 
which had raced to the battlefield over far less. That war had been 
averted could be explained in terms of a single generalization which 
Senator Gray could extrapolate for later application: irenic diplo-
macy would depend more on the gradient than on the group coup. Peace, 
even between America and her northern neighbor, was to be achieved 
neither by a single sweeping gesture nor by a single inspired thought. 
Its achievement would rest upon a foundation which had been construc-
ted slowly and with the greatest attention to detail. 
What irenic diplomacy lacked in dramatic headlines it compen-
sated for in permanence. The principle of achieving diplomatic suc-
cess through incremental steps was easily obscured by its simplicity. 
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Thus, President Wilson would opt for the grand coup 20 years later at 
Versailles, and it can be argued that much later, in attempts to re-
solve tensions in the Middle East, for example, the principle of in-
crement would be ignored in favor of a sweeping gesture to the 
grandstand. For Senator Gray, the end justified the means, and time 
was a small price to pay when the reward was to be measured in terms 
of Anglo-American comity. Within this framework Quebec had an impor-
tance not because of George Gray's role in settling the boundary dis-
pute, but because of the influence of the Conference on him. The 
London tribunal would, in time, confirm his principles, but in the 
summer of 1898 it was not necessary, as patience was already in im-
portant part of Senator Gray's personality. Before the Joint High 
Commission had recessed, he had been called to exercise this virtue 
and to apply irenic diplomacy elsewhere--in Paris. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
Take up the White Man's burden. 
Rudyard Kipling 
George Gray received his second presidential summons in Septem-
ber, 1898. As before, he was called to assume a position on a com-
mission, but this time the responsibilities were far greater. The 
war which had been conducted against Spain during the summer months 
had been successful on land and on sea, an armistice had been arranged 
through the efforts of the French government, and the Peace Conference 
was to assemble no later than October 1 in Paris. Although Senator 
Gray's work in Quebec had only recently begun, the importance of con-
cluding a peace with Spain and the immediacy of the approaching dead-
line compelled President McKinley to terminate his service on the 
Joint High Commission in favor of a position on the Peace Commission. 
The appointment was announced by the press on September 10, 1898, 
and the next few days were crowded with preparations, interviews, 
and travel as Senator Gray transferred from Quebec to Washington and 
then to Paris. The rapid and varied pace of American diplomacy in 
the pivotal year of 1898 is nowhere better demonstrated than in the 
sudden and unexpected shifts of responsibility experienced by Senator 
Gray. From the Quebec conference with a friendly neighbor he abruptly 
transferred to the Paris confrontation with a defeated enemy--all 
within the span of a single month. 
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It was in 1783 that the United States first used the French capi-
tal as the site for negotiations with a foreign enemy, and the prece-
dent established by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay was 
followed 115 years later by five commissioners who were also charged 
with the responsibility of concluding a peace with a European power. 
Like Great Britain, Spain was an imperial power with traditional inter-
ests in the New World. Unlike Great Britain, Spain had long since 
passed the period of her greatness; what was left of her empire was 
dissolving, and the only comforts allowed her were the memories of a 
glorious past. Her defeat by the United States had been rapid and 
thorough, and all that remained for the Paris Commission was to re-
flect on paper what had already occurred on land and sea. The simplic-
ity of the task awaiting both sets of commissioners, however, was 
negated by the complexity of European diplomacy and American politics. 
The possibility of a renewal of hostilities, perhaps with other Euro-
pean powers, and the difficulty of securing Senate acceptance of the 
completed treaty compelled the McKinley Administration to select the 
American commissioners with the greatest care. As finally consti-
tuted, the American delegation consisted of five members: Senator 
George Gray, Senator Cushman Davis, Senator William Frye, former Sec-
retary of State William Day, and editor Whitelaw Reid. 
With the appointment of Senator Gray, the President was able to 
satisfy several requirements of a balanced Commission. In the first 
place, Gray was the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and his membership was a recognition of the bipartisan support 
given to the President during the war. In addition, Senator Gray 
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was the symbol of anti-imperialism, and his presence in Paris would 
assure that any decision to retain territory would be made only after 
a thorough review of both sides of the issue. The advantages of his 
participation were sufficiently evident that the President refused 
to be satisfied with the Senator's initial rejection of appointment. 
Supreme Court Justice Edward D. White was the President's second 
choice for the position, and it was even announced that his appoint-
ment had been accepted. However, the original invitation was kept 
open, and on September 10 the White House issued the statement that 
Senator Gray had accepted the call and would be the fifth member of 
the Commission rather than Justice White. The Senator anticipated 
that the Paris Conference would be the most difficult assignment of 
his career, and the President believed that Democratic representation 
on the Commission would facilitate Senate approval of the treaty. 
In time, the expectations of both would prove correct. 1 
In common with George Gray, his two senatorial colleagues, Wil-
liam P. Frye from Maine and Cushman K. Davis from Minnesota, were 
members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Unlike George Gray, 
however, they were expansionists and Republicans. With Senator Davis 
in particular, George Gray was in sharp disagreement regarding the 
proper course of American foreign policy. Earlier, Senator Davis 
had written an article which criticized President Cleveland's re-
sistance to the annexation of Hawaii and Samoa. "The conduct of our 
foreign relations during the last two years," he wrote of the Demo-
cratic Administration, "has not reflected honor upon this country." 
Senator Gray had responded in behalf of the Administration, describ-
ing Cleveland's Hawaiian policy as "an example of civil courage and 
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conscientious discharge of high public duty. 11 It was not Democratic 
restraint that was to be feared, he asserted, but rather the tendency 
of Republican diplomacy to thrust American institutions forcefully 
upon alien populations: 
It is meddlesome and aggressive; it is envious and sus-
picious; it is covetous and not very scrupulous; it ex-
emplifies the evil of power without self-control, and of 
susceptibility to insult without a due proportion of 
self-respect. Its spirit is that of conquest; its first 
reason, as well as its last, is force. . . . It over-
throws by force a Queen in Hawaii in the name of liberty 
and annexation, and maintains by force a King in Samoa 
in the name of independence and autonomy. If this be 
Republican diplomacy, and we are to have more of it, 
God help the American Republic!Z 
In one of the ironies common in the world of politics, these two artie-
ulate exponents of conflicting solutions to the most difficult issue 
resulting from the recent war found themselves as fellow laborers 
toward the goal of a lasting peace. 
Because of its informal organization, the Commission presidency 
devolved by consensus upon the erstwhile Secretary of State, William 
Rufus Day. As a member of President McKinley's Ohio coterie., Judge 
Day was involved in the successive changes of leadership through 
which the State Department passed during the first two years of the 
Admini~tration. The President had originally named Senator John 
Sherman to head the Department. Like the President, he was an Ohioan, 
but he was also past 70, and his appointment was necessary to create 
a Senate vacancy which could be filled by the President•s friend, 
Mark Hanna. As the Assistant Secretary, Judge Day had already been 
handling much of the important business of the Department prior to 
his term as Secretary which began in April, 1898. With the appoint-
ment five months later to the Peace Commission, his term ended, and 
he was replaced by John Hay, whose five-year term brought stability 
to the Department. 
It was another member of the Commission, not the presiding of-
ficer, who exercised the greatest influence on his colleagues and 
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on the result of the deliberations. Whitelaw Reid was a man of com-
manding personality, not untinged by arrogance, who had already 
gained diplomatic experience in Paris, where he spoke the language 
fluently and where he had made the personal acquaintance of the Span-
ish Ambassador, Senor Leon Y. Castillo. As the editor of the New 
York Tribune, he had long favored American expansion, .including the 
retention of the Philippines. II • We must strike and cripple 
Spain wherever we can," he wrote in June, 1898. "We have already 
struck her in the Philippines, and what we seize we shall certainly 
hold, so long as it serves our purpose, and so far as the responsi-
bility in destroying the existing government may carry us." 3 A 
month before his appointment to the Commission, he had written to 
John Hay in London: 
I haven't in the least undertaken to shut people's eyes to 
the difficulties and dangers of the Philippine business; 
but I don't see how we can honorably give them back to 
Spain, or do anything with them but try to make the best 
of what Dewey flung into our arms.4 
Ever the journalist, Whitelaw Reid kept a prolix diary of the Paris 
proceedings which predtctably credited its author with the success of 
the Conference--a conclusion as accurate as it was immodest. 5 
Traditionally, the secretary of a diplomatic commission was lit-
tle more than an amanuensis--at most, the supervisor of a staff of 
stenographers. The appointment of John Bassett Moore guaranteed that 
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on this occasion the position would have much greater significance. 
His command of international law was probably the most impressive of 
any American scholar, and his presence made available to the Commis-
sioners the most expert opinion on technical matters. Years later, 
George Gray, in a letter to Professor Moore, confirmed his high opin-
ion of his friend 1 s contribution: 
On the numerous points of difference between the Ameri-
can and Spanish Commission, no discussion was had, except 
upon the basis of an argument prepared by you, and the 
frequent occasions upon which you worked all night, in 
order to have material prepared for our meetings the next 
day, were noticed and commented upon by every member of 
our Commission.6 · 
The problem of language was greatly reduced by the appointment of 
Arthur Ferguson as the American interpreter. None of the American 
delegates spoke Spanish, and only two or three of their counterparts 
were said to speak English. Although a few members of both delegations 
were said to speak French, it was decided that it would be best to 
conduct the sessions in the language of the victorious nation. Never-
theless, it was essential that the Americans have at their disposal 
trustworthy translations from the Spanish, and here Arthur Ferguson 
served them well. 11 His command of Spanish was complete, extending to 
the subtlest nuances of the language, and his alert skill had a clari-
fying and most helpful effect at important moments. 117 
The decision to hold the conference in Paris was not at first 
approved by all the'cornmissioners. The French press had been strongly 
pro-Spanish throughout the conflict, and many of the traditional ele-
ments of French society had criticized Yankee imperialism. It had 
been, after all, the French Ambassador in Washington who had ap-
proached President McKinley in behalf of the Spanish to ascertain the 
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terms of peace. Although Whitelaw Reid preferred a neutral site such 
as Berne or The Hague, Paris proved to be a fortunate choice~ 8 In 
1898 the city was more than just another European capital. For two 
generations she had been the City of Light, and now she could lay 
claim to another sobriquet: the City of Reconciliation. It was Paris 
which had reconciled its population with its new landmark, the Eiffel 
Tower--at first a symbol of considerable controversy but now the cen-
tral feature of a new international exposition scheduled for 1900. It 
was to Paris that London, Vienna, and Rome looked for cultural leader-
ship. It was only appropriate that Paris would be the setting of a 
reconciliation between the forces of the Old World and the New. 
The American delegation took up quarters in the Hotel Continental, 
against the wishes of the frugal George Gray, who would have preferred 
a less expensive hotel. From there, they were able to watch in rela-
tive comfort and safety the convulsions which accompanied the greatest 
political scandal of the Third Republic--the Dreyfus Affair. In a 
letter to his son, George Gray described the scene: 
The French troops occupied all the approaches to House of 
Deputies. The Place de la Concorde was full of soldiers, 
and cavalry and infantry were in evidence all day as tho 
there was a state of seige. It was said that 10,000 were 
in about the Place de la Concorde & the buildings across 
the Seine.9 
Notwithstanding the potential danger, George Gray found the Gallic 
temperament 11 rather amusing. 11 He and Judge Day took advantage of the 
opportunity to attend a judicial hearing on the Dreyfus Case, a real 
privilege for the Americans since few spectators were permitted into 
the courtroom. 
In spite of the Dreyfus excitement and the pro-Spanish senti-
ments of the press and population, the French government followed 
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scrupulously correct protocol. This official impartiality was con-
firmed by Monsieur Delcasse, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
at his reception for the American delegates held on September 28. 
The next day he hosted a luncheon at which the two Commissions met 
for the first time. It was 11 a beautiful affair, 11 wrote George Gray, 
11 and admirably accomplished what was intended ... The Queen Regent 
of Spain had appointed five eminent personalities to ease as best 
they could the pain of dismantling the Spanish Empire. Don Eugenio 
Montero Rios headed the Commission, and the other four included Don 
Buenaventura Abarzuza, Don Jose de Garnica, Don Wenceslao R. de 
Villa-Urrutia, and General Rafael Cerero. But as he approached the 
first joint session, arranged for October 1, Gray confided to his son: 
11 I am not happy over the outlook ... 10 His apprehension anticipated the 
impending conflict with his colleagues as much as with the defeated 
enemy. 
Facilities for the negotiations were provided by the host govern-
ment at the Quai d'Orsay, a short distance from the Continental. The 
conference room, which overlooked a pleasant terrace, was decorated 
with typical French grandeur: heavy draperies, a rich rug, marble 
trim. High windows afforded a view of the river, and from the ornate 
ceiling was suspended a massive chandelier. Beneath this stood the 
conference table covered with green felt on which the diplomats would 
attempt during the next several weeks to conclude a treaty of peace. 11 
Because Spain had been decisively defeated in the field of bat-
tle, it appeared to some that the Peace Conference was a mere formal-
ity. All that remained to be accomplished was to confirm in writing 
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what had already been decided in combat. However, there were several 
questions which the guns could not answer, and two in particular were 
of major importance. On the first of these, the question of the 
Cuban debt, the American delegation was united. On the second, the 
question of the disposition of the Philippine Islands, no such unity 
existed--an unfortunate circumstance which was to complicate the 
proceedings. 
The initial joint session was held on the first day of October, 
1898. Cordiality was much in evidence as the commissioners dealt 
with decisions of a procedural nature. George Gray had already ex-
plained to his colleagues the manner in which the Joint High Commis-
sion had operated in Quebec. In that instance, Lord Herschell had 
been elected the president of the Commission. However, it was de-
cided that this precedent would not be followed and that the joint 
sessions would have no presiding officer. Judge Gray suggested that 
each Commission designate one member to draw up a brief order of 
procedure to be submitted at the next session. This suggestion was 
accepted, and Villa-Urrutia and Judge Gray were named. With the pro-
cedural matters out of the way, each side read an opening statement, 
and the commissioners were confronted for the first time with the 
unpleasantness of their respective tasks. To the Spanish effort to 
retain Manila, the Americans replied that the topics should be handled 
in the order in which they had appeared in the armistic--i.e., that 
Mani 1 a and the Phi 1 i ppi nes waul d fa 11 ow Puerto Rico and Cuba. 11 Mon-
tero Rios, 11 recorded Whitelaw Reid, 11 looked as if he was losing his 
last friend on earth, and the others obviously experienced considerable 
emotion also at being thus brought face to face with the results of 
the war. 1112 
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About Puerto Rico, there was no substantial argument, since the 
armistice had clearly stated that it was to be ceded to the United 
States. 13 About Cuba, there was no argument that she was no longer 
to be within the Spanish Empire, but beyond that nothing had been ar-
ranged. The Spanish hoped that the United States would assume sov-
ereignty over the island and thus appear as traditional imperialists. 
But the Teller Amendment precluded this, and there was no alternative 
to Cuban independence, notwithstanding the creation of a temporary 
American protectorate until the conditions of peace could be stabi~ 
lized. Spain had amassed a debt of about $400,000,000 as a conse-
quence of subjugating the Cubans, and she was naturally desirous 
that this debt should be transferred along with sovereignty over the 
island. Therefore, if the United States would not assume sovereignty 
and the debt, it must reside with the Cubans. The Americans argued 
that this in effect made the Cubans pay for the oppression which the 
Spanish had inflicted upon them. So inflexible were the two sides 
on this initial dispute, that it appeared the Conference might be 
wrecked before the greater question of the Philippines was even con-
sidered. This would have been tragic, of course, but the Americans 
were willing to accept this if necessary. On this point, George 
Gray agreed with his colleagues: better that the Conference be dis-
rupted on the question of the Cuban debt than on some more abstract 
question or on the question of the Philippines. Whitelaw Reid sent 
the consensus to the State Department: 
Our probable line of procedure, if you do not disapprove 
and if we think emergency has arisen, will be to repeat 
that our position on Cuban debt is final, and that, if now 
again rejected, nothing is left to us excepting to give 
notice of only one more meeting, to close the protocol.l4 
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The reply from Washington was favorable, and the Conference ap-
peared almost certain to be of short duration. At the last minute, 
however, a personal appeal by Ambassador Castillo to his friend, 
Whitelaw Reid, provided the opportunity whereby the Spanish Commission 
could learn that American intransigence was not mere bluff. Reid left 
this account of the interview: 
I tried to explain to him our point of view--that the debt 
was purely and simply a debt created by Spain for the pur-
pose of maintaining a rule in Cuba which we found so bad 
and tyrannical that we had been at last compelled to in-
tervene to upset it--that it was not a Cuban debt at all 
since the Cubans had had no voice in the creation of it, 
and had derived no benefit from it. That now they had 
been freed from the rule this debt was created to maintain 
and perpetuate, it would be monstrous to saddle the debt 
upon them.15 
Convinced that there was no room for bargaining, and,unwilling 
that the Conference should be wrecked over the question of the Cuban 
debt, the Spanish had no choice but to acquiesce. The very next 
day after the Castillo-Reid interview, the Spanish Commission indi-
cated its acceptance of the debt during the joint session. While the 
statement was being read, Senator Gray leaned over to Reid, pressed 
him arm, and whispered: ''There is the result of your conversation 
with the Spanish Ambassador." 16 Regarding the next major point, the 
proper disposition of the Philippine Islands, the two commissioners 
were to evince considerably less accord. 
Although they were not negotiating from a position of strength, 
the Spanish commissioners were not e~irely without hope. The 
French press continually supported their cause and kept alive the 
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faint hope that at least part of the Philippines might yet be saved 
for the Empire. It was not merely sympathy for the underdog that de-
termined the emotions of the French and their fellow Europeans. In-
vestments in the bonds which were the substance of the Cuban debt had 
not been limited to Spanish bankers, and there was also the dynastic 
factor. The Queen Regent of Spain was the niece of Emperor Franz 
Joseph of Austria, and through this Hapsburg connection she was re-
lated to every important royal house in Europe. 
Aligned with public sentiment was a second Spanish ally: time. 
The American electorate was notoriously impatient, and the diplomatic 
questions in Paris could not be expected to hold its attention over a 
long period of time. The mid-term elections were scheduled for Novem-
ber, and if they followed the traditional pattern, they would weaken 
the party of the Administration and partially undermine the authority 
of the Corrmissioners. At any rate, the Spanish were well justified 
in resorting to a strategy of delay and playing on public sympathy. 
Even if the Conference were aborted, there was always the alternative 
of arbitration--a diplomatic device which the United States had long 
championed. By this technique, Spain had nothing to lose. Besides, 
an even more exaggerated sequence of possibilities--however unlikely--
had occurred to both sets of commissioners. If the Conference failed, 
if the United States then refused to arbitrate, and if the Americans 
expanded their military force beyond Manila to encompass the entire 
archipelago, sympathy for the prostrate Spanish might well be ir-
restible. Conceivably, a coalition of Great Powers involving any 
possible combination of France, Germany, Russia, and Japan would rise 
up to thwart the greedy Yankees. A similar concerted effort had 
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resulted earlier in a diplomatic note from six Great Powers to Presi-
dent McKinley expressing grave concern over American intentions in 
Cuba. The threatening tone of the note had been somewhat reduced by 
the insistence of the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Paunce-
fote, but nevertheless the White House was made aware of foreign 
sympathy toward the Spanish Empire. The Powers had earlier combined 
to prevent Russia from annexing portions of the decaying Turkish Em-
pire and again more recently to prevent Japan from acting similarly 
towards China. In the autumn of 1898, an immediate future of dis-
aster or triumph for the United States could be determined by the 
careful deliberations of five of its representatives in Paris. 
The difficulties which confronted the American diplomats were at 
the same time ameliorated and compounded by the Paris setting. The 
press predicted that the Spanish would sign no treaty by which they 
would surrender the Philippine Islands, and the journalistic hostil-
ity grew so intense that the Americans considered transferring the 
negotiations to Nice. 17 Still, there was never any hint of hostility 
directed toward the American Commissioners personally, and they 
chose to remain in the French capital and to savor its attractions. 
For example, on a Sunday afternoon, Whitelaw Reid escorted Judge and 
Mrs. Day to the Invalides where Mrs. Day, overcome with emotion at 
the sight of Napoleon's tomb, wept for several moments. Perhaps as 
an escape from the awesome surroundings and from the pressures of 
dismantling an empire, their conversation centered on less grandiose 
topics, specifically the scandalous news that the President's brother-
in-law had just been killed in Canton, Ohio, by a jealous mistress. 
Judge Day, who was from Canton and who was an intimate of the McKinley 
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family, talked 11With a good deal of candor about the murder 11 and said 
11 ••• it was exactly what everybody expected, and .•. had been 
threatened long before. 1118 
Diplomacy functions best where the evening activities of the 
negotiators are not ignored, and no city was less likely than Paris 
to ignore this factor of international relations. On October 12, a 
soiree was arranged for both delegations which consisted of musical 
presentations from Spain and the United States. Whitelaw Reid's de-
scription reflects the critical eye of the journalist and the conde-
scension of the man of cultivated taste: 
There was some graceful and rather unusually risque Span-
ish dancing. There were also Spanish songs, and the 
Spaniards had decidedly the best of it, so far as the 
entertainment went. When at last the American part of it 
came, it proved to be in the person of Miss Loi e Fuller, 
who told in bad French, and subsequently in not very 
good English, one or two little anecdotes about on the 
intellectual level of a rather vulgar child's newspaper. 
Then the hall was darkened, the lights were thrown on 
her, and she gave her queer dance with 'Star Spangled 
Banner' variations. Then the other national colors were 
from time to time thrown on her waving skirts, and again 
the 'Star Spangled Banner' was introduced. 
The musicale was a disappointment to the editor, but the worst was 
yet to come: 
If it had stopped then it would probably have been consid-
ered by most of the audience a success. Unfortunately, as 
the people were on the point of leaving, she felt it in-
cumbent upon her to ask them to wait a moment, and pro-
ceeded to make a sort of stilted, and yet childish stump 
speech about the beauties of peace, winding up, to the 
amazement of the Commissioners, with an appeal for having 
the questi,ons at issue sent to arbitration. It was a gra-
tuitous and incredible piece of folly and bad taste.l9 
Miss Fuller could be ignored as a bubble-headed entertainer, but 
similar expressions came from other sources not so easily dismissed. 
When the German Embassy hosted the American delegation at a dinner, 
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the hostess admitted that her sympathy was not with the United States 
but rather with the little dog. To Whitelaw Reid•s suggestion that 
the little dog should not have picked a fight with the big dog, she 
replied: 11 Well, I wish he had taken a bite out of you anyway. 1120 
While these experiences were disconcerting to all of the Commis-
sioners, it was George Gray who would be most sorely tested. Early 
in the proceedings, he had been confined to bed with a toothache 
and had missed a morning session of his colleagues. When he reap-
peared in the afternoon, it was ''with a badly swollen face. 11 But 
the afflictions of the body were insignificant compared to the poli-
tical shock he was to experience in November. The elections had re-
sulted in a Republican majority in the Delaware Legislature, and this 
signaled the end of George Gray•s senatorial career. Although the 
work of the Commission remained paramount, his disappointment was 
evident--so much so that Whitelaw Reid noted his depression. Although 
his colleagues felt 11 Very general sympathy11 for his political defeat, 
they made no reference to it as the work of the Commission continued. 21 
With no way of knowing of his impending appointment as a federal 
judge, George Gray could only view the election with regret and his 
future with apprehension. His concern is reflected in a letter to 
his son: 
I can not understand how after a registration so much in our 
favor, the Republicans .•. have achieved such an over-
whelming victory. You must have been overconfident, and the 
enemy got their work in while you slept. . . . I hope that 
law business is looking up, as I feel depressed about my 
future.22 
The coincidence of political defeat and the necessity for a resolu-
tion of the Philippine question weighed heavily on George Gray, but 
the burden was to be made heavier still by decisions being reached 
within the White House. The armistice agreement had left the final 
disposition of the Philippines to the future: 11 The United States 
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will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the 
conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, 
disposition and government of the Philippines ... When President McKin-
ley had first formed the Peace Commission, he summoned its members to 
the White House and specifically solicited their individual opinions 
regarding. the proper American policy. Whitelaw Reid provided the 
strongest and most sweeping argument for taking the entire archipelago. 
William Frye also favored retaining the entire group, and Cushman Davis 
was of a similar opinion, except that he had some reservations about 
the advisability of taking the southern islands. William Day advised 
against taking any portion. Because of obligations in court, George 
Gray was unable to be present, but his ideas were known--he opposed 
the retention of any portion of the Islands. The President then indi-
cated that he did not see how the United States could give up Manila 
or Luzon, the island on which it was located. 23 
No decision was made at the interview. Instead, it was left to 
the commissioners to decide what Professor Bemis has described as 
..... the most important question in foreign policy which the nation 
had been called upon to decide since its independence ... 24 In the 
process of reaching a decision, the commissioners spent many hours 
discussing the issue among themselves and interviewing expert wit-
nesses. Of greatest importance was the testimony of General Wesley 
Merritt, who had commanded the American army in the capture of Manila 
and whose position reinforced the belief of the three imperialists 
that it was impractical to retain Manila without retaining all of 
Luzon and impractical to retain Luzon without retaining the entire 
archipelago. 
As the American commissioners, meeting separately from their 
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Spanish counterparts, took turns questioning General Merritt, the 
division of opinion among themselves became increasingly evident. 
Senator Gray inquired as to the ability of the Filipinos to govern 
themselves, to which General Merritt replied that time and education 
would be required before they could assume such a responsibility. The 
General suggested that a temporary protectorate would be acceptable to 
the natives. On the other hand, he predicted that the native leader 
Aguinaldo would forcibly resist a permanent occupation by the United 
States or a return to rule by Spain. The dialogue between Merritt 
and Gray appeared to have disturbed Whitelaw Reid, who felt that the 
Senator 11 Was doing his best to entrap the General. 11 Reid began to 
make 11 a few notes in orderto be prepared to draw out the argument 11 
in support of the imperialist position. It was a successful effort, 
he confided to his diary, as it gratified his colleagues and tended to 
inhibit Senator Gray, 11 ••• since it showed that two could play at 
the same game. 11 The irrmodest verdict is not confirmed by the pub-
lished transcript of General Merritt's testimony, as Whitelaw Reid's 
questioning was largely restricted to the details of Manila's water 
supply. 25 
General Merritt was followed by John Foreman, an American citizen 
who had lived in the Philippines for 11 years and was familiar with 
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the local traditions. Of this witness, Senator Gray asked for the de-
tails of the mahogany trade and inquired about the land titles pos-
sessed by religious groups. The interrogation, in which Whitelaw Reid 
scarcely participated, was routine and informative. 
Senator Gray's impatience with the imperialist rationalization 
was most clearly demonstrated during the testimony of the spokesman 
for the United States Navy, R. B. Bradford. Not surprisingly, his 
advice was to take the entire archipelago rather than a single port or 
a single island. His justification--that such a move would eliminate 
the possibility of bad neighbors~-was quickly challenged by Senator 
Gray, who argued that the goal could be better attained by not annex-
ing any of the Philippines. The problem of protection for the new 
Pacific possessions was also considered, as the witness insisted that 
annexation would not require an expansion of the Navy. George Gray 
inquired if it were reasonable to believe that both the Philippines 
and Hawaii, which had only recently been annexed, could be protected 
without increasing the naval capacity. R. B. Bradford was progres-
sively pushed away from his initial assertion and was forced to admit 
that such an increase might be necessary after all. 
In an attempt to assist the beleaguered witness, Whitelaw Reid 
suggested that Hawaii provided protection for the entire West Coast 
of the mainland, but George Gray countered: whatever rationalization 
about protection might be offered, it could not be denied that the 
Navy was being called on to protect a vastly increased area and could 
do so effectively only with vastly increased appropriations. This 
heated exchange of opinions, in which Senator Gray singly upheld the 
120 
anti-imperialist position, did little to alter the positions of the 
participants, but it fulfilled the wishes of the President that both 
sides of the annexation issue be thoroughly aired. The product of 
lengthy legal and parliamentary experience, Senator Gray's talent for 
partisan debate was immediately apparent. In addition, his talent 
for anticipating future developments with clear-sighted accuracy 
would be affirmed in a later generation by a series of military 
tragedies; even with an expanded Navy, the Philippine and Hawaiian 
Islands remained vulnerable. 
A few days later, while the Commission continued to wrestle with 
the archipelago imbroglio, Senator Gray expanded his position to in-
clude moral arguments. Referring to the resolutions of Congress, 
he reminded his colleagues that the war had begun on a high ground of 
unselfishness. He found it difficult to permit it to degenerate into 
a traditional campaign of conquest, in which the original motives were 
submerged in favor of less worthy purposes. It appeared ludicrous to 
foreswear annexation of Cuba only to demand cession of the Philippines. 
Such a move not only undermined America's moral leadership, it consti-
tuted a denial of this country's traditional political philosophy, 
that government was based on the consent of the governed. Whitelaw 
Reid summarized his adversary's position in his diary: 11 ••• It 
would be a very unfortunate possession for the United States, and one 
that we could now govern in conformity with our old theories of our 
form of government ... 26 
Although Whitelaw Reid faithfully recorded his colleague's posi-
tion, he was totally unwilling to deviate from his own insistence 
that the United States should retain the entire archipelago. Nor was 
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George Gray any more successful in attracting the support of his two 
senatorial colleagues, Davis and Frye. Even Judge Day seemed to be 
gravitating toward the expansionist position from his original desire 
that the United States retain only a coaling station. Paralleling 
these developments in Paris, events were transpiring in Washington 
which were to guarantee the acceptance by the Administration of the 
imperialistic position and which would, in the process, further 
isolate and further burden the voice of dissent. 
At the request of the President, each member of the Commission 
was to send to Washington a written expression of his individual 
opinion regarding the proper disposition of the Philippines. Because 
the views of Senators Davis and Frye were so close to those of White-
law Reid, they merely endorsed his dispatch. Judge Day and Senator 
Gray each wrote individual expressions, and the entire package was 
cabled on October 25. 27 On the same date, probably without seeing 
the Paris dispatches, President McKinley sent a note to Judge Day 
which gave positive evidence of the direction in which the Adminis-
tration was leaning: II The United States, whatever it might 
prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot let 
go. 11 Furthermore, in the President's judgment, the majority of the 
public concurred: 
archipelago ... 28 
II Duty requires we should take the 
The following day, October 28, Secretary Hay drafted a message 
intended for the Paris Commission. Although it was never sent, its 
contents are widely quoted still and provide an articulate expression 
of the Administration's final and absolute determination to demand the 
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cession of the entire archipelago. The retention of Luzon singly, 
Secretary Hay wrote, would leave the remainder of the islands either 
under Spanish rule or subjected to future contention. For political, 
commercial, and humanitarian reasons, the Islands would have to be 
treated collectively. Either the entire archipelago would be ceded 
to the United States or none of it. "The latter is wholly inadmis-
sible," he concluded, 11 and the former must therefore be required." 29 
The mental process by which any decision is reached is always 
difficult to trace, particularly when the subject has not left a 
diary or an extensive set of correspondence. This is emphatically the 
case with William McKinley and the decision to retain the Philippines. 
Professor Morgan concludes that President McKinley had reached his 
decision at the time of Admiral Dewey's victory on May 1, and that he 
maintained it without waver while the Commission was being formed. By 
contrast, Professor Pratt concludes that "William McKinley was not, by 
temperament or inclination, an imperialist. . . . He had looked for-
ward to his term of office as a period of 'domestic amelioration.'" 
It was not an instinct for expansion that led to his final decision, 
but rather a lack of foresight: "McKinley did not foresee, as Lodge, 
Roosevelt, and Beveridge foresaw, the destination to which the war 
with Spain was to lead." 30 
The President's recently completed tour as far west as Omaha is 
also interpreted variously either as an effort to assess public opin-
ion or to direct it. Richard Hofstadter, in denying that the Presi-
dent was an aggressive leader of public opinion, repeats a contemporary 
riddle: "Hhy is McKinley's mind like a bed? Because it has to be 
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made up for him every time he wants to use it. 1131 Another observer 
claimed McKinley•s ear was so close to the ground it was full of 
grasshoppers. 32 These evaluations, which constitute the standard 
historical explanation of President McKinley•s decision to retain 
the Is 1 ands, are not accepted by Professor Morgan. Wi 11 i am McKi n-
ley, he argues, 11Was far more subtle, 11 than the standard explanation 
allows. Rather, he was a master of public relations, and he care-
fully cultivated the support necessary for his policy of expansion 
through his western tour, through his instructions to the Peace Com-
mission, and through his private correspondence. 33 
Whether President McKinley was the master or the victim of cir-
cumstances, it cannot be denied that he materially deviated from his 
original instructions to the Commission. There had been no indica-
tion, either in those instructions nor in the earlier armistice agree-
ment, that the demand for all the Islands would be made--a demand 
which removed the disposition of the Islands from the topics to be 
negotiated. When, towards the end of October, the notice of the 
President•s determination to retain the entire archipelago reached 
Paris, it was received with mixed emotion by the Commissioners. For 
Whitelaw Reid it was a gratifying endorsement of his imperialist 
position, but for George Gray it was the fulfillment of months of 
misgivings. His advice, already rejected by his colleagues, had 
fared no better in Washington. Although he maintained his composure 
in the face of this defeat, he must have viewed the President•s di-
rective as something of a betrayal. Had he not been appointed to 
the Commission to assure that the anti-imperialist position would be 
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represented? Was not his appointment considered essential if the 
representatives of the Republic were to make an informed decision? 
Then, why eliminate the question of acquisition entirely by demanding 
total cession? Wherewas there any room in such a stance for the ex-
ercise of diplomacy? 
Regardless of the manner in which the decision was made, it was 
the substance which most alarmed the Senator. His reply to the presi-
dential directive, cabled to Secretary Hay, efficiently enumerated 
the results which could be expected as a consequence of annexation: 
The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take the 
Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would 
be to reverse the accepted continental policy of the coun-
try, declared and acted upon throughout our history. 
Propinquity governs the case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and 
the entangling alliances against which Washington and all 
American statesmen have protested. It will make neces-
sary a navy equal to the largest of the Powers; a greatly 
increased military establishment; immense sums for forti-
fications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous 
complications with foreign nations and increase burdens 
of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for 
American labor in a labor market already overcrowded and 
cheap; no area for homes for American citizens; climate 
and social conditions demoralizing to character of Ameri-
can youth; new and disturbing problems introduced into our 
politics; church question menacing. On the whole, instead 
of indemnity--injury.34 
The financial burden incurred through annexation was secondary, 
his argument continued, to the moral considerations. Having renounced 
any interest in the acquisition of Cuba, the United States had ap-
proached the war as "a great, powerful and Christian nation," acting 
entirely on unselfish motives. It was a position of "moral grandeur" 
which was not being sacrificed in exchange for "doubtful material 
advantages." The crusade to reduce the suffering of humanity would 
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now be viewed by the world as just another example of 11 the vulgar and 
selfish greed for territory 11 which was usually associated with Euro-
pean imperialism. America had demonstrated that she could amass the 
military might necessary to support imperialistic ambitions, and she 
therefore had the opportunity to use the Paris Conference to exhibit 
to the world 11magnanimity and moderation in the hour of victory. 11 
11Let us simply keep our word, 11 he urged. The United States had 
agreed in the armistice to negotiate with Spain concerning the proper 
disposition of the Philippines. It would be erroneous and injurious--
even 11 absurd 11 now to say: 11 • We will not negotiate, but will ap-
propriate the whole subject-matter of negotiation ... 35 
Though ignored by the Administration, Senator Gray•s dissent was 
better received in other quarters which were less imbued with the ex-
pansionist fervor. Captain French E. Chadwick, who had served on the 
Court of Inquiry which had investigated the Maine tragedy, later ~ub­
lished an authoritative study of the diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Spain. To him there was 11 no questioning the cogency 
of Judge Gray•s argument, nor the nobility of its sentiment. 11 In a 
similar vein, The New York Times editorialized: 11 It is doubtful if 
any public man ever gave a more lucid and powerful exposition of his 
own highmindedness, and that most modestly, and strictly within the 
1 ines of necessary duty.u 36 
Even more evident than George Gray•s disappointment with the 
new set of instructions was his commitment to a successful peace. 
For the remainder of the Conference his qualities of self-discipline 
would be taxed as he forced himself to participate in negotiations in 
which he felt his country was committing a fundamental error. At 
one point, during the deliberations with his colleagues, he ''broke 
out in the most earnest and vehement expression. 11 In a tirade re-
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corded by Whitelaw Reid, he accused the government of hypocrisy, 
ureally striving for the utmost conquest possible, while professing 
to be controlled solely by motives of duty and humanity. He ended 
with the exclamation: 'If you do get such a treaty you won't get it 
ratified.' 1137 It was a threat made in frustration, not in sincerity, 
but it demonstrated the pressures under which he was now forced to 
labor. Fortunately for the further conduct of the peace negotiations, 
George Gray's colleagues were sensitive to his dilemma and were fully 
prepared to accord him a generous quantity of patience. After a 
brief but awkward silence, the Commission resumed its discussion, its 
dissenting member as 11 placid 11 as the others. 
The next day, Whitelaw Reid decided that the time had arrived 
for him to share with the President his opinion of each commissioner. 
In a letter dated November 15, 1898, he wrote of his adversary: 
..• Senator Gray, who generally starts out on every ques-
tion by stating the Spanish side of it, generally lands on 
ours--though often with many a protest and reservation. 
But, considering his politics and position, he is really 
doing wonderfully well and personally he is most delight-
ful, while nobody can help admiring his honest effort to 
be fair-minded and judicial.38 
As the Conference began its third month, Whitelaw Reid recorded 
other examples of George Gray's distress. Perhaps it was only natural 
that the Senator's impatience would be most strongly directed toward 
Judge Day, his friend whose position regarding the Philippines had 
been closest to his own. To Judge Day's everlasting credit, he ac-
cepted these barbs with understanding--even with humor, as he once 
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attributed his behavior to indigestion. It was apparently during the 
December 6 session of the American delegation that the most difficult 
moment came, as Senator Gray quietly arose and left. The work contin-
ued, but an unspoken fear permeated the atmosphere: was the Senator 
abandoning the Commission? Such a move would be tragic for the con-
tinuation of the Conference, it would immeasurably strengthen the pos-
ition of the enemy, and it would seriously reduce the probability 
that a treaty of annexation would be ratified. At length, Judge Day 
broached the subject of his colleague's continued absence, as well 
as the Senator's "frequent provocations." There had been several 
difficult moments, and although the Chairman had exercised the most 
admirable restraint, the strain was beginning to show. Nevertheless, 
each member of the Commission was determined that every allowance was 
to be made in an effort to help their recalcitrant colleague to bridge 
the gap. They had known from the beginning that he opposed the an-
nexation of any Filipino territory. In the fullness of time, they 
hoped, his opposition to annexation would be subordinated to his 
desire for peace and justice. 39 
It was a hope soon to be realized. When Senator Gray appeared 
for lunch, he had returned to his former pleasant disposition. His 
opposition to the annexation of foreign territory would not prevent 
his support for the instrument of peace. Anti-imperialism would re-
main a fundamental tenet of his personal foreign policy, but it 
would be tempered by his appreciation for practical politics. The 
Administration was going to have its way with the Treaty, in spite 
of his opposition, and therefore it appeared most prudent for the 
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diplomat-politician to make the most of a regretable situation. He 
would support the President, he would support the Treaty, and he would 
support the annexation. To do otherwise would be to render the sit-
uation even more regretable, as it would endanger the continuation of 
the Peace Conference and would throw the Philippine question into the 
uncertainties of international politics. Besides, once acknowledged 
as a possession of the United States, the Islands could be handled 
as a strictly domestic question, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
American Congress on which pressure could be applied which favored 
the early emancipation of the subject population. It would be diffi-
cult, he anticipated, to get such a program by the Congress, and his 
own voice would be removed from the Senate after March, 1899. Never-
theless, it was the most he could expect in view of his failure to 
prevent annexation. For better or for worse, a treaty of expansion 
would receive his support. He had bridged the gap. 
Having reconciled their own colleague to the inevitable cession 
of the Philippines, the American commissioners conceivably viewed 
the Spanish as less of a challenge. Of course, there was resistance, 
and as late as December 8 there was fear that the negotiations would 
be discontinued. But on that day the Queen Regent, recognizing that 
further delay was futile, sent instructions to Rios to sign the treaty. 
The November elections had strengthened, not weakened, the President's 
position, and the Powers had shown no willingness to provide military 
support for the Spanish. As a further inducement, the Americans had 
offered $20,000,000 as compensation for permanent improvements in the 
Philippines, and this, coupled with a secret German offer to purchase 
the Carolines, was sufficient to induce the monarchy to withdraw 
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Spanish authority from the Orient. Thus, within a few days in Decem-
ber, 1898, the Spanish Empire disappeared from the Pacific Ocean--an 
empire which had originated four centuries earlier with Magellan and 
Balboa. 40 
With the signing of the Treaty on December 10, the work of the 
Commission was concluded but not the work of the commissioners, as 
three of them woul.d continue the struggle on the floor of the United 
States Senate. Senators Frye and Davis, Republicans and expansionists, 
could be expected to support the Treaty. As a Democrat opposed to 
expansion, Senator Gray was in a more difficult position, although 
there was never any doubt that he would support the document he had 
signed. His testimony, provided in executive session of the Senate, 
was not as detailed as that of his two colleagues, but there was no 
equivocation in his support for the Treaty. He admitted that he 
11 had utterly failed 11 to sway the opinions of the other commissioners. 
As this had made the cession of the Islands inevitable, his only ac-
ceptable alternative had been to join ranks with the majority, to sign 
the Treaty, and to support it in the Senate. It was typical of his 
judicial style that he was able to couple a desire for Filipino inde-
pendence with a caution to avoid precipitous commitments. Permanent 
occupation of a hostile and distant region was out of the question, 
but neither should the decision to limit occupation be made prior to 
a study of the situation. When the native population had demonstra-
ted its capacity for self-government, the American people would, he 
was confident, grant them their independence. In the meantime, the 
United States would manage the Islands• affairs in behalf of their 
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inhabitants. As the natives advanced toward civilization, they would 
also move toward full independence. 41 
These two justifications--that a treaty of acquisition was bet-
ter than no treaty at all, and that the exercise of sovereignty over 
the Islands need not be permanent--were further amplified early in 
1899. The occasion was the 13th annual banquet of the Ohio Society 
of New York, held in the grand banquet hall of the Waldorf-Astoria 
Hotel. Because the President was from Ohio, and because Commissioners 
Day and Reid had also originated from that state, the dinner became 
a celebration of the recent military and diplomatic triumphs. The 
hall was festooned with the national colors, and nearly 500 members 
and guests mingled with each other. The head table accommodated 
General Merritt, Governor Bushnell of Ohio, and the two diplomats 
who had originally represented the opposite extremes of the Peace 
Commission: Whitelaw Reid and George Gray. Their respective com-
ments reveal the gulf which remained between their respective phil-
osophies as well as the common ground which had permitted Senator 
Gray to accept the imperialistic settlement. Whitelaw Reid's com-
ments, as might be expected, reflected the magnanimity of the vic-
tor--not only towards the defeated enemy on the battlefield but 
also towards his colleague. Spain he characterized as 11 historic 11 
and 11 courageous, 11 and George Gray was defined as 11 the regulator and 
balance wheel of the Commission ... When Senator Gray had offered ob-
jection, the Commission reexamined; when he had assented, his col-
leagues knew they 11 Were on solid ground and went ahead. 11 
The 11 Solid ground 11 of assent was, of course, the acquisition of 
the Philippines. 11 Renunciation under such circumstances, .. argued 
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Whitelaw Reid, 11WOuld have been equivalent in international law to 
abandonment, and that would have been equivalent to anarchy and a 
race for seizure among the nations that could get there quickest}' 
Although Senator Gray had approached the subject from the opposite 
direction, his position was identical: the United States had driven 
out the European master and could not now abandon the colony. To do 
so would be to create a vacuum which would attract any of several 
foreign powers. 
The diners that night demonstrated their delight with the Admin-
istration's policy, as applause interrupted frequent jingoistic ut-
terances. Even George Gray, the erstwhile opponent of all forms of 
expansion, was 11 Vehemently cheered .. when he stated 11 We have got the 
Philippines, and we have got them bad ... He made no attempt to hide 
his previous opposition, however, nor his conflict with his colleagues. 
There had been a free and open exchange of opinions within the Ameri-
can delegation, and this had meant inevitable disagreement. But 
11 ••• private opinion sank into insignificance ... 11 when the Span-
ish were confronted. Without detailing the difficulty with which he 
had forced himself to accept a treaty of expansion, he informed his 
listeners that the five American delegates had operated as 11 a single 
Corrmissioner. 11 
A similar frankness characterized his explanation of the consti-
tutional issue: Did not the acquisition violate the American princi-
ple of government by the consent of the governed? Yes, it did, he 
conceded. But such violation was justified by the low state of prep-
aration for self-rule and by its temporary nature. At the proper 
time, the United States would apply this hallowed principle, but first 
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it was necessary 11 tO show ... what we mean and what we intend to do 
before we commence to talk to them about the Government resting upon 
the-consent of the governed ... 
The manner in which the United States would show 11What we mean 11 
was considered in the remarks offered by General Merritt. Having de-
feated the forces of haughty Spain, and now safely ensconced among the 
decorations of American beauty roses, he gave free rein to his dis-
gust with the Filipinos. Instead of accepting Yankee imperialism 
with gratitude, these people had recently begun a military resistance 
under the leadership of Aguinaldo, who had earlier cooperated with 
Admiral Dewey in his hope for an independent republic with himself 
at his head. Displaying the traditional impatience of the soldier 
toward civilian idealism, General Merritt concluded that constitu-
tional niceties about government resting upon the consent of the gov-
erned were inappropriate at this time. Because the Filipinos could 
not understand what Whitelaw Reid and George Gray had been saying, 
II a realization of the situation and of the truth that we are 
acting for their good will have to be knocked into them... By con-
trast, Senator Gray reminded his audience: 11 We are their friends. 
They have shed our blood, and yet for them, I bespeak the consider-
ation that should come from a great Nation like ours ... 42 
These were the same sentiments which George Gray presented at his 
own testimonial dinner, held in January, 1899, to mark the conclusion 
of his senatorial service. 
I ardently desired that we might escape the necessity of 
taking the Philippine Islands and assuming the burden 
that their taking will impose upon us, and I know that 
the President of the United States was equally anxious 
to the same end. But it became apparent that, without our 
seeking, unexpected changes had been created, and out of 
these conditions unquestionably duties had sprung which 
could not be avoided or evaded by the United States. 
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Anticipating the lengthy rebellion and sensing the strategic vul-
nerability of the new acquisition, he recalled "that the performance 
of duty is not only sometimes unpleasant, but has dangers attendant 
upon it; nevertheless, a brave man and a brave nation will not shrink 
from it on that account." His acceptance of the policy of acquisition 
had been made easier by his confidence that the retention need not be 
permanent, even though Congress was displaying no inclination to limit 
the period of its jurisdiction. Possession of the distant Islands 
did not mean that the country was committed to "a colonial policy," 
nor that the American people were abandoning the "great principles of 
liberty and self-government." President McKinley, he assured, "is 
committed to no policy, calculated to discourage, much less to strike 
down, the aspirations of liberty-loving people all over the world." 
In the midst of the popular euphoria which followed the conclu-
sion of the successful war, there was little evidence that America 
would in the future allow herself to be restrained by concepts of mod-
eration. But George Gray's prophecy was the result of a fundamental 
understanding of his countrymen, and its accuracy would eventually be 
proved. He had no doubt that the American people had the capacity to 
"curb the ambition of territorial aggrandizement." In place of self-
ishness, the United States would exhibit to the world a policy "of 
moderation, justice and self-restraint that will be worth ... in 
mora 1 strength more than a 11 the islands of the sea. n43 
Somewhat surprising to later generations was the difficulty with 
which the Administration secured Senate approval of the Treaty of 
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Paris. The issue of an American colonial empire transcended party 
lines and excited heated debate within the Senate chamber. Strong 
convictions were held seemingly by every public figure, and both 
sides drew support from interpretations of such hallowed American 
institutions as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, 
Washington's Farewell Address, and tradition. Support of the Treaty 
had the effect of uniting Senator Gray in a rare common cause with 
the expansionists, led by Senator Lodge, who complimented him for com-
ing out 11 in a splendid way.n 44 The debate would continue into sue-
ceeding generations, but the approving vote was finally secured in 
February, 1899: 57 to 27, one more than the necessary two-thirds. 
The Bacon Amendment, which would have declared America's intention 
to exercise only temporary jurisdiction over the Philippines, was 
narrowly defeated by the tie-breaking ballot of the presiding offi-
cer, Vice-President Garret A. Hobart. Nevertheless, the confidence 
expressed by Senator Gray--that the United States would hold no nation 
in permanent subjugation--was eventually justified in 1916 by the pas-
sage of the Jones Act which promised independence after the establish-
ment of a st~ble government. 45 
The conclusion of debate on the Treaty of Paris coincided with 
the conclusion of George Gray's service in the Senate. His final 
months had been marked alike by the most difficult decisions and by 
the most valuable contributions. To several observers, he had contra-
dieted himself by supporting the Treaty after having earlier opposed 
expansion. With his appointment to the bench the following month, it 
was inevitable that some would suspect a relationship of cause and 
effect--specifically that Senator Lodge had arranged his appointment 
in return for his support of the Treaty. 46 Such suspicions ignored 
the chronology of events, particularly the fact that George Gray's 
support dated back to the Paris Conference. Although McKinley ad-
mired Delaware's Democratic Senator and appreciated his labors at 
the Peace Conference and on the floor of the Senate, he and George 
Gray were never political allies. The President declined to attend 
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the Senator's testimonial dinner, and similar responses were received 
from the members of the Cabinet and from the four Republican Peace 
Conmissioners. Partisan considerations were never entirely absent, 
/ 
but this did not prevent the White House from appointing to the Cir-
cuit Court bench the individual most qualified by reason of training 
and temperament. 
The judicial appointment was a happy conclusion to a most diff-
cult experience in George Gray's career, and it served as a form of 
official recognition that he possessed that talent which was as 
needed on the bench as it was in diplomacy. Friend and adversary 
alike admired him for his sense of determination which was tempered 
by flexibility. In addition, he had managed to preserve his sense of 
priorities. While an acknowledged opponent of expansionism, he was 
also a recognized proponent of peace. Given the difficult alternative 
of a peace settlement with imperialistic overtones or of a resumption 
of hostilities, his preference was natural and predictable. The set-
tlement did not ordain a permanent retention of the Philippines, a 
point overlooked by later generations of historians, but it did or-
dain a higher condition which George Gray respected above all else: 
peace. 47 
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The inauguration of George Gray's new domestic career had a par-
allel on the international level, made possible by his rare combina-
tion of judicial talent and diplomatic experience. As arbitration was 
not becoming the focus of those statemen seeking pacific resolutions 
of international disputes, it was appropriate that each nation should 
begin to prepare lists of names of potential arbitrators. It was 
equally appropriate that the name of George Gray be entered on such a 
list. 
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negotiations.~~ Cortissoz, Reid, p. 256. Professor Morgan is of the 
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conversations important. • . . This judgment seems exces-
sive. The Spanish would doubtless have capitulated on the 
Cuban debt question in any event. (Morgan in Reid, Making 
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144 
and U.S. Senator John T. Morgan, "What Sha 11 We Do with the Conquered 
Islands?" North American Review, June 1898, pp. 640-49. The debate 
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11 Anti-Imperialist Movement, 11 p. 221. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION 
It is wicked to proceed against him as a wrongdoer who 
is ready to refer the question to an arbitrator. 
Thucydides 
When George Gray accepted appointment to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in August, 1900, he became associated with an American 
project the origins of which extended back to the very foundations of 
the Republic. For more than a hundred years the United States had 
been in the vanguard of those enlightened states which were seeking 
methods to facilitate the pacific settlement of international dis-
putes. Among the methods advanced, arbitration had always enjoyed 
a special prominence both in theory and in practice and had been long 
implemented both at home and abroad. 
Precedent was provided by the period preceding the adoption of 
the Federal Constitution, when there was no Supreme Court to settle 
disputes among the constituent states of the new nation. Because 
such disputes were certain to arise, the Articles of Confederation 
provided for tribunals of arbitration to be composed from a list of 
39 commissioners or judges, and this provision was actually invoked. 1 
The adoption of the Constitution and the creation of the Supreme 
Court rendered arbitration among the states obsolete, but the new 
government recognized its utility in foreign affairs. As early as 
1795, in Jay's Treaty with Great Britain, the United States committed 
146 
147 
itself to the use of arbitration to resolve three disputes which had 
remained as an aftermath of the Revolution. The precedent was rein-
forced in the next generation when the Treaty of Ghent, concluding 
the War of 1812, referred four unresolved disputes to settlement by 
arbitration. Fifty years later the Civil War gave rise to the Alabama 
Claims, which were arbitrated to the mutual satisfaction and benefit 
of both the United States and Great Britain and which had the addi-
tional effect of strengthening the determination on both sides of the 
Atlantic that there was no question among the English-speaking nations 
which could not be peacefully resolved. The practice was even more 
effectively used in the final decade of the century when the United 
States and Great Britain arbitrated the fur seal fisheries dispute and 
the Alaska-Canadian dispute. In addition, Great Britain, responding 
to pressure from the United States, consented to arbitrate the boundary 
dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela. 
Although it was the United States and Great Britain which had 
made the most effective use of arbitration, the attraction of its 
utility was much broader and much older. Having been introduced to 
Europe by the ancient Greek city-states, its value was reduced by the 
unity provided first by the Roman Empire and then by the universal 
Church. As this unity declined, the practice of arbitration, especi-
ally by the papacy, increased. During the period of the Renaissance, 
Hugo Grotius, the Dutch theoretician who was to become known as the 
Father of International Law, emphasized the utility of arbitration as 
an alternative to war. His contemporary, King Henry IV of France, 
made arbitration an important element of his Great Design, an advanced 
concept of international cooperation which would have involved 14 
European states. Most significantly, this scheme had received the 
endorsement of England's Queen Elizabeth before Henry was assassin-
ated in 1610. 2 By the nineteenth century, the use of arbitration 
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in Europe had become common, largely as a result of the Anglo-
American influence, and the number of applications grew rapidly in 
the latter half of the century. According to one source, there were 
43 cases of arbitration during the years 1794-1860 and 134 cases from 
1861 to 1900. A similar pattern was developing at the same time in 
the New World, where American states were parties to 19 arbitrations 
before 1850 and to 209 after that date. 3 
As the great majority of arbitrations were handled on an ad hoc 
basis, in which a tribunal would be called into existence to deter-
mine a particular question and would then dissolve, there soon arose 
efforts to regularize procedure. Gradually, the practice developed 
by which states agreed in advance to arbitrate a narrow range of cer-
tain questions, usually of a technical nature. Europe took the lead 
in developing a form of multipartite instruments which included provi-
sions for arbitrations; e.g., the 1874 Universal Postal Convention, 
the General Act of Brussels of July, 1890, and the Convention on Rail-
way Freight Transportation of October, 1890.4 Although it was never 
brought into force, a similar multipartite arbitration treaty was 
concluded by 11 nations in April, 1890, at the Washington Conference 
of American States. 5 The effect of these agreements was to lend ad-
ditional credence to the process of arbitration, to stimulate its use, 
and to culminate in the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
George Gray's appointment was made as a result of American adher-
ence to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
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Disputes of July 29, 1899. This instrument was the most significant 
achievement of The Hague Peace Conference which had been convened in 
response to a call from Czar Nicholas II. Disarmament rather than 
arbitration had been the primary goal of the Conference, and the op-
portunity to avoid a continuation of the expensive arms race was 
greeted with enthusiasm by those nations which were least able to 
compete. Conversely, the governments with the strongest commitments 
towards militarism tended to view the Conference with disdain. For 
example, the German delegate wrote to Whitelaw Reid to express his 
opinion that disarmament was 11 out of the question, 11 and that it was 
11 hopeless" to expect an understanding on arbitration. Cynicism rather 
than optimism accompanied several other delegations as they made their 
way to The Hague. Nevertheless, respect for the Czar meant that the 
Conference could not be treated with contempt, and the German delegate 
would not be alone in his effort to coverthemeeting "with a peaceful-
looking cloak." 6 
In addition to disarmament, other items of common concern were 
also to be considered. Last on the agenda of eight topics was the 
proposal for "voluntary arbitration . with the purpose of prevent-
ing armed conflicts between nations." 7 To facilitate the use of this 
technique, an effort would be made to reach an agreement regarding the 
uniform practice of arbitration. To the McKinley Administration, this 
could best be achieved through the establishment of an international 
tribunal, and the American delegates were instructed "to use their in-
fluence in the Conference in the most effective manner" to secure its 
adoption. 8 Similar proposals were also advanced by the British and 
Russian delegations, so that the final result did not reflect the 
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exclusive influence of any one of the three. Nevertheless, there was 
ample justification for the pride exhibited by the American delega-
tion which had countered the skepticism of the Old World with the en-
thusiasm of the New. On the other hand, the Conference had failed 
to achieve disarmament, a point which pleased the German delegate. 
In a second letter to Whitelaw Reid, he expressed his relief that the 
Conference had ended without doing any harm. The editor agreed with 
him and found the results of the Conference trifling, the new interna-
tional tribunal notwithstanding. 9 The establishment of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration was an achievement the value of which had yet to 
be demonstrated. 
American reservations to the Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes, expressed at the time of the signing, 
reflected traditional reluctance to become entangled in European polit-
ical affairs as well as traditional support for the peaceful resolu-
tion of diagreements. The delegation's statement was entered into the 
protocols: 
Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed 
as to require the United States of America to depart from 
its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering 
with, or entangling itself in, the political questions or 
policy or internal administration of any foreign state; 
nor shall anything contained in the said convention be 
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States 
of America of its traditional attitude towards purely 
American questions.lO 
Without attaching any additional reservation, the Senate quickly ap-
proved the Convention, along with two other instruments submitted by 
the Conference. Although there was no clear provision within the Con-
vention as to the number of adherents required for the Court to come 
into existence, by September 4, 1900, 17 ratifications had been 
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deposited at The Hague--a clear endorsement of the Conference's deci-
sions. Additional ratifications were received from nine other govern-
ments, and the process of selecting the panel of judges immediately 
fo 11 owed. 11 
To the list of arbitrators each adhering state was permitted to 
name up to four eminent jurists "of known moral reputation and dis-
posed to accept the duties of Arbitrator."12 The details of service 
specified a term of six years with no limit placed on reappointments. 
However, no provision was made for salaries; each arbitrator was to 
be paid a generous honorarium by the parties to a dispute. 
The limited secretarial chores were assigned to the International 
Bureau which consisted of a Secretary-General and a small staff. The 
small annual expense of the Bureau was divided among the adhering 
states according to the proportion already observed by the Interna-
tional Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. General supervision was 
exercised by the Administrative Council, which consisted of the diplo-
matic representatives from the adhering states resident at The Hague 
with the host Minister of Foreign Affairs serving as the presiding 
officer. 13 
The original situs of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague reflected the tranquility within which its decisions were to be 
reached. No dramatic label was attached to the house at No. 71 
Prinsegracht which would reveal to the quiet neighborhood the impor-
tance of the proceedings within. Austerity in the form of rather plain 
furnishings marked the interior as well. Double drawing rooms on the 
main floor served as the courtroom and contained the only concessions 
to elaborate decoration. The chairs which were to serve the arbitrators 
1.52 
were of appropriate dignity, with uniform construction and with backs 
on which had been embroidered in color the coats of arms of the par-
ticipating states. The portraits on the walls were of the delegates 
to the Peace Conference and of the heads of the signatory states, 
the entire gallery dominated by the likenesses of the Czar, who was 
11 the father of the Tribunal , 11 and of the host sovereign, Queen Wil-
helmina. In time, thanks to the generosity of Andrew Carnegie, the 
Court would move to a grander setting, variously called during its 
construction the 11 Temple of Peace," or the 11 Peace Palace." 14 
The procedure under which the Permanent Court of Arbitration was 
to function was carefully considered by the framers of the Convention 
for the' Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in an effort to 
achieve a balance between discipline and flexibility. The Court was 
specifically designed to be attractive through its utility, and thus 
sufficient latitude was provided to permit the participating powers 
to choose between the established rules of procedure and any alterna-
tives of their own preference. 15 
The specific details of procedure would be contained in a proto-
col, often called a compromis, signed by the participating states. 
This would state the number of arbitrators to be selected, the extent 
of their powers, the precise questions to be considered, the relevant 
deadlines, etc. Customarily, when there were only two parties to a 
dispute, each side would select two aribtrators from the Court's panel, 
and these four would then select a president or an umpire. Should the 
four be evenly divided on this selection, the choice of umpire would 
be left to a third party selected by agreement among the four arbitra-
tors. If it should prove impossible to reach this agreement, each 
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side would choose a different party, and these two parties would se-
lect an umpire. 16 Obviously, the framers had made an effort to an-
ticipate every contingency. 
Each side was permitted to file a written case together with 
relevant supporting documents and then was permitted to file a 
counter-case. Oral arguments followed, which presented language dif-
ficulties. French was specified as the language of the Court unless 
the parties designated an alternative. After deliberation, the tri-
bunal would announce the decision, and it would then be published by 
the International Bureau. 17 
The effect of these rules of procedure was to provide for George 
Gray those elements of negotiation and deliberation with which he was 
already most familiar. On the one hand, they employed the adversary 
principle of conflicting arguments embodied in cases and counter-cases 
which were analogous to the petitions and claims common to the Ameri-
can judiciary. On the other hand, the presence of oral debate sugges-
ted his experiences as a United States Senator. In addition, there 
was the element of compromise, of which he was a skilled practitioner. 
In short, the abilities and interests of George Gray were especially 
suited to his new role as member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
One other element was also present to which Judge Gray was no 
stranger: controversy. Whereas the Hague Peace Conference had been 
received with less than unanimous approval, it was hardly to be expec-
ted that its creation, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, would do 
otherwise. Not every observer of the recent events at The Hague was 
prepared to endorse this assessment of the Court which appeared in the 
contemporary press: 
This tribunal is undoubtedly the most august tribunal on 
earth; for before it the nations of the world voluntarily 
come to judgment. Its judges are among the most enlight-
ened and distinguished of living jurists and statesmen, 
chosen by the heads of their respective governments be-
cause of their reputations for profound learning, probity 
and high moral character.l8 
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Without impugning the 11 profound learning" or the 11 high moral char-
acter~~ of its members, it was possible to level criticisms, several of 
an obvious nature, against the Court. The first of these was the bla-
tant misnomer by which the tribunal was known. In no sense of the 
words was it permanent, nor was it a court. Its members never met as 
a single body, although there was some suggestion that an inaugural 
assembly might be appropriate. Rather, the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion was a list of qualified and willing jurists from which nations 
were invited to make selection. Most of the names on the list would 
never actually serve as a member of an arbitration tribunal. In fact, 
during the first 33 years of the Court's existence, only 29 of the ap-
proximately 450 names which appeared on the list were called for 
. 19 serv1ce. 
A second fault was the failure of the International Bureau to 
publish the awards in a uniform and consistent style. Manley 0. Hud-
son, Professor of International Law at Harvard University, noted that 
the awards "lack the continuity and consistency which would constitute 
them a body of cumulating jurisprudence, and in some of the cases they 
were not adequately grounded on citations of existing law ... 20 This 
failure was especially troublesome to American and British lawyers, 
who were accustomed to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of jurisprudence based 
on the common law--a tradition which therefore placed a premium on the 
reliability and uniformity of court reports. 
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However, these concerns were secretarial in nature and could be 
corrected without much difficulty. Of greater significance were those 
criticisms directed at the very rationale of the Court. For example, 
in making arbitration more attractive did the framers of the Convention 
really solve an existing problem? Was there any real reason to be-
lieve that the nations of the world had hitherto neglected arbitration 
because there did not already exist a list of willing and qualified 
arbitrators, because there was not already a suitable location to house 
the tribunal, or because the decisions of previous arbitral tribunals 
were not readily available in a uniform style? Of course there was 
no accurate analysis which could provide an answer to these questions. 
On the other hand, even if it were admitted that the detractors were 
right, i.e., that the process of arbitration had never been related to 
its attractiveness, it cannot be denied that the pace of international 
arbitrations rapidly quickened immediately after the formation of the 
Hague Court. Through the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the 
focus of world attention had been directed to the utility of arbitra-
tion, and the various governments were soon taking advantage of the 
opportunity presented to them. 21 
Any evaluation of the efficacy of arbitration as a tool whereby 
to settle international disputes must consider its natural limits. 
From the beginning, its supporters recognized that each nation had 
certain principles which it would never submit to a panel of arbitra-
tors--principles involving concepts of national honor. There was 
never any serious or responsible suggestion that arbitration would 
serve with equal success to remove every international difficulty. 
The Convention recognized arbitration as 11 the most equitable method 
of deciding controversies which have not been settled by diplomatic 
methods. 1122 Governments were not expected readily to submit to ar-
bitration such sensitive issues as boundary disputes, which touched 
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on the question of territorial integrity, nor were such hallowed 
traditions as the Monroe Doctrine expected to be subjected to review. 
On the othell' hand, arbitration was expected to function best in those 
areas in which it had proved most effective in the past--areas related 
to technical questions, to interpretations of treaties, and to the 
resolution of disputes not likely to inflame public opinion. To ad-
mit that arbitration was not suitable for all disputes was not the 
equivalent of admitting that arbitration was not suitable for any 
disputes. There was a clear sphere of international dispute which 
had been effectively served in the past by arbitration, and the forma-
tion of the Hague Court was a positive step to increase its effective-
ness within that sphere. 
Arbitration provided a special form of service the nature of which 
could not always be admitted by the participating states. This refers 
to its usefulenss in providing a government with an escape from an un-
tenable position, thereby saving face abroad and placating its own 
public. At the time of the Alaskan boundary controversy, neither 
Theodore Roosevelt nor his British counterparts could admit that arbi-
tration was being used to permit both to back away from the br.ink of 
confrontation, but later generations would be less hesistant to make 
such a confession. The Boxer Rebellion in China ultimately provided 
another example of the unadmitted influence of arbitration. According 
to The New York Times, in a 1902 article entitled 11 Progress of Inter-
national Arbitration,~~ Russia and the United States had threatened to 
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refer the issue of China's indemnity to the Hague Court and thus had 
moderated the demands leveled by the other Powers. 23 Such unseen 
influences, lacking any form of official acknowledgment, prevent an 
objective measurement of the success of arbitration. 
Arbitration was attractive to many circles not merely because of~ 
its utility to the contemporary world, but because of its potential 
for the future. Whether it was interpreted as the initial step or as 
one of a succession of intermediate steps, several observers saw in 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration the antecedent of a genuine court 
of international justice--a true world court which would base its de-
cisions on a recognized and structured body of international law. 
This expectation provided at the same time both a source of reward and 
frustration. The supporters of the Court recognized that arbitration 
was not a synonym for the practice of law, but rather that arbitrators 
traditionally balanced considerations of law and precedent with consid-
erations of equity. Compromise and conciliation were frequent con-
comitants of arbitral proceedings, a feature which tended to make this 
form of international machinery less rigid than would be a true world 
court of international law. Nevertheless, many of the Court's most 
prominent supporters viewed it as a means to an end, specifically as 
a stepping-stone to a court of international justice. This expectation 
was described in an analysis of the Court which appeared in a 1912 is-
sue of the American Journal of International Law: 
Indeed, arbitration stands midway between self-redress, 
whose excesses it has stayed, and judicial decision, whose 
disinterestedness and impartial determination it fore-
shadowed. Arbitration is, therefore, not an end in it-
self, it is but a means, and marks a stage of transition 
from private lawlessness to public peace.24 
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However worthy the expectation thus applied to the Hague tribunal, 
it was doomed to disappointment primarily because of the difficulty of 
structuring a world court which could reconcile the various distinct 
legal systems prevailing among the different nations of the globe. 
Still, the patience and determination of this group of international 
lawyers would in time be rewarded with the formation of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice as a result of the Versailles Peace Con-
ference. Assessment of the influence of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration upon the development of a true world court must carefully 
consider the published intention of its creators. Regardless of the 
designs for future development which were fostered in many circles, it 
was unfair to evaluate the Court on any basis other than that for which 
it was organized--a specific goal of narrow dimensions which it ad-
mirably met. 25 
Notwithstanding this apologia, it is possible--even appropriate--
to argue that the Permanent Court of Arbitration did indeed facilitate 
the creation of a recognized body of international law as well as a 
tribunal to apply it. It was hardly to be expected that the delegates 
at the 1899 Peace Conference would create a world tribunal of such 
sweeping jurisdiction, fully aware that several governments, including 
that of the United States, would immediately perceive it as a threat 
to sovereignty. The formation of a world court of international law 
could only be achieved through evolution, not through a single stroke. 
Trial and error accompanied by patience would in time demonstrate a 
need for such a tribunal--a need which would be accorded widespread 
recognition. The hesitant efforts of the independent governments to 
define a commodious relationship between sovereignty and international 
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law seemed to some observers to parallel similar efforts among the 
13 American states immediately after the Revolution. Where it could 
not be expected that the states would move immediately from a posi-
tion within the British Empire to a position within a centralized 
American federation, neither could it be expected that the independent 
governments could precipitously construct a world court to apply a 
recognized body of international law. In both situations, an agency 
of transition was required: the Articles of Confederation in the 
one instance, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the other. 
In both situations, a more advanced level was attained in the fullness 
of time; the Federal Constitution and the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice. The analogy is not exact, of course; whereas the 
Articles of Confederation passed out of existence, the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration continued to function. The court of arbitration comple-
mented the court of law, the existence of which it had helped to fa-
cilitate, and the presence of the twin tribunals provided disputants 
with a choice whereby to settle issues peacefully. By either logic--
that of the narrow goal or that of the agency of transition--the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration rendered a valuable service to the cause 
of world peace. Although infrequently used, its existence has contin-
ued into the 1970s. 
As is often the case with irenic institutions, the service was 
neither immediately nor universally recognized. The skepticism which 
attended the 1899- Conference had already appeared justified by the 
failure of the delegates to reach decisions of substance regarding 
disarmament, and it was further reinforced by the outbreak of hostil-
ities between Great Britain and the Boers of South Africa. The 
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delegates had anticipated that a second conference would be called in 
five years, a move endorsed by President Roosevelt, who contemplated 
issuing the call himself. Instead, he deferred in favor of the Czar, 
but Nicholas was forced to delay, since he found it awkward to invite 
the world to a peace conference at the same time that he was waging 
war against Japan and against his own rebelling subjects in 1904 and 
1905. As a consequence, the second Peace Conference did not assemble 
until 1907. Once again it was held at The Hague, and once again it 
was subjected to abuse. As before, much of the criticism was predi-
cated on the fallacy that the delegates were seeking a panacea for the 
ills of the world. Nothing caul d have been further from the truth. 
Although the Conference leaders issued statements reflecting an aware-
ness of the realities of world politics and scrupulously avoided claims 
for the Conference which might be interpreted as utopian folly, the 
Times of London saw fit to denounce the assembly as a sham. To this, 
the Chairman of the American delegation, Joseph H. Choate, replied: 
11 8ecause we did not do everything, the London Times said we did 
nothing. 1126 
Fortunately, the Times was in no sense representative of the gen-
eral response which followed the two Hague conferences and which ap-
praised the work of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Nevertheless, 
the American officials recognized the importance of preventing an un-
justified rise of the public's expectations. Elihu Root, as Secretary 
of State, included a caution in his instruction to the delegates to the 
second Hague Conference: 
The immediate results of such a conference must always be 
limited to a small part of the field which the more sangu-
ine have hoped to see covered; but each successive conference 
will make the positions reached in the preceding confer-
ence its point of departure and • . . as each conference 
will inevitably make further progress by successive steps, 
results may be accomplished which have formerly seemed 
impossible.27 
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This emphasis on the potential rather than the immediate benefits of 
The Hague activities had appeared in earlier statements. In 1901 a 
writer in the Outlook predicted that it would be 11 Clear enough ... 
twenty years hence, that the organization of the first international 
Court of Arbitration was one of the turning-points in the history of 
the race. 1128 A like prediction appeared in The New York Times: 11 The 
Constitution of the Hague Tribunal was an epoch-making event in the 
world's history, and I have faith to believe that it will grow in 
favor and attract more and more attention as the years go by.n 29 This 
latter assessment was made by George Gray, who had previously been 
appointed as one of the original American members of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration and whose experiences in politics, on the bench, 
and in diplomacy, had conditioned him to appraise the Court in real-
istic terms. Although its original scope was narrowly circumscribed, 
the Court was fulfilling its intended responsibility, and its con-
tinued utilization augured well for the future. Here was a project 
which naturally appealed to Judge Gray's irenic sentiments and which 
would receive his fullest support. 
If the Permanent Court of Arbitration were to be judged on the 
basis of the quality of the American appointments, it is difficult to 
see how a higher evaluation could be made. The initial list of four 
appointees reflected the Administration's confidence in the new tri-
bunal as well as its effort to dignify its existence by sending to it 
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American jurists of unimpeachable public record and of undoubted 
competence. In addition to Judge Gray, President McKinley appointed 
in August of 1900, Melville W. Fuller, who had been Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court since 1888, and John W. Griggs, who had served in 
the Cabinet as Attorney-General since 1898. An effort to secure the 
bipartisan participation of two former presidents was unsuccessful. 
Whereas Benjamin Harrison accepted appointment, Grover Cleveland de-
clined, and--as it turned out--the former passed away seven months 
later, in the same year in which President McKinley was assassinated. 
To replace Benjamin Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt appointed Oscar S. 
Straus, who would later serve in his Cabinet and would be named 
Ambassador to Turkey. 30 
The frequency of reappointments lent a degree of stability to the 
American representation and indicated satisfaction with its work. It 
became somewhat customary for the members to be continually reappointed 
and to retain their positions, like federal judges, for life. Of the 
original five members, only John W. Griggs lived beyond the expiration 
of his term of appointment. The second generation of appointments con-
tinued the tradition established by Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt. 
Former Secretary of State Elihu Root received appointment from Presi-
dent Taft as did John Bassett Moore, who was universally regarded as 
the foremost authority on international arbitration. Following the 
First World War, there began a gradual tendency to appoint legal tech-
nicians who possessed unqualified competence but whose names were less 
familiar to the general public. The most notable exception to this 
new pattern was the appointment in 1926 of the former Secretary of 
State, Charles Evans Hughes, to replace Judge Gray. His resignation 
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four years later, upon his appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, demonstrated some of the confusion associated with service at 
The Hague. Although Justice Fuller had served on both courts for a 
period of ten years, Justice Hughes was still inclined to regard the 
two positions as incompatible. Also fearing a conflict of interest, 
the distinguished jurist, Benjamin N. Cardozo, in 1927 declined ap-
pointment 11With a pang of regret ... 31 Another peculiarity which contri-
buted to some confusion was a provision permitting governments to 
appoint citizens of other countries--including Americans--to the Hague 
Court. Accordingly, five American citizens received appointment from 
the King of Siam. 32 
For a year following its creation, the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion languished unused, a period disconcertingly lengthy to its con-
temporary proponents, but of little consequence in retrospect. 
Appropriately, its first case, which was presented in 1902, involved 
a dispute between the United States, which was the foremost champion 
of the institution of arbitration, and Mexico. Known as the Pious 
Fund Case, this settled a relatively minor controversy between the two 
republics. Its resolution not only removed an obstacle to harmonious 
relations between the two neighbors; it demonstrated that the machinery 
of the Hague Court actually worked. The second case was of consider-
ably greater importance, and involved the United States in a difficult 
controversy with several of Europe•s Great Powers. The cause of the 
dispute was the chronic fiscal irresponsibility of Venezuel~.a, which 
had led to the application of military force by three of her creditors, 
Great Britain, Germany, and Italy. In spite of assurances offered by 
the three intervening powers that there was to be no permanent seizure 
of territory, President Roosevelt recognized that the incursions 
were likely to be interpreted by the American public as a challenge 
to the Monroe Doctrine. This accounts for his determined action in 
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pressuring the parties to refer the whole matter to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration--a decision which satisfied the belligerents, 
which encouraged the other creditor nations not involved in the hos-
tilities, and which offered relief to the Venezuelan government. 
While the Court's ultimate decision, which was rendered in 1904, was 
not received with unanimous acclaim, it was clear that its presence 
had helped to alleviate an embroglio which possessed an obvious poten-
tial for escalation. By comparison, the next four cases handled by 
the Hague Court were relatively insignificant, although the disputants 
were not: France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. 33 
The seventh referral provided the Tribunal with its most impor-
tant case and provided George Gray with his most significant experi-
ence as an international arbitrator. For over a century, the United 
States and Great Britain had argued over the fishing rights which were 
to be accorded to Americans off the coasts of Canada and Newfoundland. 
As early as the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of 1783, 
whereby Great Britain recognized the independence of the United States, 
Commissioner John Adams had refused to put his hand to any treaty which 
did not recognize American fishing rights in the northern waters. His 
stance was more than just New England stubbornness; it reflected the 
importance of these rights to the developing prosperity of his region 
of the new republic. Although the British acquiesced, they argued in 
the following century that the rights had been abrogated by the War of 
1812. Once again an Adams accepted the challenge. As commissioner in 
-------- --- --------
Ghent, John Quincy Adams was unable to secure confirmation of the 
American rights and had to accept a treaty which made no mention of 
the issue. A few years later, however, as Secretary of State, he 
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was more successful in concluding the Treaty of London of 1818. In 
return for the American renunciation of the right to fish in other 
territorial waters, Britain specified in Article I the coasts along 
which American rights would be recognized. American vessels were to 
be permitted to enter the restricted areas to secure shelter, to make 
repairs, and to provision with wood and water, but for no other pur-
pose. These rights were also addressed by the Anglo-American Treaty 
of 1871, and when it expired the terms of the 1818 Treaty again 
prevailed. 
But since the captains of the vessels were not well versed in 
the intricacies of international law, it was hardly surprising that 
the northern waters became the scene of difficulties of expanding pro-
portions. The local governments harassed the Americans with tedious 
police regulations, and the populace refused to sell bait and supplies. 
Transshipment of cargo was also interrupted, and American entry was 
denied into certain bays which the United States had always considered 
part of the high seas. Confiscations and a mounting number of pro-
tests threatened to disrupt the Anglo-American harmony only recently 
achieved by the definition of the Alaskan boundary, and both govern-
ments readily recognized the opportunity presented by arbitration. 
The details of the arbitration were specified in the compromis, 
which was signed in January, 1909, under the authority of a general 
Anglo-American treaty of arbitration which was less than a year old. 
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Accordingly, seven specific questions were to be decided by a tribunal 
composed of members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The selec-
tion of the five arbitrators, made jointly by the British Ambassador 
in Washington and Elihu Root, who would soon resign as Secretary of 
State, included one Canadian, three citizens of neutral nations, and 
one American, George Gray. Since all five spoke English, the partici-
pants anticipated that no language problems would be present. It is 
doubtful, however, that they anticipated the huge quantity of material 
which would be presented for their consideration. Each side, prior 
to the opening of the hearings, had amassed impressive collections of 
documents, consisting largely of treaties, court decisions, correspon-
dence between government officials, analyses by venerated authorities, 
maps, charts, statistics of commercial fishing activities, police reg-
ulations, ordinances, statutes, etc. The great body of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence was treated as a single entity with the result that both 
sets of counsel freely cited authority without regard to nationality. 
This caused one member of the American counsel to complain that both 
sides quoted Hugo Grotius and every writer since. 34 
The dimensions of the written arguments were paralleled by the 
oral presentations. The opening statement presented by the British 
counsel, which numbered 16 members, consumed two weeks, a feat dupli-
cated by the slightly less numerous American counsel. Because the 
regular quarters of the Court were inadequate for a proceeding of such 
vast proportions, the host government prepared alternate facilities 
at The Hague's Hall of the Knights. There, over a period of ten weeks, 
the public was invited to witness the representatives of two powerful 
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and proud nations as they demonstrated the practical utility of arbi-
tration in the resolution of a serious dispute. 
The sessions were held.each morning and afternoon, four days each 
week, and consisted of arguments offered by three members of the Bri-
tish counsel who alternated with three members of the American counsel. 
The presentations, of necessity, were tedious and technical, and ex-
tended in scope from the great theories of international relations to 
the subtle nuances of a specific word appearing in an aged document. 
Any one of the arbitrators could have been forgiven if he had allowed 
his mind to wander during the presentations, and doubtless each was oc-
casionally guilty of inattention. Nevertheless, the printed transcripts 
of the oral arguments, which run to over 5000 typewritten pages, re-
veal an incredible performance of attentive and enlightened interest 
on the part of one of the arbitrators. More than any other member of 
the panel--even more than the Persident of the Tribunal--George Gray 
was actively involved in the deliberations, and none of the six indi-
vidual arguments escaped his scrutiny. Of Sir George Finlay he in-
quired as to the contents of a letter which was being cited as evidence, 
he helped the counsel to locate a specific page in a report being used 
as reference, and he discussed with him the distinctions between inter-
national law and municipal law. Of the American counsel, George 
Turner, Judge Gray inquired as to the corporate nature of the United 
States under its two constitutions, and asked for the details of Can-
ada's right to police her own waters and the alleged abuses of that 
right. Of Sir James Winter, Judge Gray asked for a clarification of 
some fine points of geography and inquired about the meaning of a 
statute which appeared to favor Canadian fishermen. Of the American 
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counsel, Charles B. Warren, Judge Gray asked for additional clarifica-
tions of points of geography and for the distinctions between terri-
torial bays and high seas. Of the British counsel, John S. Ewart, 
Judge Gray inquired as to the thoroughness of a document which had 
been introduced and asked for an explanation of a memorandum written 
by Daniel Webster. Of the American counsel, Samuel J. Elder, Judge 
Gray asked for details regarding the alleged right of the American 
fishermen to purchase bait and to hire Canadian citizens. Of Sir 
William Robson, Judge Gray inquired as to the existence of interna-
tional servitudes and the nature of sovereignty and easements. Of 
the American counsel, Elihu Root, Judge Gray inquired as to the mean-
ing of a conveyance made in perpetuity and discussed with him the 
Newfoundland Act of 1862. 35 
As the hearings reached the halfway point, a.letter from the Judge 
to his son William reflected something of the author's weariness: 
Do write often, as I am getting very weary of this pro-
longed stay at the Hague. I have no prospect of any holi-
day. The arguments will not conclude before August 7th 
and it will take more than a month to get thro with our 
conferences and formulate our decisions. 
Although it was the middle of the summer, it was also Holland and not 
Delaware. The cool damp climate and a "regulation" cold which had 
kept him confined to bed for a day, were included in. his list of dif-
ficulties. Although he had played golf three times, it had been two 
weeks since his last game. It was an efficient survey of complaints, 
but it only has meaning when it is recalled that the writer had just 
recently celebrated his 70th birthday. 36 
At length, the Tribunal awarded its decisions and published its 
proceedings in 12 volumes--described by Professor Bemis as .. a textbook 
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for the student of international law. 11 The two most important ques-
tions, including the definition to be applied to determine whether a 
bay is part of the high seas, were decided against the United States; 
the other five favored the American position. On a higher plane, of 
course, the decision was a victory for both nations, for the status 
of arbitration, and for the members of the Court. In writing of the 
details of the entire procedure, one member of the American counsel 
concluded: 11 It would be difficult not to pay tribute to the learning 
and industry of the tribunal. Each one of the arbitrators has justi-
fied his high repute in the field of international jurisprudence. 1137 
Even before the Hague Tribunal achieved the heights of the North 
Atlantic Fisheries decision, its influence was manifest in other 
areas of international relations. The success of institutionalized 
arbitration spawned related projects which were likely to attract the 
attention and support of George Gray, and one of these was the attempt 
to conclude a series of bilateral arbitration treaties. Because of 
the Senate's perpetual reluctance to commit the United States in ad-
vance to a particular course of action and thereby to lose a measure 
of its control over foreign policy, the campaign to secure approval 
of the treaties extended over several years and occupied the atten-
tion of Secretary Hay and his successor, Elihu Root. During the elec-
tion campaign of 1904, amidst the customary partisan debate over 
domestic and foreign issues, Judge Gray was able to view the first of 
these proposed treaties--with Great Britain--from a perspective su-
perior to that of the typical politician, and therefore he was able 
to contribute his support to what was essentially a project of the 
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Republican administration. Two addresses especially reveal his con-
tinuing confidence in the role to be played by arbitration with Great 
Britain. In June, 1904, he spoke of the beneficial influence the 
treaty would have on the rest of the world: 
What imagination is not kindled, what heart does not glow, 
at the thought of an arbitral agreement between the two 
great English-speaking nations of the world. Too powerful 
to be animated by any other motive than a brave and worthy 
one, the moral effect of their agreement in such a treaty 
could not fail to advance the cause Qf international arbi-
tration to a world-wide acceptance.3~ 
Following President Roosevelt's triumph in the November election, the 
treaty proponents organized a rally at Carnegie Hall to demonstrate 
to a reluctant Senate the extent of public support. Mayor McClellan 
presided, and Judge Gray was scheduled to be a featured speaker, but 
his turn at the rostrum did not come until after Archbishop Ireland's. 
After greeting the prelate with hearty applause, the audience appar-
ently found his remarks too generous in quantity. A voice shouted, 
"For heaven's sake, give somebody else a chance!" Another concurred 
with "amen." From the first row: "Time! Time! 11 Fortunately for 
the remainder of the program, the Archbishop took the hint. "I will 
retire, 11 he replied, "thanking your for your implied promise of fur-
ther indulgence." He was followed by Judge Gray, who spoke of the 
importance of the Hague Tribunal and--most significantly, considering 
the mood of his listeners--of courage: 
I do not fear that the courage of manhood is going to die 
out in this generation, but I do believe that courage and 
true manhood will die out in this land, and every other 
land, if we oppose that progress of humanity and of civil-
ization which is marked so significantly by the establish-
ment of the permanent court of arbitration at The Hague.39 
Although the general arbitration treaties with Great Britain 
were finally approved in 1908, President Taft's effort to secure a 
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later series was unsuccessful, because it would have deprived the 
Senate of the right to approve the compromis preceding an arbitration. 
With the Democratic victory in 1912, similar efforts were renewed in 
the form of the so-called Bryan "cooling-off" treaties, which were 
approved by the Senate but were never invoked. For the supporters of 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the path of least 
resistance appeared to lie in other directions, specifically in the 
direction of a world court of international law. Although several 
schemes were advanced and although the project had supporters in every 
major nation, the difficulty of providing representation for each of 
the world's legal systems proved insurmountable until the general 
readjustment of international society which followed the First World 
War. Appropriately, it was the American statesman, Elihu Root, who 
proposed the formula which made the World Court a reality. 40 
The formation of the new tribunal in 1921, formally entitled 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and bearing the sobriquet 
of the "World Court," called into question the continued existence of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Because of the distinctions be-
tween jurisprudence and diplomacy, the decision was early reached 
that the older body should be retained, and, in accordance with this 
consensus, the League of Nations defeated an attempt by Argentina to 
dissolve the arbitration tribunal. The wisdom of this course of ac-
tion was confirmed by experience, as the passage of time demonstrated 
that the two courts were complementary, not competitive. Both were 
housed in Carnegie's Peace Palace at The Hague, permitting the repre-
sentative of a disputing nation literally to make his selection while 
standing in the entrance--a turn to the right for the World Court, a 
turn to the left for the Court of Arbitration. Each state was free 
to select the machinery best suited to its particular grievance, a 
recognition of the truism that there was no universal solution for 
all international disputes. "Law fares rather badly in diplomacy," 
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observed one writer. "It seeks to correct human weaknesses; diplomacy 
accoll1ll0dates them • ..4l 
The two courts were associated in another manner. Members of the 
World Court were to be nominated by the national groups of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, with a special arrangement for those na-
tions not participating in the latter body. The nominations were then 
submitted to the General Assembly and the Council of the League of 
Nations, a process which permitted participation by the smaller na-
tions. The first opportunity for the American contingent of arbitra-
tors to exercise this function arrived in 1921, and appropriate 
invitations were sent to Elihu Root, Oscar Straus, John Bassett Moore, 
and George Gray. Collectively, they were permitted to nominate a 
total of four candidates, no more than two of whom could be Americans, 
and Judge Gray indicated that the invitation would be welcomed: 
I do not see how the United States, the wealthiest, the 
most powerful and most influential nation in the world, 
can stand aside and not participate in the deliberations 
of the nations of the world that are trying to prevent 
war as a method of settling international disputes.42 
However, complications immediately arose. Since the United States 
had only recently rejected membership in the League and had refused to 
adhere to the document establishing the World Court, it was not clear 
if the invitation to submit nominations could or should be accepted. 
As an act of courtesy, the League's Secretary-General had sent the in-
vitations to the Department of State, with the request that they be 
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forwarded to the individuals concerned. Whether by deliberate intent 
or by bureaucratic inefficiency, the invitations disappeared, and the 
State Department came under fire for treating the League contemptu-
ously. The invitations were eventually located in the office of Sec-
retary Charles Evans Hughes and were tardily delivered. Nevertheless, 
Secretary Hughes maintained that he was not responsible for the delay, 
and he emphasized his innocence by banishing a Department official to 
a post in Egypt. 
In the meantime, the Secretary-General, having learned that the 
messages had not been delivered, cabled a second invitation directly 
to the four arbitrators. 43 The four judges convened in New York City 
at the Bar Association and made their selections, but they hesitated 
to go further until they had consulted with Secretary Hughes. To this 
end, Root journeyed to Washington only to learn that the Secretary 
felt 11 it would be distasteful to the Administration to have the 
nominations made. 1144 Secretary Hughes explained his position the 
following year: 11 The point was that the American Judges had been ap-
pointed under another treaty to which the United States was not a 
party. 1145 The four judges respected the Administration's wishes, but 
only with reluctance and, as Judge Gray suggested in a letter to Elihu 
Root, with a suspicion regarding its real motives: 
•.. This interpretation of the Administration is most un-
fortunate and will subject it to a criticism, whether just 
or not, that will be embarrassing. It will certainly be 
viewed by a large number of our people as evidence that 
their country has been prevented by partisan and personal 
consideration from giving its sympathy to a hopeful effort 
to attain an object which the good and intelligent the 
world over have so long desired.46 
Of the four judges, John Bassett Moore was the least inclined 
to be influenced by the Administration's position. Having been 
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nominated to the World Court by another national group, he sent his 
acceptance to Geneva before he notified Washington. His candidacy was 
successful, and thus a single American citizen secured election to the 
original Permanent Court of International Justice in spite of the dis-
couragement of his own government. 47 
The potential for a repetition of this awkward sequence of events 
occurred two years later when the League again invited the judges of 
the arbitration tribunal to nominate candidates to fill a vacancy on 
the World Court. This time, however, the parties involved were better 
prepared, and the four judges were permitted to submit their nomina-
tion, which was ultimately accepted by the League, without hindrance 
from Washington. Although every president from 1923 to World War II 
recommended that the United States should adhere to the World Court, 
the Senate consistently refused to vote its approval. This did not 
prevent participation of individual citizens, however, and several 
prominent American jurists served with distinction--most notably, 
John Bassett Moore, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley 0. Hudson--most 
ironically, Charles Evans Hughes. 48 A long-time supporter of the 
concept of a genuine international court of law, George Gray, now in 
his eighties, could not be considered for membership. 
As a result of the general restructuring of international society 
which followed World War II, the World Court was renamed the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and became associated with the United Nations. 
The American response to internationalism had also undergone a re-
structuring. The United States had taken a prominent role in the cre-
ation of the United Nations and its adjunct agencies, and the Senate 
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readily approved American participation. 49 The ease with which adher-
ence was obtained contrasted sharply with the debates of the previous 
generation and appeared to many as a revolution in Washington's for-
eign policy. But America's new role as active leader in world affairs 
resulted more from evolution than from a revolution. The interna-
tionalism of the 1940's reflected the debate and experimentation which 
extended back through several decades. Throughout the evolutionary 
period, intertwined with the tedious details of policy formulation, 
and positioned midway between the extreme predictions of world calamity 
and world comity, was the figure of George Gray. Having advanced to 
an age which would have more than justified idle retirement, he contin-
ued to exercise his influence in the interest of peace. His work in 
behalf of arbitration and his support of the League of Nations and 
the World Court were conducted without hope of personal gain. With 
his political career behind him and having retired from the bench of 
the Circuit Court in 1914, he continued his efforts to influence the 
foreign policy of his government so as to reduce the causes of war. 
Even the presence of two world wars and of a host of smaller conflicts 
cannot invalidate the verdict that it was a worthy labor. 
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to the World Court, see William I. Hull, "The Permanent Court of 
International Justice as an American Proposition," The Annals 147 
(July 1924), pp. 147-49; Edwin L. James, "Butler Decries League to 
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French, 11 The New York Times, 4 January 1921, p. 3. Examples of the 
debate in the contemporary press are The New York Times, 6 December 
1923, p. 7; 19 January 1924, p. 11; 23 May 1924, pp. 1 and 4; 3 April 
1925, p. 13; 10 May 1925, pp. 1 and 16; 6 June 1925, p. 15; 4 October 
·1925, p. 27; editorial of 5 October 1925, p. 20. The debate at-
tracted the participation of future president Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
11 0ur Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 6 (July 1928), pp. 581-82. In 
1926, the Senate did approve a resolution of adherence, but attached 
so many reservations that it failed to have effect: see Meyer, 11 Dif-
ferences between the Two World Courts," p. 629. 
49Technical comment relevant to international jurisprudence follow-
ing World War II is represented by three articles by Kenneth S. Carl-
ston, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois, all in the 
American Journal of International Law: "Procedural Problems in In-
ternational ARbitration, 11 39 (July 1945), pp. 426-49; "Codification 
of International Arbitral Procedure, .. 47 (April 1953), pp. 203-50; 
11 0raft Convention on Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Com-
mission," 48 {April 1954), pp. 296-99. Criticisms of arbitration, 
especially of procedure, are represented by J. H. Ralston, The Law 
and Procedure of International Tribunals (Stanford University: Stan-
ford University Press, 1926), pp. 191-213; M. 0. Hudson, International 
Tribunals: Past and Future (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and Brookings Institution, 1944), pp. 84-98; 
Frederick Kenelm Nielsen, International Law as Applied to Reclamations, 
Mainl in Cases between the United States and Mexico (Washington: 
J. Byrne & Company, 1933 , pp. 67-69, 72-74; all cited by Carlston, 
11 Procedural Problems," p. 426, n.3. Technical and detailed compari-
sons are provided by William D. Coplin and J. Martin Rochester, 11 Per-
manent Court of International Justice, the International Court of 
Justice, the League of Nations and the United Nations: A Comparative 
Empirical Survey," American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972), 
pp. 529-50. In recent years, use of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion has greatly declined; see 11 Permanent Court of Arbitration: 
Circular Note of the Secretary General, American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 54 (October 1960), pp. 933-41. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The advance of civilization is not by leaps and bounds, 
and we have reasons for encouragement if we make a 
measurable advance in the right direction. 
George Gray 
George Gray•s irenic diplomacy was as multifarious as the oppor-
tunities for its application would permit. Beginning with his service 
on the Joint High Commission in Quebec, and continuing through the 
Paris Peace Conference, the Dominican arbitration, the North Atlantic 
Fisheries arbitration, the Mexican-American Commission, the Pan-
American Scientific Congress, the Anglo-American International Commis-
sion for the Advancement of Peace, the Lake Mohank Conferences, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American National Red 
Cross, the Smithsonian Institution, and the American Society of In-
ternational Law, he demonstrated the considerable diversity of his 
efforts and his willingness to work with any institution which could 
contribute to world peace. As a senator, as a federal judge, and as 
a private citizen he was able to apply a diplomacy which associated 
the qualities of a career diplomat with those of a scholar and which 
therefore brought to the level of application an unusual combination 
of pragmatism and acumen. 
George Gray•s diplomacy, though varied, maintained a fixed des-
tination regardless of the path chosen. The roads to peace were 
scattered, poorly marked, and characterized at every turn by detours 
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and dead ends. But if one road failed to advance the cause suffi-
ciently, there was always another and another, and they all led, some 
directly and some indirectly, in the same direction--towards peace. 
Proliferation of effort and fixity of purpose were but two of 
the qualities characterizing George Gray's irenic diplomacy. A third 
was practicality--a consciousness of limitations. As a successful 
politician and a respected judge, he could not allow himself the com-
forts of visionary excesses. Since he cherished no illusion that he 
was reforming the world, he could avoid the sense of crushing failure. 
Comparison with the tragic conclusion of Woodrow Wilson's career is 
inescapable. Never more evident than at the Paris Peace Conference, 
where he recognized the futility and the danger of opposing the im-
perialists, George Gray's sense of pragmatism prevailed. Here was 
recognition that compromise had its proper place; here was the ful-
fillment of the familiar prayer, in which the supplicant asks for 
the strength to change what he can, the patience to accept what he can-
not change, and the wisdom to know the difference. 1 
At the same time, this occasion also demonstrated yet another 
quality, his perspicacity. While others about him were predicting 
untold national wealth as a consequence of the acquisition of the 
Philippines, he anticipated losses: expenditures in behalf of the 
welfare of the Filipinos, appropriations to support an expanded mili-
tary force, and bloody resistance to American rule. His support of 
arbitration was always tempered by the hope that it would move the 
world to a higher level of international cooperation--for example, to 
a World Court, a League of Nations. His support of these institutions 
was similarly inspired by the hope that they too would be but steps 
upward on the ladder of international cooperation. 2 
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George Gray•s diplomacy--varied in its application, fixed in its 
direction, practical, and realistic--was a plea for moderation in an 
immoderate era. Swept along by the enthusiasm which followed the suc-
cessful war with Spain, the Republic applied a foreign policy more 
internationalist than ever before. But it was the imperialist var-
iety, not the irenic; it was the policy of expansionism, of Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, rather than of George Gray. Another 
generation would pass before American foreign policy acquired the ma-
turity of restraint which George Gray counseled. In time, the expan-
sionist urge would wane, the Filipinos would receive their independence, 
and American foreign policy would be marked by a greater commitment to 
the irenic settlement of international disputes. 
Americans who were slow to recognize the merits of irenic interna-
tionalism showed less reluctance in accepting the merits of its chief 
advocate. Of all his contemporaries, it is doubtful if anyone at his 
level of public service could command the public trust to the extent 
that George Gray did. As a politician he had opponents; as a lawyer 
he had adversaries; but as an irenic diplomat he had no enemies. His 
magnanimity was compared to Lincoln•s and accounts for his remarkable 
success in dealing with the broadest range of public officials--such 
as the series of presidents, Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, 
Wilson. If a common cause in the interests of peace could be attained, 
party labels and class distinctions evaporated. In the tradition of 
George Washington, George Gray could rise above partisan considerations 
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and could move comfortably and freely in a rarefied atmosphere known 
only to a few in the nation's history. 
The immense popularity of George Gray in his own time and the 
high regard in which he was held by his contemporaries provide a 
peculiar contrast to the later obscurity of his name. Skeptical of 
the contribution of any figure not associated with high political of-
fice, the student of a later generation may hesitate to accord to 
George Gray the full credit which he merits. To be sure, his public 
career, brilliant and productive as it was, was also that of a human 
being, and there were occasions, rare indeed, when his behavior was 
a disappointment to his admirers. His impatience toward his col-
leagues during the difficult days in Paris is an obvious example. 
Of equal certainty, there were contemporaries whose respect was 
guarded. For them, George Gray's courage and steadfastness were bet-
ter described as stubbornness; his ability to discontinue futile re-
sistance and to capitalize from reverses they felt was indecision. 
His integrity, however, they would concede. Undoubtedly, most of 
George Gray's contemporaries formed a well-balanced picture of him, 
and only a few of his supporters would ascribe to him the capacity 
for walking on water. What is of importance here is that his de-
tractors would be likely to concede the same talent, though with the 
qualification that it probably meant he could not swim. In writing 
a multivolumed history of the state of Delaware, a contemporary his-
torian reached this conclusion: 
Could the verdict of all classes within the borders of 
the Diamond State irrespective of party affiliations be 
had, a consensus of opinion would undoubtedly nominate 
George Gray to the post of honor of Delaware's first 
living citizen."3 
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The generation of George Gray was crowded with giants of American 
history, and the historian who is attracted to the drama and sweep of 
these commanding figures can easily be forgiven for passing over per-
sonalities of a reticent nature. The attention of the student, whether 
lay or professional, is more often attracted by the blustering per-
sonality of Theodore Roosevelt with his Rough Riders and his African 
safari, by Henry Cabot Lodge with his New England efficiency and aloof-
ness, by William McKinley with his Midwestern affability and tragic 
demise, by Woodrow Wilson with his League of Nations, and by John Hay 
with his splendid little war. All of these, as well as William Jen-
nings Bryan, William Howard Taft, and Andrew Carnegie, have been so 
exhaustively treated that they appear as stereotypes to the general 
public. The historian's craft, when properly applied, will go beyond 
these towering names to others of equal merit and, in doing so, will 
contribute to the image of the obscure without detracting from that of 
the famous. 
If, in recounting the life and career of George Gray, the result 
takes on a hagiographical appearance, it is a natural consequence the 
appropriateness of which is accorded nearly unanimous recognition. 
Although there are many selections from which to choose, the follow-
ing excerpt, written by a historian shortly after George Gray's death, 
is atypical only because of its eloquence: 
The modesty with which he bore his honors, his untiring 
helpfulness to his fellow-men, his forgiving disposition, 
the gentleness as well as justice of his judgments and 
estimates of others, the courage which which he followed 
his convictions,the purity of his private and public life, 
and all the qualities which were his and which are tribu-
tary to the character of a gentleman, have left the im-
press of his character and personality upon the history 
and people of his generation.4 
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As he announced his retirement, effective June 1, 1914, George 
Gray could look forward to days of comparative ease. He would return 
to the Wilmington law firm ofWard, Gray, and Neary, of which his son 
Andrew was a member, and of which he had also been a senior member 
15 years earlier, prior to his appointment to the bench. Now in his 
74th year, with the active years of his public service behind him, 
he could enjoy a leisurely schedule of correspondence interrupted with 
an occasional speaking engagement. With friends and colleagues he 
could reminisce at length about the days in Congress or diplomatic 
activities abroad. 5 
It was a reasonable expectation, of course, but it was not to be 
reality. The year 1914 was not good for irenic diplomats. George 
Gray was called to serve as a delegate to the 1915 Pan-American Sci-
entific Congress and again in 1916 to serve on the Mexican-American 
Commission. In addition, he continued his active participation in 
several of those organizations which he had served before his retire-
ment. Hence, the next ll years were but an extension of his earlier 
personal life. 11 • • • Still straight as an arrow, 11 and unbent by the 
weight of time, he combined 11 ••• with the dignity that is always 
becoming to a leader of men a human sympathy that makes him a delight-
ful companion. 116 He continued his law practice until the night of 
January 2, 1925, when he was stricken with a severe chill while at 
his office. A general physical breakdown followed and even pneumonia 
threatened for a while. The public was informed on January 30 that 
there was practically no hope, and that the doctors feared he would 
not last another night. 7 But he did--in fact, he lived for several 
months. His strength, the result of a lifetime of good health habits, 
began slowly to return, and he was able to move about the house, to 
receive visitors, and to take car trips. 
It was, as he must have known, only a temporary reprieve. The 
end came late in the afternoon of Friday, August 7. Wilmington's 
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Mayor Forrest ordered the flags to be flown at half-mast for a week, 
and all business activities were suspended during the funeral services 
on the following Monday. In keeping with his lifestyle, the services, 
attended by a capacity crowd, were conducted with simplicity. A 
private interment followed at New Castle, where he was laid to rest 
next to the two sisters who had shared his life. 8 
The New York Times, which had consistently s~pported the career 
and aspirations of George Gray, provided him with a eulogy which 
stands in stark relief next to the coarse image usually associated 
with metropolitan journalism: 
There are a hundred noisier names. George Gray never 
reached, outside of the Senate, any shining permanent 
place to concentrate upon him the minds of his country-
men. We should not forget, however, that before he ab-
sorbed himself in those judicial duties, official and 
extra-official, which best correspond to his impartial 
mind and intellectual habit, he was, for fourteen years, 
one of the glories of a Senate rich in illustrious 
names that haven't faded. He knew much more than the 
law. . . • Devoid of rhetoric, he had the authority of 
reason. . • • 
If we lose in him perhaps the last notable, if not 
popular, figure of Mr. Cleveland's time, we keep through 
him faith in that nobler citizenship, that unselfish, un-
advertised high public service, which is the guarantee 
of the continuation of the American polity. These things 
trans~end infinitely political notoriety and bill-
boarding.9 
Younger and stronger hands would take up George Gray's unfinished 
work, a continuation of a tradition that stretched back through hun-
dreds of generations--through thousands of years--through all nations--
through all races and classes of men--to the vision of Isaiah: II 
And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears 
into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, 
neither shall they learn war any more. 11 
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ENDNOTES 
1Especially indicative of George Gray's balanced view toward the 
effectiveness of irenic institutions was his reply to a query regard-
ing the likelihood for universal peace, posed by a popular monthly; 
although most of the replies reflected cautious optimism, galimatias 
was also present. Other prominent respondents included Woodrow Wil-
son, Charles W. Eliot, Oscar Straus, and John W. Foster; see 11 Pros-
pects for Permanent Peace, .. pp. 157-64. 
2For George Gray's support of the League of Nations, see The New 
York Times, 10 January 1920, p. 2, and 16 June 1920, p. 2. 
3Henry C. Conrad, History of the State of Delaware, 3 vols. 
(Wilmington, Del.: published by the author, 1908), 3, p. 1009. 
4sevan, History of Delaware, 3, p. 198. 
5The announcement of Judge Gray's retirement appeared in The New 
York Times, 24 March 1914, p. 3. A message of appreciation from Pres-
ident Wilson was reprinted in The New York Times, 30 May 1914, p. 10. 
6Abbott, 11 Little Delaware, .. p. 529. 
7The New York Times, 30 January 1925, p. 17. For related com-
ment, see the following issues: 22 January 1925, p. 19, and 24 Jan-
uary 1925, p. 13. 
8Ibid., 6 August 1925, p. 19; 7 August 1925, p. 15; 8 August 
1925, p. 11 , and 11 August 1925, p. 21 • 
9Ibid., 9 August 1925, sec. 2, p. 2. Also see 11 George Gray of 
Delaware, .. Outlook, p. 545. 
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